2024

SCHWARZ

CYBER SECURITY REPORT

Preface

State-sponsored crime holds sway over cyberspace – and what are you planning to do?

For two years now, war has been raging on Europes doorstep. The threat however doesn't exist only on the ground or in the skies. Every day cyberattacks threaten our core values of freedom and democracy. Authoritarian states are engaging in espionage and sabotage. Terrorists are targeting civilian security systems. Criminals are offering their services to state-sponsored organizations, effectively penetrating highly sensitive areas. Their overriding intentions are clear: spreading disinformation, causing division and weakening our society. Endangering our domestic and international security. Inflicting lasting damage on our infrastructure and supply chains. Harming economic profits.

In our extensively connected world, cybercrime affects every citizen, every company, every administration and every single country. Attacks strike individuals in all sectors and fields of activity. Our geopolitical, economic and technological interconnectedness is under targeted attack. Yet far too many of us are still lulled into a false sense of security. You believe you're not big enough or important enough, or even that you're somehow invisible to the attackers. It's always others that are targeted and fall victim to cybercriminals – not yourself, your own company, your own organization. However, real-world experience has repeatedly shown that by the time you realize how serious the situation is, it's usually too late. A hard lesson which comes at a high price. Hybrid threats are a real danger – 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

It has never been more important to constantly monitor the threat landscape and put effective protection mechanisms in place. A proactive security strategy is an essential topic for the agendas of every executive or supervisory board. Another key aspect is to constantly learn about new technologies and continue developing them in line with our liberal, democratic values. Artificial intelligence (AI) already offers a wide range of benefits, but also accelerates the battle for sovereignty in the cyber space. Combining AI models with quantum computing, for instance, has enormous potential. At the same time, we find ourselves confronted with totally new challenges.

As a society, we can only overcome these challenges if we share our experiences, foster knowledge and resilience, and constantly strive to promote research and education. Failing that, the resulting "cyber skills gap" threatens to cause a downward spiral of lacking protection and a shortage of skilled staff. In this year's Cyber Security Report, we consider how to generate and sustain enthusiasm for the field of cybersecurity. Lifelong learning is the cornerstone on which sustainable cybersecurity can be built.

Just as crucial as training and education is the mental strength required to deal with crisis situations. In contrast to the financial damage incurred, the psychological impact of cybercrime is extremely difficult to assess and rarely the subject of public discussion. Yet only when problems are brought out into the open, can we strengthen our resilience against cybercrime. That's why, in this year's report, we take a closer look at what happens to the people impacted by a cyber incident.

The systems employed by cybercriminals are becoming more professional at a remarkable pace across the globe and at the highest levels – geopolitically, technologically and economically.

Guard against falling into a false sense of security – it would be misguided and could have fatal consequences.

Gerd Chrzanowski
General Partner Schwarz Gruppe

Executive Summary

Cybersecurity is a topic which perennially belongs at executive board level and on every supervisory board's agenda.

Rapid and interdependent geopolitical, economic and technological developments are pushing individuals and organizations to their utmost limits. Decision makers have a big role to play in ensuring their organizations have the necessary resilience to withstand cyberattacks and other crises.

This report aims to provide a wide range of insights and practical recommendations for executives and leaders in business, government administration and politics – irrespective of their prior knowledge, scope of tasks or responsibility for making decisions.

Core aspects of the current cybersecurity situation are the damages incurred, geopolitical developments, cybercrime ecosystems, as well as staffing and budgetary issues. The motives and methods employed by attackers are also examined. While the activities of cybercriminals are becoming ever more professional, they are also competing with each other for fame and to recruit the best minds in the global underworld. This report clearly shows why hackers have repeatedly succeeded in gaining access to well-protected organizational networks and achieving their predominantly financial goals. Nevertheless, it also shows that criminal prosecution can be achieved.

In compiling this report, a wide range of data and analyses were combined. Drawing on expert knowledge, a comparative analysis of national and international reports by authorities, scientists and IT security companies published between June 2023 and March 2024 was carried out. These cover a broad variety of topics, methods and data. The report also includes a practical, non-legal classification of selected regulatory trends.

To gain a better understanding of the hackers' approach once they have penetrated an organization, anonymized data sets from 2023 pertaining to XM Cyber's customers from various sectors were analysed by independent experts. In addition to the technical dimension of measuring exposures in hybrid IT environments, 300 IT security decision-makers were surveyed as part of a representative study in the UK and the USA regarding how they deal with various exposures.

The key issue of artificial intelligence will continue to be of concern and interest to the public and decision-makers. All the more important, then, to classify AI realistically within the context of cybersecurity based on the latest research and practical use cases. Large language models are the knowledge repositories of the future and can also be targeted in attacks. The same applies to quantum computing which, contrary to widespread opinion, does not pose a threat to all encryption methods.

On the other hand, the psychological impact of cybercrime on those responsible for cybersecurity at companies is largely unknown. It is seldom discussed in public, and hardly any research findings are available. Leveraging a fictitious cyberattack as an example, and transferring knowledge from relevant scientific fields, the inner life of specialist staff and decision-makers is examined – before, during and after a cyberattack.

This year's Cyber Security Report also takes a closer look at the options available to study for bachelor's and master's degrees in cybersecurity at 285 universities in 33 countries in Europe, the USA and Israel. They are supplemented by numerous qualification courses and new EU programmes, such as the Cybersecurity Skills Academy, which are intended to address the shortage of cybersecurity specialists.

The total amount of damage caused by cybercrime in Germany is estimated to have risen to €206 billion in 2023. Globally, the damages are expected to grow to around €10 trillion by 2025. By way of comparison, natural disasters caused €230 billion in damages over the same period. Russia, North Korea, China and Iran are often pulling the strings, as well as engaging in disinformation campaigns. A campaign of attacks is especially expected in connection with the upcoming presidential elections in the USA.

One out of ten companies around the globe has been impacted by ransomware. No industry is spared – not even MGM's casinos and hotels, which suffered a total loss of US $100 million within 10 days in September 2023. That was well above the global average of €5 million, or indeed the €2.5 million the district of Anhalt-Bitterfeld was forced to pay following a ransomware attack. In Germany, at least one public or private sector organization is affected by ransomware every day. It used to take more than 30 days for attackers to steal data and encrypt entire systems – now it takes hours. What's more, around 15 million new varieties of malware appear every month.

However, successful operations conducted by law enforcement agencies in 2023 managed to dismantle attacker infrastructures, reducing the lifespan of ransomware groups such as "LockBit" from 150 to around 75 days. The involvement of law enforcement units can also reduce the cost of a ransomware attack by 10%. Law enforcement agencies are up against professional organizations, often sponsored by state actors. Cybercriminal gangs consist of up to 100 direct members with various tasks and responsibilities, supported by an extensive network of partners.

The launch pad for ransomware attacks remains a successful social engineering campaign – phishing, smishing, vishing – carried out by other protagonists in the cybercrime ecosystem who can be hired for less than €15 a day. With 5 million attacks recorded worldwide, phishing emails reached a new dimension. Remarkably, 66% of all spam mails in Germany now contain malicious elements, and even two-factor authentication can be circumvented.

The theft of data is closely related to social engineering. It affects both organizations and individuals. The opportunities provided by large language models have provided scammers with new ways to enhance their results. Mainly due to misconfiguration of cloud services, there is simultaneously a trend towards data breaches from these environments. Automatically and hidden from view, infostealer botnets supply cybercriminals with access data for email accounts or crypto wallets, which can be acquired in an "Access-as-a-Service" model using cryptocurrencies. Over 3,200 incidents (+77%) of data theft are known to have occurred around the world, affecting more than 350 million people in 2023. Virtually no company in Germany can claim that it has never suffered a data breach. Companies impacted in the past were very likely to be attacked again in 2023. Meanwhile, 7 out of 10 people worldwide feel threatened by the potential theft of their digital identity. According to the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), identity theft is among the biggest threats to society.

Half of all DDoS attacks registered globally were related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This included IT overload attacks on German airports, defence companies and authorities following the delivery of Leopard tanks to Ukraine. France was also hit by a DDoS attack on over 300 domains in March 2024.

During the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, DDoS attacks were employed to disrupt systems used to warn the civilian population of inbound rocket attacks. For the attackers, DDoS attacks are becoming shorter, more intense and less expensive.

Software supply chains are increasingly under attack. During the period covered by this report, 242 such attacks were registered. The EU has taken steps to tackle the issue with its Cyber Resilience Act, slated for 2024. Other requirements, such as setting up a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), documented security-by-design development processes (DevSecOps), exposure management, and ensuring long-term software updates will have to be established within the next three years for hardware and software. Assailants are constantly looking for opportunities to infiltrate legitimate software projects by sneaking packets containing malicious code onto open-source platforms. Vulnerabilities in software have generally gained in significance during the reporting period and now serve as the initial gateway more often than social engineering.

Despite IT security teams already feeling overloaded and an acute shortage of qualified staff on the labour market, 87% of organizations surveyed would like to expand their cybersecurity activities over the coming 12 months. At the same time, 90% of the companies do not see themselves as being in a position to master their current exposures. The average number of exposures that went unaddressed rose sharply from 11,000 in 2022 to 15,000 in 2023. Genuinely consequential vulnerabilities, enabling pathways to access critical data and systems, consistently accounted for two percent of all exposures, regardless of the size of the organization or whether the data was stored locally or in the cloud. The exposure of companies fluctuated from day to day. In this regard, the category of large organizations with over 100,000 employees recorded very similar numbers to the smallest organizations with fewer than 100 employees, even though the latter group barely had sufficient resources. The efficient management of cyber risks needs to become more than the one-time or annual project required by most current regulations. It calls for a dynamic, ongoing approach, which has been identified under the name “continuous threat exposure management” as one of the top 10 technology trends for 2024.

Investment in cybersecurity pays off. It increases the trust of customers and employees. Penalties, claims for compensation and costs incurred to restore systems can be avoided. In companies with a high degree of cyber resilience, 60% of the decision-makers deal with the threat posed by cyberattacks in the same way – as financial risks. German companies, depending on the source, spend between 5% and 20% of their entire IT budgets on cybersecurity. Overall, it is expected that organizations in Germany will spend more than €10 billion on cybersecurity measures in 2024, already rising to €12 billion in 2025.

Over the next few years, organizations are going to be facing new regulatory frameworks, which will necessitate significant changes to their business practices or products. Especially in the EU, there are a host of new, revised or proposed laws. These include the AI Act, the Data Act, the Product Liability Directive, the Cyber Solidarity Act, the Cyber Resilience Act, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) as well as the Network and Information Systems Directive 2 (NIS2), each implemented differently in the various Member States and with many details still unknown at this time. In terms of the scope of their impact, these regulations should be comparable with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. The EU laws will change global business practices, promote the development of new products or services, and inspire the introduction of new laws outside of the EU. In the USA, lawmakers are likewise taking steps to improve the cybersecurity of entire sectors by introducing new regulations with very well-defined, practical measures

and duties. The new transparency and reporting requirements for the US Securities and Exchange Commission allow unprecedented insight into cyberattacks on companies. Executive directors and IT security managers are increasingly held responsible for their actions and are tasked with steering their companies through the heterogenous landscape of digital and cybersecurity regulations.

In recent years, concerns about falling victim to a cyberattack have topped international surveys on the most significant global risks for organizations across all sectors. When an incident occurs, the first week is characterized by immense stress and powerful emotions such as anger, despair, inability to act and helplessness. Working 12-16 hours a day and on weekends becomes the norm, while sufficient sleep and good nutrition are often neglected. The employees' fear of losing their livelihood combined with high stress may lead to irrational decisions. Long-term repercussions requiring psychological support, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) cannot be ruled out. Even during regular operations, 54% of employees in Security Operations Centres (SOCs) feel stressed by hundreds of thousands of threat alerts and false alarms. Responding to an international survey, 60% of participating CISOs stated that they had experienced burnout within the past year. In 2023, 50% of German CISOs shared the view that their organizations were not adequately prepared for a targeted attack. At the same time, 50% of CEOs presume that the cost of implementing cybersecurity measures would be higher than the consequential costs of a cyberattack. To protect themselves, people tend to take an overly optimistic view of something which seems very complex or highly technical and believe that it can be controlled. In combination with the discrepancy between responsibility and fields of competence this leads to both a dilemma and an illusion. In addition to company-specific technical and organizational measures, following a cyberattack, measures to support mindfulness are equally important for successful protection. Along with the negative consequences, those impacted also report a feeling of empowerment after working together to overcome a cyber crisis.

However, the burden on the shoulders of cybersecurity experts is increasing rather than decreasing. By 2030, a global shortfall of 85 million skilled workers is forecast. In Europe, Israel and the USA, 367 different degrees (bachelor's/master's) which focus on cybersecurity or IT security are offered at 285 universities. In Germany, there are 28 degree courses at 25 universities. The level of interest in these degrees is unfortunately sometimes so low that the course of study is not always included in the university's curriculum every year. Various EU initiatives, such as the EU Cybersecurity Work Programme or the Cybersecurity Skills Academy take holistic approaches towards raising awareness about cybersecurity. It will take a concerted effort by a coalition of various stakeholders to reduce the cyber skills gap and already interest younger generations in cybersecurity from as early as preschool age.

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CYBERSECURITY – A BRIEF OVERVIEW

THE TOP 5 THREATS

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- DISTRIBUTED-DENIAL-OF-SERVICE (DDOS)
- DATA BREACHES (DATA OR IDENTITY THEFT)
- ATTACKS ON SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAINS EXPLOITING VULNERABILITIES

TYPE OF COMPROMISED DATA
SHARE OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT IN 2023 COMPARED TO 2021/22



CASES SOLVED 2023

136,865
Cases reported to the BKA

39,937
Cases solved

CRYPTO CRIME

24.2 B
Bitcoin received from unauthorized addresses

0.34%
of the total on-chain transaction volume

CYBER BUDGET
AS A SHARE OF TOTAL IT BUDGET



Diagram: Investment in cybersecurity at German companies

WANNA PLAY A GAME?

BREAKING CYBER NEWS

SUCCESSFUL CYBERATTACKS NOW TAKE AS LITTLE AS 14 HRS +++++++++

N US$ +++ GLOBAL COST OF CYBERCRIME EXPECTED TO REACH +++++++++

KET REPRESENTS A THREAT +++ A LITTLE LESS CONVERSATION, A LITTLE MORE ACTION: +++++++++

ATTACK VECTORS PROMINENCE OVER TIME



Diagram: Top attack vectors employed in data breaches, 2017-2023

THE BIGGEST HTTP DDOS ATTACKS

CYBERCRIME AS A SERVICE PRICES IN US$

BANKING TROJAN	1.000 – 10.000
BULLETPROOF HOSTING	
SHARED	5 – 50
DEDICATED	12.50 – 3,300
COUNTER-AV-SERVICE	0.15 – 85
CRYPTING	0 – 200
DDOS-AS-A-SERVICE	50 – 2,600
INFECTION-ON-DEMAND	100 – 600
MINING BOTS	50 – 300
RAT (REMOTE ADMIN TOOL)	40 – 8,000
STEALER LOGS	0.01 – 40

Source: Own diagram; [15, 25, 28, 29, 46, 50, 54, 59, 113, 125, 145, 162, 217, 238, 245, 260, 292]

+++++ AND 4 DAYS +++ EVERY 8TH OPEN SOURCE PACKET REPRESENTS A THREAT +++ GLOBAL CO

+++++ 12 TRILLION EUROS IN 2025 +++ FBI vs. CHINA 01 : 50 +++ EVERY 8TH OPEN SOURCE PACKET

+++++ CYBERATTACK LASTING 10 DAYS COSTS MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL 100 MILLION US$ ++

1 Cybersecurity – A brief overview

1.1 The Geopolitical Situation

What started almost exactly two years ago with Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, has brought about a lasting change to the world we live in. Germany and Europe continue to feel the repercussions of the hybrid war taking place in cyberspace. The result is a world in which autocratic states are engaging in (economic) espionage and sabotage, while cybercriminals are increasingly entering into joint ventures with national security organizations. The clear distinction between state, non-state, criminal and terrorist groups of protagonists is more blurred than ever before, while the domestic and foreign threat situation is characterized by the blending of digital and analogue threats [38].

The attack by the terrorist group Hamas on the State of Israel is a typical example. As part of the attack, the terrorists targeted websites and systems designed to warn Israeli civilians of incoming rocket strikes [293]. The establishment of numerous Russian IT companies in Cyprus, seen as a threat to EU member states, has also come under scrutiny [68]. Moreover, Germany's announcement that it would send weapons to Ukraine precipitated a coordinated attack on German companies and state institutions ([35], p. 27).

These risks are clearly both geopolitical and geoeconomic in nature, as disinformation campaigns, political interference and espionage attacks, along with sabotage, extortion, and theft, can cause considerable damage to companies and supply chains. The same applies to research institutions, which are coming under targeted attacks aiming to siphon off valuable knowledge [38]. In this way, confidence in the ability of the state to protect its population from attackers is being deliberately undermined ([28], p. 11). As a response to this new world, states are developing catalogues of appropriate measures. On 14 June 2023, the German government published such a security policy framework, the "National Security Strategy" [78].

1.2 General threat situation

Ransomware, social engineering, data theft, distributed denial of service (DDoS) and attacks on software supply chains comprise the top five cyber threats. At the same time, a considerable increase in the significance of vulnerabilities is apparent during the period covered by the report. This represents a consolidation of the situation since last year's Schwarz Cybersecurity Report 2023 (SCSR23).

During the period covered by this report, ransomware and related services have remained the attack vector of choice for cybercriminals and continue to present the leading threat to cybersecurity ([28], p. 5), ([108], p. 15), [162]. The threat situation is characterized by increased professionalism and heightened competition in the cybercrime ecosystem. The growing pressure on attackers to succeed is passed on to the victims, with criminals turning to ever more aggressive extortion scams.

The attackers' main targets appear to be victims in the USA, the UK and Canada ([160], p. 5), ([253], p. 11). In Europe, Germany occupies top position ([108],

p. 57), ([160], p. 5). Big game hunting, meaning the pursuit of large, high-revenue victims, is a prevalent approach ([28], p. 55), ([59], p. 32). However, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), municipalities, universities and research institutions are also frequently targeted in ransomware attacks due to their inadequate protection mechanisms ([28], p. 55). Official figures show that during the reporting period, on average, at least one German company fell victim to an attempted ransomware attack every day ([35], p. 17).

As it has proven highly effective, social engineering remains the primary gateway for attackers to introduce malware. The barriers to entry for criminals to start engaging in social engineering have continued to fall, and attackers are able to incorporate current social and political events into fraud campaigns to boost their chances of success ([35], p. 4), ([108], p. 73) ([113], p. 5).

In Germany, approximately one in three unsolicited marketing emails is an attempt at fraud using social engineering techniques ([28], p. 31). The risk of falling victim to malware by clicking on malicious links remains extremely high. As a form of social engineering, phishing plays a decisive role in scams where large-scale data theft ([35], p. 14), including data breaches ([153], p. 20), is carried out. This includes targeted attacks on the highest echelons of corporate and political leadership [12], ([108], p. 75), [139]. Consequently, the illegal market for the sale of stolen identity and login credentials continued to flourish during the reporting period and was observed to have more than doubled ([59], p. 9).

In terms of attacks on availability using DDoS, the geopolitical situation has brought about a significant shift towards politically and ideologically motivated hacktivism, which was consolidated over the latest reporting period. Observational evidence suggests that DDoS attacks are increasing in frequency and intensity ([186], p. 4), while also becoming more sophisticated and less expensive for assailants ([108], p. 97). In addition to their use in the geopolitical context, they therefore continue to provide the ideal weaponry for successfully engaging in financial blackmail or sabotage in cyberspace. Germany ranks fourth in the world for this type of attack [294].

Attacks on software supply chains show a clear upward trend. Four out of five decision-makers have reported either being attacked or informed about security vulnerabilities in their supply chains at least once during the period under review ([108], p. 127). Open-source package management platforms are another popular vector for distributing malicious code – inserted into software packages. The number of malicious packages was observed to have increased by more than 28% ([230], p. 9). In this respect, vulnerabilities specific to open-source software play a significant role, as criminals can effectively exploit them to gain access to the victim's systems. Around the globe, about 70 new vulnerabilities are discovered in software products every day – an increase of 25% compared with the previous reporting period ([28], p. 96).

1.3 European regulatory bodies are responding to the threat situation

In the light of advances in digital transformation and the accompanying challenges posed by the cyber threat situation, governments are under growing pressure to take regulatory action. Statistical analysis shows that in relation to data processing, such regulatory interventions can have a positive effect on the extent of damage and losses incurred ([153], p. 40).

As a result, in January 2003, the European Union (EU) issued the Network and Information Security Directive 2 (NIS-2) [103], which aims to increase the overall level of cybersecurity through establishing regulatory requirements. By updating previous regulatory efforts, NIS-2 strives to boost the resilience and responsiveness of public and private sector entities across the EU, depending on the sectors

they are affiliated with. NIS-2 imposes far-reaching obligations on companies and institutions covered by the directive. Organizations have a basic duty to report a material security incident. In addition, proactive risk management structures must be established. This includes risk analysis, security policies, technical measures for prevention, detection and response, crisis management plans and exposure management. Measures regarding exposure management also apply to the supply chain. EU member states are currently working intensively on implementing NIS-2, and it remains uncertain to what extent the directive can be implemented by the deadline of 17 October 2024. In Germany, NIS-2 will be transformed into national law by way of the NIS2 Implementation and Cyber Security Strengthening Act (NIS2UmsuCG). The coordination of this law between various governmental departments is currently at a standstill.

To complement existing directives such as NIS-2, the EU presented the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) as a draft law in September 2022 [97]. The CRA outlines mandatory cybersecurity requirements for hardware and software products with digital aspects. The objective is to improve security and transparency for such products brought into circulation and traded or operated within the EU's domestic market. The draft bill takes into account the fact that vulnerabilities in these products are increasingly exploited by cybercriminals. Manufacturers bear responsibility for ensuring the cybersecurity of their products throughout their lifecycles. Therefore, cybersecurity considerations are crucial during the planning, design, development, production, delivery, and maintenance phases. Following the sale of a product, manufacturers are required to ensure that any vulnerabilities are effectively remediated through appropriate patch management throughout the expected life of the product or a period of five years (whichever is shorter). When manufacturers become aware of security incidents due to exploited vulnerabilities, they have an active duty to report them. With regard to transparency, products including digital elements must be accompanied by clear, comprehensible instructions for use. The CRA is expected to come into force during 2024.

1.4 Globally coordinated law enforcement has an impact

Despite the very fraught threat environment, there is some good news to report regarding the latest period. International law enforcement cooperation resulted in significant disruption of cybercrime activities. Joint campaigns run by governmental organizations were able to shut down or even completely take over criminal infrastructures for further investigation. One such example was "Operation Power Off", which shut down the Hydra Market (in existence since 2015). Among cybercriminals, this marketplace had provided the opportunity to buy stolen data, forged documents, digital services, and concealment techniques. Since 2018, Operation Power Off has seized more than 17 million registered user accounts and 21,000 vendor accounts. In the course of the investigation, it was also discovered that the technical infrastructure of the Hydra Market was located in Germany ([35], p. 22). The most noteworthy operation was known as Cronos. On 19 February 2024, it was announced that the criminal activities of the LockBit group had been brought to an end by shutting down 34 server systems distributed around the globe. Over 200 crypto accounts and 14,000 user accounts were seized, two cybercriminals arrested, and three international arrest warrants issued [134], [196]. Within the period under review, LockBit was one of the most dangerous extortion gangs. These spectacular strikes, as well as many other successful campaigns against organized cybercrime, have been shown to shorten the lives of ransomware groups significantly. Whereas prior to this reporting period such groups could operate with impunity for around 150 days, experts estimate that by the end of 2023, the average life span had been cut in half ([49], p. 29).

> "If I took the FBI's cyber personnel and said forget ransomware, forget Russia, forget Iran, do nothing but China, we would be outnumbered 50-to-1" ([55], p. 2) – FBI Director Chris Wray.

1.5 Ransomware

1.5.1 Ransomware remains the most popular tool for cybercriminals

As in SCSR23, ransomware and its related services, grouped under the collective term "Ransomware-as-a-Service" (RaaS), remain the most popular tools for cybercrime ([28], p. 16), ([160], p. 5). RaaS provides a low barrier to entry and very favourable conditions ([160], p. 5). As a result, this remains the greatest threat to companies and organizations ([28], p. 55), ([35], p. 4). In 2023, there was a significant rise in the number of ransomware incidents recorded ([108], p. 52). In the reporting period, a growing trend towards a cybercrime "value chain" was identified, in which a division of labour takes place within the shadow economy between the providers of ransomware products and those actually carrying out the attacks ([28], p. 11 ff.). In an effort to significantly increase the extortion pressure on victims, a combination of data encryption and an additional attack vector is often employed by attackers – known as "double extortion" ([35], p. 17).

1.5.2 Every tenth company worldwide affected by ransomware

Ransomware remains the main threat to cybersecurity ([28], p. 11). Over the reporting period, a continued escalation in cyber threats was observed from a quantitative standpoint. On average, adversaries attacked organizations worldwide about 1,150 times a week with ransomware [51]. In total, more than 60,000 attacks were recorded across the globe in 2023 [51]. Based on these figures, it can be assumed that every tenth company or organisation worldwide was affected by a ransomware attack [51]. Affiliate programs for RaaS introduced since the last reporting period have proven particularly popular, recording an increase of 12% ([199], p. 17). RaaS involves developers and operators offering ready-to-use ransomware products to partners (so-called affiliates) ([160], p. 5). A complex ransomware attack has become easier to carry out, as assailants can find a suitable tool to use for almost every single step in their attack ([28], p. 16 ff.). Ransomware providers benefit from focusing entirely on the development of their products, while affiliates take care of the actual execution of attacks and then pay a commission to providers following a successful operation ([28], p. 11). The provision of these tools ensures that attackers are able to execute a ransomware attack much faster. At the same time, the approach increases the complexity of combating these networks.

Experts now assume that the time required for a successful attack is between 14 hours ([217], p. 34) and 4 days. The main targets for ransomware attacks and the highest number of victims during the reporting period were located in the USA (45%), the UK (7%), Canada (5%) and Germany (4%) ([160], p. 5).

1.5.3 All sectors targeted in ransomware attacks

Ransomware attacks cast a wide net and continue to target companies with large turnovers ([28], p. 55). The hunt for large companies, known as "Big Game Hunting" (BGH), remains the dominant threat on the cybercrime landscape ([59], p. 32). As already outlined in SCSR23, no sector-specific trends can be inferred directly from reports on ransomware attacks, as the attackers' motivation and overall capabilities are generally too heterogeneous. Nevertheless, a closer analysis of the industries and sectors for various groups of attackers does reveal certain tendencies (see section 1.10.6).

Overall, ransomware attackers tend to exhibit two distinct behavioural patterns when it comes to selecting potential victims. While some groups select their victims according to the "We'll take what we can get!" principle, others are much more selective and single out victims based on specific criteria, particularly their financial capacities [57].

One specific trend was identified in attacks on the logistics industry during the reporting period. The substantial organizational work required to logistically maintain Ukraine's food and weapons supply became a clear target of attacks for Russia. Russian hacker groups have demonstrably disrupted or sabotaged this logistics supply chain by sneaking the "Prestige" ransomware into logistics companies in Poland and Ukraine [198].

1.5.4 One German company per day subject to a ransomware attack

Germany ranks fourth worldwide when it comes to ransomware attacks, confirming that ransomware remains a serious threat. Over the reporting period, the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recorded a total of 132 known ransomware victims ([28], p. 56), while another study yielded similarly high figures. A comparative analysis of the various sectors reveals that no industry remains unaffected by the threat of ransomware ([245], p. 16 ff.). On average, at least one attempted ransomware attack on a German company can be identified per day ([35], p. 17), while two ransomware attacks strike municipal facilities (27 incidents) on average per month ([28], p. 46 ff.). Particularly noteworthy is the growing number of impacted IT service providers in government administration or at other companies ([143], p. 56) which are not adequately protected from an IT perspective ([28], p. 55).

Since the beginning of 2024, there has been a growing trend of successful ransomware attacks on municipal administration, institutions and hospitals, resulting in services being restricted [127], [175], [283]. Consumers have mostly been spared from ransomware attacks to date ([28], p. 51).

1.6 Social Engineering

1.6.1 Social engineering remains a popular attack vector for cybercriminals

Due to its simplicity in both form and execution, as well as its low procurement costs as opposed to lucrative profit potential, social engineering remains a popular method of attack for cybercriminals ([108], p. 72), ([277], p. 8). The best-known form of social engineering, phishing, is still one of the primary entry vectors for malware into victims' systems. Criminals can adapt their phishing attempts to reflect the latest social situations and events ([35], p. 4). Phishing occurs in many forms – from direct messages and fraud emails to "voice phishing" (vishing, a form of IP phone fraud) ([28], p. 31), ([277], p. 8). Cybersecurity is only as strong as its weakest link. Humans generally constitute this weak link, and cybercriminals aim to exploit this to their advantage ([277], p. 8).

1.6.2 Five million phishing attacks worldwide

Phishing continues to be one of the most frequently used gateways for cybercriminals to gain access to their victims' systems. However, according to studies, a new trend towards using software vulnerabilities as the main gateway is now emerging ([217], p. 25). Approximately 5 million phishing attacks were recorded worldwide during the reporting period, the most ever recorded ([10], p. 2). The largest increases were in social media (+43%) and vishing attacks (+260%) ([10], p. 5). According to research, approximately 900 phishing attacks (+17%) can be linked to a significant loss of data ([277], p. 31).

By virtue of the closure of free domains provider "Freenom", the number of phishing attacks decreased considerably in the second quarter of 2023. Freenom was responsible for more than 60% of phishing attacks ([10], p. 4). The number of blocked

phishing websites has increased by 80% and confirms the dynamic developments taking place in the phishing environment ([108], p. 73).

Targeted attacks on company decision-makers by way of Business Email Compromise (BEC) techniques remains a very popular approach among cybercriminals. BEC usually consists of a direct instruction from an impersonated company executive to pay out a sum of money, often including harmful links or attachments. These bogus emails are sent to targeted persons within the attacked organization ([108], p. 80). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported 21,800 BEC incidents during the reporting period, resulting in a total loss of approximately US $2.7 billion ([161], p. 11). Other statistics confirm the rise in the number of BEC attacks, although the damages reported indicate a trend towards a decrease in the loss resulting from each BEC attack ([10], p. 2). In addition, a trend towards spreading malicious archive files and QR codes in phishing emails can also be observed ([35], p. 14).

1.6.3 Social engineering used for propaganda and sabotage

Social engineering continues to be employed as a means of achieving specific goals in the context of the Ukraine war. In this case, social engineering is used for propaganda or sabotage both in Ukraine and in European countries ([108], p. 74). For purposes of propaganda or gathering information, pro-Russian protagonists are carrying out targeted phishing attacks on government institutions, defence companies and non-governmental organizations ([108], p. 74). A targeted phishing attack on EU diplomats by the “APT29” group, and the use of specific information relating to the visit of the Polish ambassador to the USA, aimed to inject malicious code into the EU’s IT system ([108], p. 75). Political think tanks have also been popular targets as springboards to penetrate government administration and political organizations.

In addition, cybercriminals are skilfully exploiting the global political situation and reacting quickly to new circumstances to improve their chances of success ([113], p. 5). Cybercriminals are specifically targeting supporters of and donors to Ukraine throughout the EU, attempting to generate donations for their own benefit through phishing campaigns or fraudulent websites. In some cases, celebrities or humanitarian organizations conducting real campaigns are impersonated to encourage unwitting victims to donate cryptocurrency ([113], p. 5).

1.6.4 All sectors affected by social engineering

Preferred sectors for social engineering could be identified during the period under review. Social media is the sector most heavily impacted, with 43% of all phishing attacks targeting it. In addition, webmail services (15%), the financial sector (14%), online shops (6%), the logistics industry (5%) and payment services (4%) were also targeted by attackers ([10], p. 5). Based on analysis by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the focus of social engineering campaigns is on individuals (31%), public institutions (18%), the financial sector (5%) and digital infrastructure (5%) ([108], p. 72). Another focus of cybercriminals is gaining access to victims’ cryptocurrencies through phishing. The FBI noted a huge increase of 183% in cryptocurrency fraudsters during 2023 ([108], p. 80).

1.6.5 In Germany, phishing attackers set their sights on user data

In Germany, approximately 66% of all spam emails contain content for a cyberattack. Phishing attackers are mainly interested in capturing credentials relating to the financial sector ([28], p. 46). During the period under review, the Verbraucherzentrale (German consumer protection organization) most frequently warned against phishing emails purporting to be from companies in the financial sec-

tor and attempting to capture authentication data, particularly under the guise of an emergency situation ([35], p. 14).

In Germany, cybercriminals have also demonstrated great ability to adapt their attacks to reflect current events, thereby increasing their chances of success. During the reporting period, there were targeted phishing campaigns related to the "Energiepauschale" (German energy cost subsidy) and the earthquake in Turkey ([28], p. 31). Likewise, a growing proportion (+20%) of blackmail attempts using social engineering were recorded. In these cases, attackers try to put massive pressure on their victims through personal and intimidating messages in order to extort a ransom payment ([108], p. 81).

1.7 DDoS attacks motivated by politics and activism

During the reporting period, overload attacks or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) were once again a very popular method used by attackers to temporarily disrupt the operations of companies or state organizations ([109], p. 5). A total of 310 successful DDoS attacks with considerable impact were recorded in Europe ([109], p. 19). In 66% of these cases, the attackers' motives were political and activist in nature ("hacktivism") ([35], p. 22). Financial interests were the main focus of attackers in only a small fraction (5%) of DDoS attacks ([109], p. 20). DDoS attacks can always be included as a component in complex cyber operations.

Overall, 50% of DDoS attacks worldwide can be attributed to the war in Ukraine ([109], p. 5). The pro-Russian hacker groups "REvil", "Killnet" and "NoName057(16)" are believed to be responsible for the bulk of DDoS attacks ([109], p. 23), ([186], p. 8). They are behind numerous DDoS attacks on countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia and are members of the NATO alliance. These attacks impacted government and private websites in Romania, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Japan, the USA and Germany ([108], p. 98). The main aims of these DDoS attacks on NATO states were propaganda and sparking social insecurity with regard to the target country's own state apparatus ([28], p. 11). However, the attacks registered often only have a minor harmful effect and the total number of attacks has decreased slightly ([28], p. 29).

A new trend was observed during the 7 October Hamas terrorist attack on Israel – which followed the overload logic of DDoS attacks. In collaboration with hacker groups, during rocket attacks by Hamas, websites and systems used to warn Israeli civilians of the attacks were targeted [293]. Hacktivist groups such as "Team_insane_Pakistan", "Anonymous_Sudan" and the pro-Russian actor "Killnet" were associated with the majority of the attacks ([200], p. 2). Israel also employed DDoS attacks (470 terabytes / 1.2 billion requests) against the Palestinian networks of banks or internet providers [54].

Investigations by providers of DDoS defence systems, on the other hand, do not confirm the trend of falling numbers of incidents, but instead indicate an increase ([186], p. 8). Therefore, a continued threat situation for Germany may be assumed overall. Germany ranks fourth in the global rankings for DDoS attacks [294].

1.7.1 DDoS attacks are becoming shorter, but more intense

DDoS attacks are becoming increasingly intense, complex and cost-effective for the attackers ([108], p. 161). The average intensity of DDoS attacks has increased by about 40% compared with the previous year ([186], p. 4). Parallel to this, there is a growing trend (+17%) towards DDoS attacks using a combination of different techniques (known as multi-vector attacks) ([186], p. 16). The majority of DDoS attacks (86%) were shorter than 5 minutes and only 3% of the attacks lasted longer than 1 hour ([186], p. 12).

During the reporting period, DDoS attacks exploiting a vulnerability in the HTTP/2 protocol (CVE-2023-44487) occurred for the very first time [65]. Attacks on various Google services were recorded, with the DDoS attacks measuring up to 398 million requests per second at times. In these HTTP/2 DDoS attacks, the attackers used a rapid reset, in which connections to the server are repeatedly established and immediately disconnected again without waiting for a response [65], [244].

1.8 Attacks on software supply chains

Targeted attacks on software supply chains were once again recorded in the reporting period. The largest attacks were those on data transfer service "MOVEit" (see section 1.11.3) and VoIP provider "3CX". Software supply chains continued to provide the largest attack surface for cybercriminals, regardless of whether organizations were developing or deploying software ([230], p. 17). A total of 242 attacks on software supply chains were reported, representing a sharp increase of 110% compared with the previous year ([154], p. 17). Around 54 million people were affected by these supply chain attacks ([154], p. 6).

An ever-expanding network of dependencies between the respective software applications and the sprawling distribution of applications are making it increasingly difficult for organizations to maintain control over the security of their software and software development processes ([108], p. 127).

A major reason for this threat scenario is the fact that 94% of companies are using open-source packages more often in their products than previously, in order to accelerate development and cut costs [46]. Open-source code was the common denominator in 90% of all successful supply chain attacks in the period under review ([248], p. 6). Developers are advised to work under the assumption that one in eight open-source packages should be deemed a risk ([248], p. 4).

During the period covered by the report, the total number of open-source software downloads was in excess of four billion ([248], p. 9). Checks for malicious code packages on the "npm" and "PyPI" platforms detected more than 11,000 such packages, up 28% from the previous year ([230], p. 9). The cumulative number of malicious packages developed between 2019 and 2023 is estimated at over 245,000 ([248], p. 11). Over 7,000 instances of malicious packages were detected on PyPI, and 4,000 instances on npm ([230], p. 6). A comparative analysis of the platforms shows opposing trends. The number of malicious packages detected on the PyPI platform rose by more than 400%. This huge increase can be attributed to the growing popularity of Python as a programming language. The opportunity to hide malicious code from anti-malware applications in compiled Python packages has increased the appeal of this approach for cybercriminals ([230], p. 14).

Potentially malicious packages were also concentrated on particularly widely used applications and hosting platforms (such as Slack, AWS, Google, GitHub and Azure) ([230], p. 16). An attack on the AI framework "PyTorch" was also reported. Here, the attackers leveraged special tactics to steal sensitive data, which also indicates that cybercriminals are increasingly going after AI tools ([248], p. 12).

Another risk related to software supply chains was due to the discontinuation of software updates and support. For instance, it was established that 18% of open-source projects developed in the programming languages Java and JavaScript were no longer being actively maintained. In particular, software at industrial plants was sometimes extremely outdated. In some cases, the software was no longer supported and had been developed at a time when cybersecurity was not a priority.

The use of libraries containing known vulnerabilities provided another opportunity for adversaries to launch supply chain attacks. In the open-source

platform for Java development, 12% of downloads contained at least one known vulnerability ([248], p. 15). One third of these exposures was shown to have a critical or highly critical degree of severity ([248], p. 14). Moreover, findings also show that for around 96% of downloads with a known vulnerability, an option was available that did not contain the vulnerability, meaning that any potential risks could easily have been avoided ([248], p. 25). In light of this fact, integrated software development processes (DevOps) and integrated security testing during the software development process (DevSecOps) continued to gain in importance in the latest period ([112], p. 13). The use of generative AI in DevOps was found to play an increasingly important role here ([248], p. 52).

Another trend observed, in the broader sense of supply chain attacks, was the spreading of malware via IT providers, especially within small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) ([108], p. 128). The increased use of applications and "Software-as-a-Service" (SaaS) pose a growing problem for organizations, as many of these third-party apps are equipped with high-risk rights that enable them to access or manipulate company data ([108], p. 129).

1.9 Data theft

1.9.1 How is the data targeted by cybercriminals created?

As already noted in SCSR23, data and the information it comprises are among the key targets for cybercriminals. Advances in digitalization, combined with approximately 5 billion internet users, mean that vast amounts of data are generated each and every day [81] – in the reporting period, to be precise, an estimated 97 zettabytes per day [81]. For example, every minute an average of 231 million emails and 16 million messages are sent, around 6 million search queries entered in Google, 575,000 posts made on X and 500 hours of video material uploaded to YouTube [81]. Consequently, the amount of data available for cybercriminals to steal, sell or use for blackmail is growing day by day. It is also becoming increasingly difficult for those producing data to keep track of and retain control over it. During the reporting period, every single company surveyed in Germany had been impacted by a data leak ([21], p. 10).

1.9.2 Global rise in data theft

Across the globe, there was a sustained trend towards data theft incidents which then became public knowledge ([108], p. 86). In March 2024, for example, France's national employment agency reported that it had been hacked, and that the personal data of 43 million French citizens had been stolen. This included data pertaining to individuals previously registered with the agency dating back 20 years. In total, over 3,200 data breaches (+77%) were recorded in 2023 due to cyberattacks, impacting more than 353 million people (–16%) ([154], p. 6). A rapid growth in data leaks from cloud environments was observed (+82%) ([153], p. 43). According to the US National Security Agency (NSA), misconfigurations on cloud instances are the most common exposure exploited by cybercriminals to access data and services ([253], p. 8).

Worryingly, almost every organisation which had experienced a data breach at least once in the past fell victim to a breach again in 2023 ([253], p. 8). Of all data leaks, 83% were caused by external attackers, and 19% by internal actors (including deliberate acts and unintentional human error). Only one percent of leaks were caused by partner organizations ([277], p. 12).

In almost all cases of data theft (94%), the attackers had a financial motive ([108], p. 87). Espionage played a role in only 5% of attacks in the reporting period. Data theft in connection with cryptocurrencies quadrupled compared with the previous year ([108], p. 87). Stolen data (especially login credentials) is commonly sold on underground marketplaces for financial gain. Over the reporting period, more than 2,000 (+23%) such offers were observed

([160], p. 8). When it came to identity theft, the attackers most frequently made off with sensitive data such as name, national insurance number, date of birth, home address and driving licence or ID number ([108], p. 92). The USA, Brazil, France, Germany and the UK were the main countries targeted ([160], p. 8). Personal or sensitive data was sold for a substantial profit or exploited for other purposes ([253], p. 2). The price this stolen data was sold for ranged, for instance, from US $500 to US $4,200 for bank account login details, US $300 to US $2,560 for crypto account data, US $100 for credit card information and US $1 to US $60 for social media account details [299]. The highest quantities of stolen user data were recorded in the USA (96 million), Russia (78 million), France (10 million), Spain (8 million) and India (5 million) [255]. Relative to its population size, Germany is considered to have suffered a comparatively low amount of stolen user account data – an estimated 1.8 million [255]. The proportion of all data breaches in the period under review relating to data stored in cloud environments was 82% ([153], p. 43).

1.9.3 Healthcare and IT sectors affected by data theft

In terms of data theft, clear trends were identified regarding the main sectors targeted by attackers. These were public administrations, healthcare organizations, digital infrastructure providers and private individuals ([108], p. 86). On account of the sensitive and personal nature of the data managed in healthcare, this sector proved a major target for attackers, with approximately 800 data breaches reported. This was closely followed by the financial sector, which reported 740 data leaks, followed by service providers with around 300 breaches ([154], p. 6). A new rising trend towards data leaks was observed among large IT companies (see section 1.11.1) [207]. This is attributable to the sheer volume of data and the high potential for exploitation of the information by Russia or China for intelligence purposes. In January 2024, a package containing 26 billion data records (12 terabytes) was published on the dark web in an attack dubbed the “MOAB” (mother of all breaches) [222]. However, this included a large amount of data compiled from previous hacks and data breaches.

1.9.4 Infostealers and other data theft techniques

As in previous years, botnets were used in the majority of cases to steal information (infostealers) in the latest reporting period ([28], p. 13). Infostealers generally operate hidden from view, passing on sensitive information to attackers over long periods of time. This data may include login details stored in browsers, crypto wallet data or detailed personal information. Each data record extracted is known as a “log” and can be purchased on the darknet for as little as US $10 to US $60 each. Well-known darknet markets include “Russian Market”, “2easy” and “Genesis Market” ([28], p. 17).

It is not only ransomware groups that benefit from customer-oriented services. On one of the largest marketplaces for identity data, attackers can purchase browser plugins which enable them to instantly assume another person’s identity using stolen data ([28], p. 52). Another trend among attackers is to circumvent access control mechanisms such as multi-factor authentication (MFA) ([199], p. 36). To date, botnets have focused their attacks on Android-based mobile operating systems. Attacks on conventional desktop systems are becoming less significant ([28], p. 13).

1.10 Attacker's perspective: A glimpse behind the scenes

The ability of cybercriminals to precisely analyse and understand their targets provides them with a significant advantage in terms of strategy and time. It affords them the opportunity to conduct their attacks with high precision and effectiveness.

To minimize the attackers' supremacy, it is essential for decision-makers to gain an in-depth understanding of the threat actors, their tactics and their methods. This year's SCSR24 provides insights into the motivations and tactics of cybercriminal actors. The knowledge and lessons learned will assist cybersecurity decision-makers in developing a proactive security strategy which is able to pre-emptively identify and address exposures before attackers can exploit them.

The general public's perception of the typical cybercriminal is as a lone hacker in a hoodie, surrounded by darkness and screens, launching targeted malware attacks on unsuspecting victims. However, this picture is far removed from the complex reality behind modern cyberattacks. In fact, highly organized groups pursuing precise strategies and targets are operating behind the scenes.

1.10.1 Cybercriminals are usually not lone perpetrators with opportunistic tendencies

The prevailing ransomware attacks are not carried out by sole perpetrators ([28], p. 15). It is estimated that over 60% of all ransomware incidents are conducted by highly organized cybercrime groups ([277], p. 16). The five most prominent examples of such ransomware gangs are "LockBit", "ALPHV" alias "BlackCat", "Bian Lian", "Cl0p" (see section 1.11.3) and "Royal" ([108], p. 53). However, it is not only these gangs who are driven by financial gain. Cybercriminals generally pursue a profit motive and tend to be opportunistic and non-partisan. Through their illegal operations, they target the data or infrastructures that have the greatest value for their victims. Furthermore, these threat actors have raised their levels of cooperation and professionalism, making them a serious threat in cyberspace ([108], p. 21).

1.10.2 State interests promoted by highly specialized groups

As the importance of cyberspace grows, states are increasingly pursuing their interests there. To advance these interests, they are not only relying on their own expertise (e.g., in the military and foreign intelligence services), but also leveraging the capabilities of cybercrime groups. However, the nature of such "state-sponsored" groups differs considerably from that of conventional cybercriminals in terms of their motivation and approach.

In contrast to the mass distribution of untargeted malware, state-sponsored groups are more cautious and target-oriented. The groups, moreover, often disguise themselves as departments of technology companies providing regular IT services (e.g., IT security consulting, software development) in their respective countries. Instead of monetization, such organizations are rather focused on gathering information or potentially conducting sabotage ([28], p. 26). In the geopolitical context, these groups primarily endeavour to obtain sensitive data or unauthorized access. In the scope of such espionage activities, these state-sponsored groups focus their efforts on targets such as diplomatic services, private and public military organizations, think tanks, humanitarian organizations, IT companies and critical infrastructures (KRITIS) ([108], p. 26).

In the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, targeted sabotage has played a critical role, especially at the beginning of the war through the use of wipers – converted ransomware

with considerable malicious potential – as already reported in SCSR23. State-sponsored actors also have other motives, as clearly shown by the example of North Korea. Since 2014, it has been known that such groups engage in espionage to procure data on behalf of the North Korean secret service while also exploiting the boom in cryptocurrencies to reap financial gains ([108], p. 28). Chinese sponsored threat actors are especially involved when it comes to conflicts linked to China's rival territorial claims ([108], p. 27).

1.10.3 Cybercriminal activists, alias hacktivists

Since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine, the concept of "hacking" in connection with "activism" has become more prominent. The aim is to promote ideological, social and/or politically motivated viewpoints through activities in cyberspace. These self-proclaimed hacktivists align themselves with a particular side in a conflict and carry out cybercriminal activities to support these allies. Notable examples include the pro-Russian group "Killnet", while the "IT Army of Ukraine" and "Anonymus" are active on the Ukrainian side ([35], p. 25).

Driven by their ideological motivation, hacktivists are not as powerful as other threat actors. Their skills and capabilities vary greatly, and they are therefore susceptible to being leveraged by state-sponsored groups for disinformation campaigns and covert operations to exert influence in cyberspace ([108], p. 22).

1.10.4 Hack-for-hire actors

Another type of cybercriminal group comprises hack-for-hire actors or "affiliates". They differ from conventional cybercriminals or state-sponsored groups in that they work for a fee much in the same way as freelancers or mercenaries, providing their services and compromised infrastructures in return for payment. As with cybercriminals, the motivation driving hack-for-hire actors is financial gain.

They also contribute to the professionalisation and expansion of the cybercrime ecosystem, as infrastructures for hire play an essential role in making services such as RaaS possible in the first place. At the same time, they constantly lower the barriers to entry for illegal cyber activities ([108], p. 21 ff.). This extremely flexible range of services can be used to carry out a wide variety of attacks, which makes hack-for-hire a challenging, multi-layered cyber threat that law enforcement agencies will struggle to contain over the long term. The spectrum of illegal operations implemented in this way ranges from industrial espionage and data theft to disinformation campaigns [234].

At this point, it should be noted that the descriptions provided about various types of threat actors do not always provide a clear line of distinction between them. For example, hacktivists could just as easily be categorized as hack-for-hire actors or state-funded groups – as in the case of the Killnet group, which was originally ideologically motivated. It now offers its services for hire to state and private clients [16], [221]. Hack-for-hire actors, with their malicious infrastructures, could likewise change mindset and become opportunistic cybercriminals, driven by greed for even more lucrative returns.

1.10.5 Attack phase: Tactics and techniques

Cybercriminals pursue a variety of strategies, tactics and techniques to achieve their objectives. While their approaches can be extremely multi-facetted, they are also characterized by certain essential activities and behavioural patterns ([113], p. 6) which have a significant influence on the success or failure of their operations. For analysing attacks and determining effective countermeasures, MITRE ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques (ATT) & Common Knowledge (CK)) [202] has proven a highly reliable tool. The approach provides a comprehensive framework that offers a detailed taxonomy and classification of various cyberattack patterns.

There are currently MITRE ATT&CK mapping matrices for enterprise applications, mobile applications, industrial control systems and satellite systems. MITRE ATT&CK sub-divides adversarial behaviour used by attackers against enterprise applications into 14 tactic categories based on their specific aims. In a second step, each attacker tactic is then assigned potential attacker techniques which are particularly suitable for achieving the objective of the tactic. For each individual attack technique, a description of the attackers' methods is presented along with detailed information on detection and prevention. In addition, a section of the database allows users to look up information about well-known cybercrime groups, including the specific techniques and software tools they use.

Many detailed analyses of cyberattacks use and follow the MITRE nomenclature and taxonomy to facilitate the analysis and evaluation process. To provide an initial introduction and an overview over the method, SCSR24 uses a simplified representation that is clearly geared towards MITRE ATT&CK. This is set out in Table 1. The outline provides an overview of the key aspects of the anatomy and phases of a typical attack, starting with the scouting of potential victims through reconnaissance (see section 1.10.6), followed by penetration (see section 1.10.7), maintaining control (see section 1.10.9) and through to achieving the desired impact (see section 1.10.11).

Attack phase	14 Associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics
Reconnaissance and preparation (see section 1.10.6)	• Reconnaissance (TA0043) • Resource Development (TA0042)
Penetration and installation (see section 1.10.7)	• Initial Access (TA0001) • Execution (TA0002) • Persistence (TA0003)
Taking, maintaining and extending control (see section 1.10.9)	• Privilege Escalation (TA0004) • Defense Evasion (TA0005) • Credential Access (TA0006) • Discovery (TA0007) • Lateral Movement (TA0008) • Collect (TA0009) • Command and Control (TA0011)
Achieving the desired impact (see section 1.10.11)	• Exfiltration (TA0010) • Impact (TA0040)

Table 1: Attack phases and associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics

1.10.6 Reconnaissance: Analysis and selection of targets, timing of the attack

In the first stage of a cyberattack, reconnaissance and preparation, the attacker seeks to gain a decisive advantage by gathering information about the potential victim. Therefore, it is particularly important for decision-makers to have some insight into this phase, as it also gives them the opportunity to learn more about attack groups and thereby reduce an adversary's advantage. Furthermore, organizations can use this information to optimize their own defence strategies. It also underscores the need for decision-makers to increase the priority given to data security and the protection of sensitive information, so that they expose a smaller attack surface to potential attackers. The attacker tactics associated with this phase are described in Table 2.

While in the past most cybercrime operations were uncoordinated, meaning that malware was simply distributed widely and randomly, we can now observe a clear change in approach. Threat actors are increasingly taking the path of least resistance, in other words looking for large, unprotected attack surfaces. Consequently, it is not uncommon for SMEs and government institutions to become the object of an attacker's focus ([28], p. 11 ff.). This means that the reconnaissance and preparation phase is growing in importance. Despite the cost-benefit advantage alluded to above, during this phase the criminals require substantial resources to examine potential victims, identify weaknesses, vulnerabilities and gateways – and ultimately exploit them – while keeping errors to a minimum at the same time ([108], p. 21). In an effort to counteract these costs, cybercriminal groups have become increasingly specialized, as the example of LockBit illustrates. As one of the leading ransomware gangs, LockBit focuses primarily on specific sectors, with 43% of its attacks aimed at service providers, retailers and manufacturers ([108], p. 55).

Attackers are also increasingly setting their sights on IT service providers and managed service providers (MSPs). These organizations are particularly lucrative for attackers because they can be expected to constitute a link in a supply chain, paving the way for criminals to cause more widespread damage through opportunistic planning. The statistics speak for themselves. By the beginning of 2022, 98% of all organizations worldwide had a relationship with a supplier that had fallen victim to a data breach within the previous two years [261]. The same applies for companies using third-party applications connected to cloud environments. Many of these applications are equipped with user rights which grant adversaries direct access to highly sensitive company data should an attack succeed ([108], p. 128 ff.). Finally, threat actors do not only meticulously select their victim and identify the most opportune point of entry into the victim's environment. To ensure that they remain undetected and undisturbed within the attacked systems for as long as possible, adversaries also strategically plan the ideal point in time to infiltrate the victim's envi-

Attack phase	Associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics with descriptions
Reconnaissance and preparation	• **Reconnaissance (TA0043):** Attackers actively or passively attempt to covertly gather information which can be used to plan future operations. This includes detailed information about the organization, infrastructure or personnel. This knowledge can be used to support other phases of the attack, such as planning and achieving initial access, prioritizing targets after compromise or conducting further reconnaissance. • **Resource Development (TA0042):** Attackers attempt to obtain resources that can be used to support their operations. These resources include infrastructure, user accounts or malware. They can also be used to support other phases of the lifecycle.

Table 2: "Reconnaissance and preparation" attack phase and associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics

ronment, as the actions taken by the Cl0p group as their attacks unfolded during the reporting period clearly demonstrate (see section 1.11.3).

1.10.7 Exploiting exposures or getting the victim to open the door

During the second phase of a cyberattack, penetration and installation, attackers succeed in gaining digital access to their victim's IT systems. The specifics of each potential gateway or vulnerability vary from company to company, depending on their business processes, the technologies they are using, and the behaviour of their employees.

To be able to deploy appropriate protection mechanisms – in the right place and sufficient quantities – it is essential for decision-makers to understand the attackers' methods. This enables them to tailor their security strategies precisely to cover each individual threat and risk. They can identify potential exposures at an early stage, after which measures can be implemented to close or protect them effectively and quickly. The adversary tactics associated with this phase are described in Table 3.

The reconnaissance and preparation phase not only involves identifying vulnerabilities arising from programming and configuration errors, design flaws, previous attacks on the software supply chain or a lack of security measures. The development or acquisition of specialized malware or malicious scripts also plays an important role. However, the effects of such exploits should be attributed to the penetration and installation stage as described below, because they represent the way for adversaries to gain the technical leverage to initially break into the target environment.

A distinction is typically made between known and unknown vulnerabilities and their exploits. Unknown vulnerabilities, also known as zero-day vulnerabilities, are the most critical. As the general public has absolutely no knowledge of them, threat actors can exploit them at will without encountering any protective mechanisms. Consequently, there is a "[...] constant race between security researchers and the various attacker groups. Those who discover vulnerabilities first can either use them for cyberattacks or offer them for sale to other attackers on the darknet, or report them to the manufacturer in order to expedite the provision of a patch (security updates to close vulnerabilities)" ([28], p. 34).

To understand the huge value zero-day vulnerabilities and their exploits represent for cybercriminal groups, one simply has to take a look at the exorbitant sums of money they are sometimes traded for on underground forums (see section 1.10.12). However, known vulnerabilities are often sufficient for the attackers' purposes. For some vulnerabilities, in-depth technical analyses have already been conducted and published by security experts, providing attackers with fertile soil for carrying out their malicious operations. One such example is

Attack phase	Associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics with descriptions
Penetration and installation	• **Initial Access (TA0001):** Attackers attempt to penetrate the target environment. The initial access usually consists of a combination of techniques, including social engineering or the exploitation of vulnerabilities. The foothold gained through initial penetration can be used to enable continuous access (through valid credentials) or it can be restricted by changing passwords. • **Execution (TA0002):** Attackers attempt to execute malware. Execution comprises techniques that result in code controlled by the attacker being executed on a local or remote system. This often involves a combination of tactics. • **Persistence (TA0003):** Attackers attempt to manifest their intrusion into the system, to maintain access after reboots or when credentials are changed in the environment.

Table 3: "Penetration and installation" attack phase and associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics

the “Log4Shell” vulnerability, which was already closed in 2021, but still poses a threat to organizations ([108], p. 24). The outcomes of numerous studies from the current reporting period indicate that vulnerabilities are primarily leveraged by attackers to achieve initial penetration into systems, thus surpassing social engineering as the most common initial access vector ([217], p. 25). This confirms how extremely important appropriate, continuous exposure management is for an organization.

1.10.8 Effectively utilizing the human factor to penetrate IT systems

Social engineering remains a widespread technique for gaining initial access to target environments. In the case of social engineering, an attacker does not need to use exploits to technically crack open the door – instead, the victim simply opens the door and invites them in. Using a variety of manipulation strategies, the aim of social engineering is to deceive victims and persuade them to carry out actions desired by the attacker. Among other things, victims are requested to open email attachments, visit websites or disclose information, with attackers usually looking to take advantage of the victim’s good faith [30].

According to ENISA, the five forms of social engineering most frequently employed during the period covered by the report were: “phishing”, “spear phishing”, “whaling”, SMS phishing” (smishing) and “vishing” ([108], p. 8). The term “phishing” can be described as an act of fraud in which perpetrators present themselves as a trustworthy counterpart to potential victims in order to convince them to carry out a well-disguised malicious action, such as sharing sensitive information (e.g., credit card numbers, usernames, passwords) or clicking on a link. This makes phishing the ideal tool for stealing data or spreading malicious content. As previously reported in SCSR23, phishing continues to play a significant role in the infiltration of malware into systems, which has been confirmed by official assessments for the current reporting period ([35], p. 4), ([108], p. 72). Phishing is mainly conducted using fraudulent emails and websites ([113], p. 4). Spear phishing is a variant of phishing in which a certain organization or individual is targeted more specifically.

Whaling, on the other hand, is even more specific and targets potential victims in key positions (including politicians, chief executive officers, activists, security researchers) ([108], p. 71). Whaling is a technique which increasingly came to light during the period under review in connection with state-sponsored threat actors ([108], p. 24). Smishing and vishing involve fraudulent attacks using other communication channels. Smishing employs text messages or other short messages which usually urge their recipients to click on a link leading to a malicious website, vishing involves actively calling potential victims by phone to elicit specific information from them or arrange a bank transfer to a shady account ([28], p. 31).

Another noteworthy development is the lowering of entry barriers for launching phishing attacks, thanks to the large and affordable range of “phishing kits” or “Phishing-as-a-Service” (PhaaS) options now available. “EvilProxy”, with monthly license fees of between US $200 and US $1,000, shows just how effective such kits can be ([199], p. 29 ff.). First detected by an IT security firm at the end of 2022, EvilProxy acts as a reverse proxy, meaning that it is placed between the victim and a legitimate website in order to tap login details and cookies. Using this cleverly selected mechanism, also commonly known as a “man-in-the-middle attack” (MitM), attackers can even bypass security measures such as MFA. Moreover, EvilProxy offers deceptively realistic templates for fake websites to impersonate well-known companies such as Google or Microsoft ([28], p. 54). Simulations of phishing campaigns have shown that they achieve success rates of up to 40%, including the C-level management [139].

Other noteworthy social engineering techniques registered during the reporting period include "search engine optimization poisoning" (SEO poisoning) and "malvertisment", both of which have not lost any of their effectiveness despite being well-known scams ([28], p. 17), ([108], p. 30). SEO poisoning aims to convince users who have entered a search engine query to click on a malicious link that has achieved a high ranking through manipulation by the attacker. Its high positioning makes the link in the search result seem legitimate to the potential victim, even though it usually conceals a malicious website or malware. Malvertising refers to the distribution of malware via online advertising networks. Attackers place malicious adverts on legitimate websites or in legitimate advertising environments, which then directs victims to deceitful websites where they are infected with malware.

1.10.9 Gain control and spread unnoticed

Detect and stop intruders at an early stage

By the third phase of a cyberattack, "Taking, maintaining and extending control", cybercriminals have already successfully penetrated the target environment, regardless of whether this is a specific physical environment or cloud-based infrastructure. This also includes environments that can be described as "public facing", i.e. all applications and services in the context of companies and organizations that are publicly accessible via the internet, opening them up to the threat of infiltration. Knowing the typical methods used by hacker groups and having insight into the organization's own IT infrastructures are essential for ensuring that suitable measures can be taken to contain, ward off or detect attackers at this stage in order to avoid negative effects. The attacker tactics associated with this stage are described in Table 4.

Attack phase	Associated MITRE-ATT&CK tactics with descriptions
Taking, maintaining and extending control	• **Privilege Escalation (TA0004):** Attackers attempt to gain higher-level rights. With regular, unprivileged access, they can penetrate the environment and explore it. However, they need higher privileges to pursue their goals. Common approaches include the exploitation of misconfigurations and security vulnerabilities. The techniques used at this stage overlap with the persistence step. • **Defense Evasion (TA0005):** Attackers take steps to avoid detection. Techniques include the deactivation of security mechanisms or the obfuscation/encryption of data and scripts. They also use and abuse trusted processes to hide and disguise their malware. • **Credential Access (TA0006):** Attackers attempt to steal account names and passwords. Using legitimate credentials can give them access to systems, make them harder to detect and allow them to create more accounts to achieve their aims. • **Discovery (TA0007):** Adversaries explore the environment. This gives them the points of reference they need for their next actions. Inconspicuous tools are often used for this gathering of information. • **Lateral Movement (TA0008):** Attackers attempt to move through the environment. They use techniques that involve breaking through barriers. Using legitimate credentials and tools, among other things, they attract little attention. • **Collect (TA0009):** Attackers attempt to gather relevant data in the environment to achieve their aims, often followed by data theft. • **Command and Control (TA0011):** Attackers attempt to establish well-camouflaged command and control (C2) channels to gain remote access to the compromised environment.

Table 4: "Taking, maintaining and extending control" attack phase and associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics

1.10.10 Under the radar with legal tools: Gaining privileged user rights and opening back doors

At this stage, attackers generally pursue the goals of consolidating their position and advancing their attack objectives. At the same time, they try to draw as little attention to themselves as possible within the target environment. This typically includes deactivating technical safeguards such as anti-malware, endpoint detection and response systems (EDR) and firewalls or engaging in "log tampering", which involves the manipulation or deletion of log files. However, attackers have shown a tendency to move away from these classic measures and instead use legitimate means, such as altering authentication processes or raising the rights of the access details found (privilege escalation) ([59], p. 14).

In this regard, the exploitation of exposed applications installed in the target environment can also play a role. Remote monitoring and management programs, for instance, are classified as trusted applications and thus often not covered by technical security measures or subject to continuous monitoring [150]. This means they are necessarily more exposed to attack. In addition, they are of course equipped with privileged access. Once adversaries have succeeded in penetrating them, they are often presented with ideal conditions, as commands or scripts with system-wide access can be executed from within remote monitoring and management programs ([199], p. 22). In addition to obtaining elevated rights, which also facilitates false-flag reconnaissance, cybercriminals and state-sponsored groups typically establish backdoors and/or C2 (command & control) channels in these applications [66]. In the case of C2 channels, the communication between the compromised environment and its remote controllers is concealed using sophisticated techniques to effectively overcome "domain sinkholes" ([28], p. 14).

However, attackers can even go beyond remote monitoring and administration, orientating themselves unhindered in the target environment under the guise of legitimate applications and then spreading persistently ([113], p. 7). They literally merge with it. This includes the use of executable or binary files, which are present by default on every operating system ([108], p. 29). These can also be used to carry out malicious activities without necessarily having to load additional malware via C2.

In this context, attackers may also make use of tools familiar from the offensive security approach – a trend that has been emerging for some time ([35], p. 16). Originally employed for the proactive detection of vulnerabilities and potential points of entry by security experts and continuously developed further, these tools are of particular interest to cybercriminals. By their very nature, cybercriminals are striving to expand their arsenals via these kinds of channels. State-funded groups, on the other hand, tend to be more reluctant to use cutting-edge tools ([108], p. 23 ff.). One of the most efficient tools in the offensive security repertoire is known as "Cobalt Strike". In the first three quarters of 2022 alone, it was involved in almost 50% of all incidents reported to the security company Sophos [249]. It should also be mentioned that during the period covered by the report, attackers leveraged these and other supposedly legitimate applications to target local systems, knowledge databases, source code control systems and collaboration platforms within the target environment, particularly while gathering data ([59], p. 15).

Having said this, strategies to bypass security mechanisms or disguise attacks are not limited exclusively to the interior of the target environment. Stealth techniques also play a crucial role in penetration itself and during the preparation stage. Following Microsoft's announcement that it would disable macros in Office products by default, for instance, a new trend in the placement of malware has been noted. While malicious Office documents were still the primary means of achieving the initial infection over the previous reporting period, attackers are now increasingly relying on other

formats such as ISO, LNK and ZIP files for delivery ([28], p. 17), [183].

Furthermore, threat actors are increasingly turning to non-traditional programming languages such as Rust or Go to create malware. The primary motive for this is to take a cross-platform approach, often combined with better performance and memory management, meaning that their "products" can be offered efficiently to a wider audience. As security experts often have no practical experience with such programs, cybercriminals benefit from the fact that it is more difficult to analyse how malicious such programs might be ([108], p. 30).

DDoS attacks are also increasingly being leveraged in the context of camouflage techniques. It has been observed that attacks on availability are increasingly taking place almost in parallel with other attacks, such as data theft or the execution of malware. This could be interpreted as showing that DDoS has been employed as a diversionary tactic (false flag) [158]. DDoS is also used in state-sponsored activities, although not primarily for the purpose of diversion. In certain cases, experts assume that the aim is obfuscation. This was the case with operations carried out by the group "Anonymous Sudan" at the beginning of 2023, which targeted Swedish organizations with the aim of obstructing Sweden's accession to NATO. A sub-group of the pro-Russian Killnet gang, which specifically carries out hacktivism under a false flag, is suspected to have been behind these incidents ([108], p. 37), ([186], p. 9). These and other techniques are among the main reasons the attribution of cyberattacks is massively disrupted, leading to the boundaries between different groups becoming increasingly blurred.

1.10.11 Exploitation of the target environment

By the fourth and final phase of a cyberattack, "Achieving the desired impact", the attackers have now succeeded in setting themselves up to pursue their actual intentions. For this phase, the various hacker groups are also known to use their own specific tactics and methods. Analysing your own IT infrastructure and business model in advance enables you to develop measures for dealing with cyberattacks. With the knowledge they have about this attack phase, decision-makers can help to ensure that preventive and reactive measures are defined for the organization's cybersecurity strategy and implemented on an ongoing basis. Knowledge of the attacker's modus operandi can be used to determine the appropriate containment measures. The attacker tactics associated with this phase are described in Table 5.

Expansion within the target environment and extension of the attackers' control is followed by the final phase, which appears particularly complex in terms of its effects. Exploitable data detected within the target environment is moved to malicious infrastructures using exfiltration tactics such as established C2 channels. However, more mundane tools are also used to move the data. In fact, the various threat actors each have their own clear preferences as regards their choice of exfiltration applications. While the "Akira" group prefers to steal information via WinSCP, the adversaries involved in "ALPHV" and "Scattered Spider" use the Filezilla program [58]. It is hardly surprising that the last-mentioned two groups use similar tools, as their collaboration has recently come to light.

Attack phase	Associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics with descriptions
Achieving the desired impact	• **Exfiltration (TA0010):** Attackers attempt to steal data from the infiltrated network and potentially delete it there. They typically use established C2 or other channels. • **Impact (TA0040):** Attackers attempt to manipulate, disrupt or destroy systems and data to cause the desired impact on their victims.

Table 5: "Achieving the desired impact" attack phase and associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics

This was clearly illustrated by an attack on the MGM Resorts hotel and casino business. By exfiltrating information, these and other groups are able to lay their hands on masses of assets in the form of data for the purpose of espionage or monetization, depending on their ideology – including the sale of data in underground forums or demands for hush money via a "hack-and-leak" approach. The simple principle behind hack-and-leak is to publish stolen information on dedicated data leak websites. Using this approach, cybercriminals blackmail and pressure their victims into paying them before details of the incident are made public. In the period covered by the current report, this approach is pervasive and shows a rising trend ([28], p. 21 ff.), ([253], p. 2).

However, when it comes to extortion attempts in cyberspace, ransomware still predominates. Once the target environment has successfully been penetrated, ransomware is used in over 80% of cases ([277], p. 25 ff.). Attackers can also conveniently download ransomware onto their victims' environments via C2 channels. Once the ransomware is executed, victims immediately notice the effects, as data is encrypted and victims are presented with demands for ransom payments. This act of sabotage may also be combined with exfiltration of the data, to set up a "double extortion" approach. Similar to "hack-and-leak", this additionally involves a threat to release the stolen data to the public if victims do not pay up.

Legitimate system processes which have been manipulated by the attackers can also be used to perform the encryption of the data. Such activities are difficult to detect using existing security solutions and impressively demonstrate that attackers are constantly evolving to further minimize their footprint ([199], p. 18).

Another dimension of exploitation is "resource hijacking", in which the IT infrastructure of the victims, which can include organizations or individuals, is leveraged by attackers.

With this tactic, systems in the target environment are infected with malware, turning them into bots in a botnet that is controlled via C2 channels. The network bandwidth made up of these bots can be utilized for DDoS attacks. An armada of many thousands of bots, collectively working together by remote control to produce a huge amount of unwanted data traffic, bundle it and launch it towards a defined target, are very well suited to this task. If the size of a botnet can be kept consistently high over an extended period of time, this constitutes a lucrative business model. This is known as "DDoS-as-a-Service" and is primarily offered by hack-for-hire actors (see section 1.10.4). Also known as "booters", "stressers" or "DDoSers", they rent out their botnets as a service for a small fee, starting from as little as US $5 ([199], p. 39).

Using DDoS-as-a-Service, carrying out extortion attacks becomes a very straightforward proposition. The most basic form of DDoS extortion involves the attacker sending their victim a message in which they demand ransom against the threat of a DDoS attack. In some cases, the botnet may not even need to be used. A similar approach can also be used with ransomware. Another attack involves the intimidation of victims through an actual DDoS attack. In the wake of a short sample DDoS attack, victims receive a message claiming responsibility for the attack and requesting payment of a ransom under threat of an actual, more severe attack being carried out ([108], p. 94 ff.). If a ransomware attack is coupled with DDoS-as-a-Service, "double extortion" quickly turns into "triple extortion", in which a DDoS attack is carried out after the victim's data has been encrypted and made public in a bid to ramp up the pressure on the victim.

However, all of this crucially requires hack-for-hire actors to continuously ensure the quality of their services by intensively maintaining and supporting their malicious infrastructures. Consequently, any departures from the botnet must be compensated for by the addition of new bots. In view of this, the recruitment of devices from the Internet of Things (IoT) was observed to be an increasing trend [15], which underscores the importance of the EU Cyber

Resilience Act. Available in large numbers and seldom designed in accordance with security-by-design principles or ever provided with updates, IoT devices are easy targets to compromise ([7], p. 17). Unsecured clouds are also often used in connection with these devices. As a result, between 500,000 and 1 million globally distributed IoT devices or cloud instances account for more than 40 per cent of DDoS data traffic every day ([186], p. 14).

In addition, bots can leverage their resources in the form of computing power for specific use cases, such as crypto mining ([28], p. 14), in which very intensive computing operations are carried out to verify transactions made in digital currency. As a reward for their work, these "miners" receive a certain amount of the respective cryptocurrency. However, crypto mining can also be carried out by way of merged mining using a combination of different miners. This provides an ideal opportunity for cybercriminals to make their victims' resources work for them and line their own pockets further.

1.10.12 Underworld dynamics: Rivalry and outsourcing

SCSR23 provided an account of the cybercriminal ecosystem and its accelerators. The spotlight was on the business models behind CaaS and RaaS, along with their affiliate programs, specialized tools and services used by cybercriminals. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine were certainly contributing factors. In many respects, the organization and specialization of threat actors was already discernible at that time. Against this backdrop, the period currently under review provides an even more transparent view of the ecosystem's internal structures, revealing how professionalism has reached new levels and competition has become a crucial factor.

An understanding of organized cybercrime cannot simply be derived from the individual phases of an attack described above (see section 1.10.5). Cybercriminals are constantly trying to optimize their operations and organization. According to the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), a typical ransomware gang is structured as follows ([35], p. 19). It consists of 30 to 100 gang members and can be roughly divided into three organizational units. The "Administration" unit is responsible for the RaaS business model, recruiting, training and knowledge management. The "IT" division is responsible for providing and maintaining the technical infrastructure and giving support to all units. The last unit, "Operations", is essentially concerned with the creation of malicious code, the circumvention of security mechanisms and obfuscation tactics. This unit also contains specialized teams which are in contact with potential victims to conduct negotiations with them or their incident response service providers. The attacks, on the other hand, are carried out by in-house hacking teams or affiliates.

Even though the organizational structure outlined above is a blueprint for RaaS, these structures can be optimized further using the services offered by clandestine criminal operators. Hack-for-hire threat actors, in particular, play a key role in "Access-as-a-Service" (AaaS). In this attack model, stolen identity

and credentials as well as ready-to-use access to compromised target environments is offered for sale on illegal marketplaces ([28], p. 17), ([108], p. 21). In fact, this segment of the ecosystem is flourishing considerably, to the extent that the supply has more than doubled ([59], p. 9).

Despite the descriptions provided here, it must be pointed out that cybercriminals by no means have a carefree life. With the launch of the first affiliate programs some time ago, the floodgates to competition were opened ([28], p. 18), ([49], p. 30). For instance, if one RaaS offer is deemed not to be as promising as another, affiliates may defect to competitors. This can damage the reputation of a "brand". Due to this competitive aspect, providers of these services always endeavour to provide high-quality services. The tactics of other providers are closely scrutinized and replicated as required. Therefore, it is not uncommon for players to add capabilities they have observed competitors using to their portfolios only weeks or months later ([108], p. 66). Failure by a group to pay its affiliates with cryptocurrency after having received a ransomware payment can cause lasting damage to its reputation and capabilities. On 1 March 2024, this is exactly what happened when US healthcare provider Change Healthcare transferred a payment of US $22 million to the "BlackCat" / "ALPHAV" ransomware gang to decrypt their data and prevent four terabytes of data from being released [180]. On 3 March, an affiliate posted a complaint in an underground forum about not having been paid his commission, which "BlackCat" had increased to 90% following infiltration by the FBI in December 2023.

The offering of bug bounty programmes for cybercriminals is a rather recent phenomenon. Just like their legal counterparts, CaaS operators call for exposures in their own services to be identified in return for a finder's fee. One prerequisite is that sufficient details of any exposures discovered must be documented and made available in a way that makes them reproducible. The financial bounty is then paid out by the CaaS provider following successful validation. At the beginning of the reporting period, a "bug bounty" was issued by "LockBit" for its namesake RaaS for the first time ([28], p. 18), ([35], p. 21).

Even though media news tickers report an abundance of cyber incidents, and the number of financially motivated groups was observed to have grown during the period of the report (see section 1.5), the number of key players in the cybercriminal ecosystem can be described as moderate at best ([35], p. 21), ([49], p. 30). Three gangs dominated the RaaS market from the second quarter of 2023: "LockBit", "ALPHV" and "Cl0p". These threat actors are adapting and developing their methods to enable them to outperform their competitors, repeatedly demonstrating the competitive spirit and resilience of the market ([160], p. 7). However, it has also been noted that large groups, sooner or later, become conspicuous and are rendered harmless ([28], p. 18).

Efficient law enforcement has reduced the average lifespan of a ransomware gang from around 150 days in the previous reporting period to less than half that length in the period covered by this report ([49], p. 29). However, the dismantling of criminal networks and official dissolution of gangs, accompanied by headlines around the globe, only tells part of the true story as the case involving the "Conti" group reveals. The feared cybercrime syndicate splintered at the beginning of the report period due to internal political disputes regarding the war between Ukraine and Russia. However, in the meanwhile it has emerged that its operators and users are still active. While some members of the group have joined "Akira" ([160], p. 6), a large number of affiliates are now collaborating with "LockBit" ([49], p. 32). As part of "Operation Cronos", "LockBit" and its global infrastructure were also raided by law enforcement authorities in numerous countries on 20 February 2024. It remains to be seen which new groups will dominate in 2024.

1.11 Description of critical incidents

In the current reporting period, a multitude of cyberattacks have succeeded in achieving their goals and having their desired impact. This section provides insight into particularly noteworthy incidents according to the MITRE framework. The details presented here provide a deeper understanding of the roles played by both attacker and victim, allowing decision-makers to develop a better grasp of the dangers in cyberspace.

1.11.1 Microsoft Master Key / Storm-0558

1.11.1.1 Initial situation

In mid-June 2023, a US government authority alerted Microsoft to the fact that they had detected irregular email access in its Microsoft-operated cloud environment. Analyses carried out by the provider confirmed that unauthorized access had been gained to the Exchange accounts of its customers (primarily European government agencies and authorities). This intrusion took place using a stolen "signature key", which gave the attackers access to emails and attachments ([144], p. 1). Technically, a signature key is like a digital fingerprint which is used for authentication purposes, i.e. verifying a given identity. Exchange accounts are employed to centrally manage and synchronize emails, calendars and contacts.

Microsoft initially kept a low profile regarding the incident ([144], p. 1). Meanwhile, security researchers were investigating the potential damage the loss of such a key could cause. In their analysis, they were able to clearly match the signature key to the cloud directory service, which acts as a kind of telephone book for known cloud users. In this way, it would not only grant the attackers full access to external Exchange accounts, but also to a significant portion of the provider's global Azure cloud services ([257], p. 2).

1.11.1.2 The perpetrators and their motives

According to internal forensic investigations, the attack can most likely be attributed to the Chinese-backed "Storm-0558" group. Microsoft cites espionage as the reason for the attack. In its July 2023 analysis, the company additionally reports that cybercriminals connected with "Storm-0558" were observed attacking US and European political targets as well as individuals linked with the geopolitical interests of Taiwan and the Uyghurs, among others. Previously, "Storm-0558" had specifically aimed to achieve unauthorized access to the email accounts of selected organizations, for example by stealing credentials via phishing campaigns. However, they have also been known to exploit vulnerabilities in public-facing environments to gain initial access. Microsoft regards the technical capabilities possessed by the group, which was first identified in August 2021, to be outstanding. The group has in-depth knowledge of its targets, their environments and underlying security policies. Analysis of the attack revealed the use of sophisticated tools and extensive preparation, which suggests advanced equipment and in-depth knowledge of authentication techniques [197].

1.11.1.3 Attack strategy and tactics

In September 2023, Microsoft published details of the attack, including the circumstances that led to the theft. However, it remained unclear how the perpetrators had obtained the signature key. Initial reports stated that the theft had resulted when a signature system for customer environments had crashed back in April 2021 ([257], p. 1). According to Microsoft's current knowledge, the stolen signature key was used to create fake authentication tokens (i.e. software keys) via token forgery and ultimately penetrate the secure cloud environment.

Token forgery involves adversaries replicating the appearance or characteristics of legitimate tokens in order to hoodwink authentication systems into believing they possess the valid authorizations. Accordingly, access was granted to the cloud. In addition, the attackers exploited a validation error in the source code of the cloud application to gain access to private customer accounts and protected business customer areas [204]. The use of this attack strategy deviates from previous observations of "Storm-0558"'s practices.

Starting mid-May 2023, the attackers used the stolen key to generate tokens and leveraged a large number of other dedicated servers to carry out their illegal operations. The tactics and techniques applied in this attack are outlined in Table 6.

1.11.1.4 Extent of the attack

In addition to 25 impacted organizations, including their Exchange accounts in the public cloud, a double-digit number of government-linked accounts were also hacked ([257], p. 1). US authorities also reported the loss of 60,000 emails ([253], p. 9). As state-sponsored groups mainly focus on large companies, government officials, regime critics and journalists, one would expect private cloud users to have been spared from the attack ([257], p. 2). If the authorizations obtained with the stolen key are indeed as extensive as experts suspect, this would be a considerable blow to the operator's reputation. Even though there are no indications that the attackers have used the key beyond the known extent ([144], p. 3), several security researchers point out that it is currently unclear whether the attackers have succeeded in gaining wider access and potentially even managed to install backdoors ([144], p. 3), ([257], p. 2).

1.11.1.5 Findings and lessons learned

On June 27, 2023, Microsoft ensured that the security risk had been eliminated by declaring the key invalid [197]. This step resulted in all access created with the affected signature key also being blocked. However, more far-reaching security measures need to be taken on the customer side with regard to the affected services. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the FBI are calling for organizations to monitor the logging protocols they receive from the operator for suspicious activity. This is especially crucial for critical infrastructure (KRITIS) operators using Microsoft's Azure cloud service [67].

Attack phase	Description of tactics and techniques used
Reconnaissance and preparation	Exploring the cloud environment, including the underlying security architecture and any relevant policies. Theft of the signature key.
Penetration and installation	–
Taking, maintaining and extending control	Signature key used to create forged tokens for authentication in the cloud environment. Extension of authorizations via systematic flaws within the cloud. Gathering of data from secure areas for private and business customers.
Achieving the desired impact	Emails, file attachments, calendar entries, etc., were stolen.

Table 6: Tactics and techniques by attack phase – Microsoft Master Key by Storm-0558



Source: Own diagram

Figure 1: Overview of the Microsoft master key theft from China

As a supplementary measure, experts recommend implementing end-to-end encryption ([257], p. 2). This ensures that the transmitted information is not accessible in unencrypted form by the service provider, but rather only on the end device itself. Even if this specific incident has been technically resolved from Microsoft's perspective, it raises fundamental questions about the security of its Azure cloud solutions ([207], p. 2), ([257], p. 1). Beyond this, there may also be implications for the German government's digital transformation plans and the security strategy set out in the coalition agreement. The BSI has already conducted a detailed analysis of the technical background to the incident. It is now examining potential consequences and considering measures for the federal administration's cloud initiatives ([257], p. 2 ff.).

1.11.1.6 Similar incidents

In 2022, security experts identified a BEC campaign targeting key decision-makers at companies using Microsoft Office 365. The attackers succeeded in compromising a CEO's Office 365 account by intercepting credentials using MitM techniques (see section 1.10.7). Although MFA had already been set up, the attackers were nevertheless able to use a second authenticator application – without the knowledge of the CEO concerned – to circumvent the previous measures by exploiting weak security settings and intercepting the MFA tokens. Sensitive and personal data was then exfiltrated by way of the compromised account and misused for subsequent CEO fraud [201], [285].

Another incident was reported by Microsoft in early 2024, when the company discovered an attack on its own systems by the Russian state-funded "Midnight Blizzard" hacker group. According to the reports, "Midnight Blizzard" (also known as "Nobelium", "APT29") began using brute force attacks to gain access to a legacy, non-production test account which was not protected with MFA, at the end of 2023. "Midnight Blizzard" then managed to access a small number of Microsoft email accounts using the assigned rights. Emails and attached documents were stolen from the senior management team, the cybersecurity team and the legal department [203], [269]. In March 2024, Microsoft again announced that the Russian hackers were continuing to invest significant resources in attempts to gain access to its networks and had succeeded in stealing some of the company's source code.

1.11.2 MGM Resorts International / No more bets, please!

1.11.2.1 Initial situation

MGM Resorts, operator of numerous hotels and casinos worldwide, announced a cybersecurity incident via social media on the morning of 11 September 2023. It stated that some systems had needed to be shut down in response to the incident, and that an investigation had been initiated [235]. The chaos caused by the forced shutdown generated widespread publicity on social media. Those affected by the attack reported problems with booking systems and the loyalty program as well as the apps and websites associated with the hotel chain. In some cases, accessing booked rooms with key cards became an issue and analogue solutions had to be found [25], [246]. The conglomerate's 13 resorts in Las Vegas were hit particularly hard. Even some of their slot and gambling machines were affected by the outage. A ransomware attack was suspected almost immediately, but the provider did not initially confirm this [25]. A day later, the entire digital guest service was still disrupted, while complaints about the issues continued to accumulate on social media. In the days following the MGM attack, video clips and images of frustrated guests in queues, deserted casino floors and out-of-service slot machines prevailed on social media. Failures within the room key card system also resulted in significant security concerns. Guests were granted access to all corridors unhindered and were able to enter any unlocked room [235].

1.11.2.2 The perpetrators and their motives

Two days after the initial impact of the incident, the attack was attributed to the "Scattered Spider" group [235], [246]. Security researchers consider the English-speaking gang, also known as "Scatter Swine", "Roasted 0ktapus" and "Storm-0875", to be extremely youthful and motivated purely by financial gain. One security firm found that "Scattered



Source: Own diagram

Figure 2: MGM Resorts International Ransomware Attack

Spider" often leverages a combination of phishing for credentials and social engineering tactics to snag one-time passwords. The group's repertoire also includes tactics to bypass MFA. They achieve this by collecting targeted information from social media to use in impersonation attacks. Misleading phone calls are made to trick IT helpdesk staff into handing over legitimate credentials [246]. Some experts suspect that "Scattered Spider" is linked to the ransomware gang "ALPHV", which first appeared as a provider of RaaS in November 2021 [237]. On 14 September 2023, "ALPHV" published a statement on its darknet page, claiming responsibility for the incident as well as expressing their annoyance with the reporting to date and lack of communication on the part of MGM. In their statement, the criminals also describe the exact course of the attack from their perspective [236].

1.11.2.3 Attack strategy and tactics

To infiltrate MGM's systems, the attackers first scouted social media platform LinkedIn for MGM employees likely to have elevated privileges in the "Okta" identity service used by the entertainment giant. Once sufficient information had been gathered, they conducted a 10-minute vishing call with the IT helpdesk in which they posed as a preselected employee and obtained all the information they needed to access the victim's Okta account [246]. The attackers claimed in their statement that they had infiltrated MGM's Okta and Azure environments starting on 8 September 2023. Once inside, they had obtained administrator rights and thus gained full access to the company's systems [235], [246]. When MGM became aware of the intrusion, the company shut down large parts of its systems to protect its infrastructure, but the attackers could no longer be stopped by this measure [235], [236]. To demonstrate that sensitive data had already been exfiltrated, the criminals published a portion of the data and protected the link with a combination of the passwords of two executives. After the attackers had been unable to establish contact with MGM by 10 September 2023, they launched a ransomware attack on over 100 of the corporation's servers to ramp up the pressure [236]. The tactics and techniques used for this attack are listed in Table 7.

1.11.2.4 Extent of the attack

The impact of the attack led to severe repercussions and caused significant disruption to the company's network and connected devices. More than 30 hotels and casinos were affected around the globe for an extended period of time [246]. MGM announced that the damage suffered by the company amounted to around US$100 million, including

Attack phase	Description of tactics and techniques used
Reconnaissance and preparation	Scouting of MGM employees with high privileges on LinkedIn.
Penetration and installation	Vishing attempt on helpdesk, impersonating and resetting the MFA of an MGM employee. Intrusion into cloud environments by way of vishing attack using already privileged credentials, followed by installation of ransomware variant.
Taking, maintaining and extending control	Collecting data.
Achieving the desired impact	Exfiltration of sensitive data combined with ransom extortion (hack and leak). Double extortion through encryption of data in target environments.

Table 7: Tactics and techniques by attack phase – Ransomware in MGM casinos: "No more bets, please!"

US$10 million in fees for IT consultants and lawyers [174]. Due to the website outages, there were also fewer bookings than usual [238]. In addition, a large amount of sensitive customer data was stolen and published [238]. According to one security researcher, this customer data included names, contact information such as dates of birth, telephone numbers, email addresses and postal addresses, as well as driving licences and social security numbers [174]. MGM confirmed this in an open letter, declaring that the data only comprised transactions prior to March 2019 [238].

1.11.2.5 Findings and lessons learned

On 22 September, MGM Resorts announced that all its hotels and casinos were operating smoothly again. The operator also emphasized that no ransom payments had been made when resolving the situation [238]. To improve the security of its systems, the company has since taken additional security measures. MGM moreover advises those affected to be more vigilant regarding phishing attempts and offers those impacted by the incident access to a credit monitoring and identity protection service free of charge for two years [174]. The incident impressively demonstrates how even the security mechanisms of a company worth US $34 billion can be rendered ineffective within a few minutes through social engineering due to a simple blunder by an individual employee [235].

1.11.2.6 Similar incidents

It was revealed that in August 2023, only shortly before the attack on MGM, a similar security incident had unfolded at casino operator Caesars Entertainment. According to reports, a large ransom was extorted by "Scattered Spider". Caesars reported that, unlike MGM, their customer-facing operations were not impacted. The company's physical locations and online gambling applications were both affected by the incident. In the two incidents, the attackers proceeded in an almost identical fashion by using the IT helpdesk of a third-party provider as a gateway [235]. Personal customer data was also breached in the case of Caesars. However, the attackers stated that they did not intend to make this data public [237].

1.11.3 Zero-day exploit in file transfer service MOVEit

1.11.3.1 Initial situation

On 31 May 2023, software manufacturer Progress announced that a zero-day vulnerability had been discovered in its software product MOVEit. Progress also announced that an ongoing campaign of attacks was already exploiting the vulnerability. MOVEit is a file exchange service that enables external users to upload data and make it available to other users ([28], p. 38). The vast number of customers using the popular software includes well-known companies from a wide range of sectors, such as healthcare, aviation and government institutions ([167], p. 3). Zero-day vulnerabilities are considered particularly critical, as they are completely unknown before they are published, meaning attackers are free to exploit them at will (see section 1.10.7). As a result, the BSI (German Federal Office for Information Security) classified the situation as extremely threatening with an acute need for action ([28], p. 38).

1.11.3.2 The perpetrators and their motives

Several IT security service providers attributed the attack to the "Cl0p" group, which had already become known for conducting ransomware attacks. Their typical scam involves financial blackmail using the "double extortion" approach, i.e. blackmailing victims initially by encrypting their data and then combining this with the threat of publishing the data they have stolen (see section 1.10.11). Shortly thereafter, Cl0p claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement to the news site Bleeping Computer ([28], p. 38). Based on the most recent

Attack phase	Description of tactics and techniques used
Reconnaissance and preparation	Scouting the target environment. Development of a webshell called „LEMURLOOT“ for data exchange. Acquisition or in-house development of zero-day SQL injection code (see CVE-2023-34362). Strategic scheduling of the attack (weekend around the US Memorial Day public holiday).
Penetration and installation	Intrusion via zero-day SQL injection and installation of LEMURLOOT.
Taking, maintaining and extending control	Remote control and data collection via LEMURLOOT. Obfuscation of the webshell through legitimate naming in the target environment.
Achieving the desired impact	Exfiltration of sensitive data via LEMURLOOT and extortion of ransom (see Hack-and-Leak).

Table 8: Tactics and techniques by attack phase – Zero-day exploit in MOVEit data exchange service

knowledge available, it can be assumed that the actors behind Cl0p have their origins in Russia [80], ([167], p. 3), [187].

1.11.3.3 Attack strategy and tactics

Attacks were launched on vulnerable server systems starting from 27 May 2023, four days before the official announcement of the zero-day vulnerability ([28], p. 38), ([108], p. 58). The “Cl0p” group thus aimed to compromise a large number of file-sharing servers and exfiltrate data within the shortest possible timeframe. This approach intended to minimize the effectiveness of countermeasures, such as installing security updates or shutting down the servers ([28], p. 38). The tactical ingenuity of the cybercriminals is also reflected in the timing of the attack. It mainly fell on Memorial Day, an extended US bank holiday when many organizations reduce IT security staff numbers, further increasing their exposure. The majority of the data is now known to have been compromised between 30 and 31 May 2023 ([108], p. 58). However, exploiting the zero-day vulnerability only served as the gateway – the first step in the attack sequence. By gaining access to the server systems, the cybercriminals were able to put a webshell in place, which allowed them to execute any code they desired and enabled them to control the server systems remotely. Subsequently, the attackers issued the command to transfer the stored data to their own infrastructure, thereby exfiltrating it ([28], p. 38). Although the cybercriminals behind “Cl0p” are known for their extortion campaigns using encryption tactics, there was no evidence of conventional ransomware being deployed in this incident ([108], p. 58). This reflects the general emergence of a trend towards the pure exfiltration of data, followed by extortion without encryption technology (see section 1.10.11). The tactics and techniques used for this attack are described in Table 8.

1.11.3.4 Extent of the attack

A large number of well-known companies worldwide have been confirmed as victims of the attack, including a British payroll service provider, a broadcaster, several airlines and more than one bank ([167], p. 3), ([253], p. 17). JDepending on the servers’ particular functions, a variety of sensitive information was lost. For example, large amounts of personal data were leaked ([288], p. 33), including 4 million health records, 2 million birth certificates and customer data ([253], p. 17). Although the precise number of victims impacted by this attack cannot be determined ([28], p. 38), it is estimated to be more than 2,700 companies worldwide [242].

1.11.3.5 Findings, lessons learned and similar incidents

The vulnerability was closed by way of a security update issued by the manufacturer on 2 June 2023, 6 days after the attacks had begun. As of 14 June 2023, the attackers started posting the data stolen from the impacted companies publicly with the aim of blackmailing them ([28], p. 38). The sophisticated methods employed by the attackers, coupled with the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities, underline the importance of stepping up cybersecurity measures. At the same time, it is essential that manufacturers disclose their known vulnerabilities ([108], p. 59).

The approach is analogous to an attack by the same group in January 2023 on file-sharing servers on which the GoAnywhere software ([28], p. 38) was installed. The attack was also cleverly timed, and a zero-day vulnerability was exploited to steal data from 104 affected organizations. The stolen data was then used as leverage to blackmail the impacted companies, by threatening to publish it if the victims failed to comply with the ransom demands ([108], p. 58).

1.11.4 Hamas' attack on Israel: An overview

1.11.4.1 Hamas carries out terrorist attack on Israel employing a combination of digital and analogue means

At 6:30 am on 7 October 2023, towards the end of a Jewish holiday, up to 3,000 members or sympathizers of the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas launched a surprise attack on the state of Israel. The terrorists managed to break through or overcome the extensive, well-secured barriers between Israel and Gaza using an overload attack analogous to DDoS. The terrorists committed large scale atrocities against civilians and military personnel during the attack. More than 1,200 people were killed in the terrorist attack, some of them in the most brutal manner, and around 240 people were taken hostage and abducted to Gaza. Some of Hamas' horrific actions were broadcast live on various social media, leaving many security experts to wonder how these actions had apparently remained hidden from the Israeli security forces [68], [76].

In previous attacks, Hamas had never been characterized by a particularly high level of planning and technicality. It was also not known for its ability to combine analogue and digital tools [68]. Mainly among the Israeli press and public, questions arose such as: "Is it possible that the surveillance camera systems were hacked and the video recordings from those cameras destroyed or replaced with fake ones? Might hackers allied to Hamas have been able to penetrate the cell phones of soldiers and security forces in the border area, in addition to monitoring and tracking the location of Israeli Defense Force (IDF) patrols?" [166].

1.11.4.2 Hamas allies itself with Arab, Russian and Iranian hacker groups

According to analysis by the Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD) and an Israeli group of investigators (Digital Forensics Investigation Group – IPCS), various actors were identified as having supported the Hamas terrorist attack. The perpetrators were found to be linked with various Arab, Russian and Iranian hacker groups.

Based on various forum posts on the darknet, the attacks on Israeli video surveillance systems could be attributed to a Russian group called "IT UNDERGROUND". Group members report that IDF security cameras at the border were taken over by way of camera hacking techniques. Brochures and descriptions in Arabic and Persian were posted as proof. IT UNDERGROUND was also able to provide evidence of earlier orders from the client "Internet Research Agency", the Wagner Group's hacker division [68].

Various malware programs used in the attack could be attributed to the Iranian hacker group "GREATRIFT". Wipers known as "BiBi-Windows Wiper" (Bibi is the nickname of Benjamin Netanyahu), "BiBi-Linux Wiper", "ChiLLWIPE" and "COOLWIPE", can be traced back to hacktivists named "Karma" and "Handala Hack". Furthermore, the Iranian "Charming Kitten" hacker group attacked various Israeli media and non-governmental organizations via a phishing campaign to plant backdoors with the name "POWERPUG".

The exploitation of cell phones for espionage purposes using the "MOAAZDRO-ID" and "LOVELYDROID" malware can be linked to the Hamas-affiliated actor "Desert Varnish" [262]. Throughout 2023, numerous cyberattacks by the "Storm-1133" hacker group on various Israeli institutions had already been registered ([199], p. 74). A hacker group known as "AnonGhost" was responsible for the attack on the missile warning system [223].

1.11.4.3 Exploiting a vulnerability to warn of an alleged nuclear attack

The hacker group "AnonGhost" calculatingly exploited a vulnerability in the "Red Alert" missile warning application to send fake alerts regarding an alleged nuclear attack to an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Israeli users. Taking advantage of a vulnerability in a programming interface, the attackers were able to send spam messages within the Red Alert chat to a large group of users. After developing the exploit, the attackers were able to expose vulnerable servers and interfaces, allowing them to use Python scripts to spread their messages [223]. The attackers also set up a fake website offering unsuspecting users a link prompting them to download a malicious software package for mobile phones [70].

1.11.4.4 Sabotage of missile warning systems and media through DDoS attacks

Intended to disrupt the provision of information and warnings about incoming rocket attacks to the Israeli population, massive DDoS attacks were carried out on critical websites. Numerous media outlets were affected by these DDoS attacks in an effort to substantially obstruct the dissemination of news and alerts about the Hamas terrorist attack. The first of these DDoS attacks reached a peak of 100,000 requests per second and lasted ten minutes. The second, much larger attack, peaked at 1 million requests per second and lasted only six minutes [293]. The DDoS attacks primarily employed requests at the application (layer 7) and communication (layer 3 and layer 4) levels [166].

1.11.4.5 Hamas utilizes poorly configured surveillance cameras for its own propaganda

In the attack on surveillance cameras, poorly configured cameras were evidently exploited by the adversaries. Such cameras often use the Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP). While the protocol is very useful for the transmission of real-time data, it offers neither encryption nor lockout mechanisms to prevent passwords being guessed. As a result, attackers only need basic skills to find valid login data for a camera using a brute force approach. Attackers can use well-known software tools with instructions that have long been available. In addition to risks such as the theft of personal information, manipulation and the posting of recorded data on the Internet, such cameras also offer an opportunity for attackers to penetrate the network to which the cameras are connected [205].

1.12 The impact and damage caused by cyberattacks

1.12.1 General damage

To the general public, cyberattacks on the IT infrastructures of government institutions, companies or private individuals are often associated with damage and other undesirable outcomes, which can generally be separated into material and immaterial damage. For IT security experts, however, the resulting damage or IT security breach is characterized by the fact that the three main protection objectives of information security – confidentiality, availability and integrity – have been violated. Decision-makers at a company primarily need to control and manage the financial and operational impact of cyberattacks. However, the consequences of cyberattacks are considerably more complex and multi-layered. To ensure that all facets of cyberattacks are taken into consideration and remain in focus, it is advisable to keep the following categories in mind when dealing with an incident ([108], p. 16):

- **Digital impact** (breach of confidentiality, availability and integrity) refers to damaged or unavailable systems, corrupted data files, the exfiltration of data or the undesired manipulation of data.

- **Economic impact** refers to the direct financial loss incurred (loss of business, financial damage), the damage to national security caused by the loss of critical materials, the cost of restoring the normal situation or of ransom payments.

- **Social impact** refers to any effect on the general public or to a widespread disruption that may have an impact on society (e.g., incidents disrupting a country's national health system, failure of services to the general public by government authorities).

- **Reputational impact** refers to the potential for negative reputation, publicity or an adverse public perception of individuals or organizations that have fallen victim to a cyberattack.

- **Physical impact** refers to any type of injury or harm to employees, customers or patients.

- **Psychological impact** refers to any kind of pressure, discomfort, frustration, worry or anxiety which affects employees, customers or patients, or the general public. See chapter 4 for a detailed assessment.

In the period covered by the report, more than 1,000 incidents (19%) in Europe can be described as having a significant economic impact. These were mainly caused by ransomware, DDoS or malware. A similarly high share (18%) of the incidents – caused by ransomware, data breaches and malware – also had a notable social impact. Roughly 5% of all incidents had a negative reputational or psychological impact. Reputational damage was mainly caused by ransomware, data breaches or data leaks, along with DDoS attacks and information manipulation. Psychological impact was primarily observed in incidents involving information manipulation or data leaks of personal details ([108], p. 17). For the first time during the latest report period, the majority of companies surveyed in Germany, 52%, felt that their continued existence was threatened by cyberattacks (previous year: 45%) ([21], p. 12). It is not without good reason that cyber incidents are the cause of business interruption rated as the top global risk by companies of all sizes ([7], p. 7).

The direct cost of an information security incident during the period under review was €250,000 on average, again rising sharply (by 25%) compared with the previous year ([112], p. 5). In the case of successful attacks on cloud applications, the average cost (excluding reputational damage and loss of customer trust) was over US $4 million ([156], p. 6). The total annual losses sustained in Germany due to cyberattacks, espionage and sabotage were estimated at €206 billion over the period under review

([21], p. 4). Compared with the previous year, losses edged up only slightly from €203 billion (+1.5%) ([21], p. 4). This suggests that the steep growth in total losses observed from 2019 to 2022 was successfully halted by the introduction of countermeasures. The figures also show that almost every German company has already been directly affected by an attack ([28], p. 55). Overall, the largest increases in damages recorded were related to damage to the organization's image (€35 billion; +50%), the cost of legal disputes (€30 billion; +84%) and blackmail leveraging stolen or encrypted data (€16 billion; +50%) ([21], p. 4).

In addition, during this period there was a clear trend towards cyberattacks on hospitals and public institutions in Germany. In many cases, this led to institutions having to suspend their operations entirely or only being able to maintain emergency operations to ensure essential care. In the previous report, these severe restrictions were limited to only a few local authorities.

In 2023, for instance, the "Akira" cybercrime group launched an attack on the IT service provider Südwestfalen-IT, disrupting around 160 organizations (11 district administrations, 105 municipalities including schools, 26 companies, 10 registry offices) in the federal states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony ([127], p. 3), [177], [181], [296]. In late November 2023, 11 municipalities in the district of Neu-Ulm were impacted. In addition, a number of local authorities in Hesse also reported severe cyberattacks. At the beginning of February 2024, the hospital network of the Dreifaltigkeitshospital in Lippstadt (850 employees, 295 beds, 14,000 inpatient and 34,000 outpatient treatments per year) was paralyzed by a cyberattack, due to which the hospital not only lost personal data, but also ran into financial difficulties because it lacked invoicing capability. The local authority had to come to the rescue with a bond worth €8 million.

1.12.2 Ransomware

In the period under review, attacks increased significantly in many spheres. This upsurge and the resulting impact are now so substantial that even third parties such as regular citizens, schoolchildren or healthcare patients are also feeling the effects. For months on end, the provision of certain services could only be sustained with emergency operations ([283], p. 2). Ransomware attacks on the operational technology of industrial companies have a huge impact on the victims, which extends to companies further downstream in the supply chain [250].

When it comes to ransomware, the heaviest damages and costs are incurred in the course of restoring normal operations and paying ransom. For Germany, the total damage caused by ransomware is estimated at €10.7 billion. The proportion of companies known to have paid ransom continued to fall [57] and now stands at 41% ([35], p. 17), although the hidden number of unreported cases is likely to remain high. In contrast, the overall cost for restoring systems has risen ([277], p. 30). These growing costs are especially concerning for small and medium-sized enterprises. Companies come under extreme pressure to limit the damage, leading some businesses to pay the demanded ransom in the hope of quickly becoming operational again ([28], p. 14). The average ransom paid in the current report period lies between US $276,000 ([35], p. 17) and US $568,000 [57]. During 2023, cybercriminals were able to generate total revenue of US $457 million (−40.3%) worldwide from ransom payments [49].

When exclusively focusing on ransomware attacks that additionally resulted in data leaks or breaches, the damages are significantly higher. The average cost of a ransomware attack in the period under review was US $5.13 million, an increase of 13% compared to the previous year ([153], p. 32). The payment of a ransom only leads to minimal cost savings in terms of recovery costs. The companies that paid ransom incurred costs of US $5.06 million – in direct comparison to US $5.17 million for companies that did not pay a ransom. However,

this cost comparison does not take into account the cost of the ransom itself. The data shows that the overall costs can hardly be reduced by paying ransom ([153], p. 35). Only 37% of ransomware victims consider involving law enforcement agencies, even though this has been proven to reduce costs. The average cost of a ransomware breach in the period under review was US $5.11 million when law enforcement authorities were not involved as opposed to US $4.64 million with their involvement. This is equivalent to cost-savings of 9.6% or US $470,000 which can be achieved by involving law enforcement agencies ([153], p. 33). This data clearly illustrates and reaffirms the recommendations of the BSI or BKA not to pay ransom in the event of a ransomware attack and to involve the law enforcement authorities, even from a purely financial point of view.

1.12.3 Social engineering

The majority of attackers (98%) [225] attempt to gain access to IT systems by way of social engineering techniques. When attackers gain direct access, this in itself does not initially cause any immediate damage to the victim. It is therefore difficult to quantify the direct damage caused by social engineering. Overall, it could be determined that phishing and stolen or compromised access credentials were responsible for roughly 16% of all security breaches registered in the period covered by the report ([153], p. 20). The average damage resulting from a social engineering attack is around US $130,000 [138]. The average damage from data breaches caused by social engineering is US $4.55 million. When it comes to phishing, the costs are as high as US $4.76 million ([153], p. 20). According to the FBI's assessments, the total losses due to business email compromise (BEC) attacks during the period covered by the report amounted to US $2.7 billion ([108], p. 80). The average loss resulting from each BEC attack in the period under review was US $83,000 [121]. When law enforcement agencies succeeded in shutting down a CaaS website for spoofing calls, it was determined that over 10 million calls had been made and €115 million damage caused ([113], p. 8). Attacks leveraging social engineering are among the most effective and lucrative of all attack types, as the costs for the attackers are very low in comparison with potential profits. Working alone, a threat actor with minimal knowledge of cybersecurity can acquire the technical means to carry out a complex phishing campaign for as little as US $15 per day ([108], p. 73).

1.12.4 DDoS

In DDoS attacks, the protagonists focus on directly disrupting the operations of IT systems or web applications. Therefore, all successful DDoS attacks inevitably lead to disruptions in the provision of services or the operation of systems. The targets could be websites, for instance, or payment system infrastructures. As many as 56.8% of DDoS attacks cause total disruption of the system under attack. In 21.3% of DDoS attacks, on the other hand, there was a partial disruption or intermittent outages resulting in severe disruption of services for users. Only in 3.9% of the incidents did the DDoS attacks cause what was described as "zero disruption", in which the attack itself was totally ineffective or the existing DDoS safeguards ensured that there was no noticeable impact on the target ([109], p. 23).

During 2023, the websites belonging to Dortmund, Düsseldorf, Hanover, Nuremberg and Erfurt-Weimar airports were impacted by DDoS attacks for an extended period of time ([256], p. 2). Organizations in the financial sector also increasingly came under attack (+22%) [122], ([256], p. 1). The duration of attacks has a significant impact on the costs incurred by both the victim and the attackers themselves. Consequently, a trend towards shorter DDoS attacks (approx. 10 minutes) was noted [295]. In 48% of DDoS attacks, the duration was several hours, while in 17% of such attacks the duration even extended to several days ([109], p. 23). With regard to attacks on public services, in contrast, there is a trend towards very long attack durations of over 1,000 minutes. The longest DDoS attack registered during the period under review lasted over 17.8 days [295].

As mentioned above, the duration of the attack substantially affects the potential damage which may be incurred. The average damage caused by a DDoS attack is currently US $6,130 per minute [295] and US $218,000 [208] per DDoS attack. The total damage resulting from lost revenue, detection and recovery costs, legal costs, reputational damage, customer churn, and opportunity costs incurred during a DDoS attack can easily exceed US $150,000 for a single 20-minute attack [295]. DDoS attacks are increasingly used to extort ransom from their victims. No analyses in this regard were available for the period under review.

1.12.5 Data theft

In this section, we consider the impact and damage resulting from data theft, including general data breaches, data privacy violations and identity theft. When data is lost, the impact on operations is very difficult to quantify, but it can certainly have serious consequences for individuals. As many users tend to employ the same usernames and passwords for multiple services, this type of data can easily be exploited by criminals for further attacks.

Among attackers in Germany, there is still a growing interest in intellectual property documents, research and development information, financial data, credentials, passwords, employee data, customer details and communication data ([21], p. 10). When it comes to data security, cloud environments are becoming increasingly important with one survey showing that 66% of organizations are already storing between 21% and 60% of their data in the cloud. Trust in the cloud has continued to grow. At the same time, more than a third (39%) of companies reported falling victim to successful data theft in the cloud context during the period under review, revealing an upward trend (+35%) [260].

The loss of data also has a considerable impact on operations. It took 320 days, on average, to detect a data breach in the period under review. In contrast, breaches detected internally were identified and contained much faster at 240 days. Compared with the previous report period, the average time required to identify and contain security breaches has remained roughly the same ([153], p. 14 ff.).

The total financial losses due to data theft can be determined specifically for data breaches. In the period under review, the average costs climbed to a new high at US $4.45 million (+2.3%). The average cost per data record involved in a data breach was US $165, a slight increase over the previous period ([153], p. 10).

As in SCSR23, the highest average cost for a data breach was in the USA, where a breach cost US $9.48 million. The cost in Germany was slightly above the global average at US $4.67 million ([153], p. 11). An analysis of various sectors reveals major differences in costs. The healthcare sector continues to incur the highest costs for a data breach at US $10.93 million (+8.2%) ([153], p. 41). In the financial sector, costs amounted to US $5.9 million per breach, representing a slight decrease. For other critical infrastructure sectors (KRITIS), the costs amount to around US $5 million per breach – on average 28% higher than the cost of a breach in sectors without KRITIS status ([153], p. 41).

The costs of data breaches occurring in the public cloud were recorded for the first time during the period under review. The cost of a data breach in a public cloud environment amounted to US $4.75 million on average, 17.6% higher than for private cloud environments (US $3.98 million) ([153], p. 44). If the data breach was due to partner supply chain compromise, the cost incurred was US $4.76 million, 11.8% higher than a data breach due to another cause to ([153], p. 38).

In the event of a data breach, less than a third of companies or organizations incurred additional costs due to regulatory sanctions. The vast majority of those fines (80%) were for no more than US $250,000 and represent only 5.6% of the average total costs incurred ([153], p. 42). For smaller companies with fewer than 500 employees, the average cost of a data breach rose sharply from US $2.92 million to US $3.31 million (+13.4%) in the latest report

period ([153], p. 16). There was also a significant rise of 21.4% in the cost of a data breach for companies with 500 to 1,000 employees from US $2.71 million to US $3.29 million ([153], p. 16). For companies with between 1,001 and 5,000 employees, the average cost of a data breach rose from US $4.06 million to US $4.87 million (+20%). However, in large companies with more than 5,000 employees, the costs have fallen slightly (–2%), ranging from US $5.46 million to US $5.56 million ([153], p. 16).

1.13 General measures and budget

1.13.1 Decision makers play a key role in achieving a cyber-resilient organization

In all organizations, decision-makers at the highest levels are set to play an increasingly important role in cybersecurity. Of all the leaders surveyed at the World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity, 73% were in agreement that covering cybersecurity fundamentals more comprehensively and closing existing gaps should be the biggest priority for their most senior leadership. In addition, 74% of respondents also stated that geopolitical events have a significant influence on their own company's cybersecurity strategy ([288], p. 13 ff.). Currently only 15% of board meetings are dedicated to the subject of cybersecurity. In contrast, results from companies already pursuing the goal of becoming a cyber-resilient organization reveal up to three times lower costs in the event of a cyber incident ([69], p. 14). The actions taken by leaders have a profound influence on the achievement of a resilient organization.

When it comes to cybersecurity and establishing the required cybersecurity culture, it is vital for decision-makers and leaders to be aware that people in an organization tend to model their behaviour on others belonging to or leading the group [185]. In this regard, evidence from NIS-regulated companies shows that closer involvement of decision-makers, coupled with cybersecurity training focusing specifically on this group, has a substantial impact on a company's ability to better detect and control attacks, as well as improving their risk management ([112], p. 63).

A company's executive leaders are constantly called on to make decisions in a competitive environment (customers, competitors). Cybersecurity also represents a form of competition or a conflict between two parties, where the potential victim does not know the attacker, but the attacker knows their victim very well indeed. To minimize the advantage of these adversaries, decision-makers need to be familiar with the most active assailants in their specific sector. It is also crucial for leaders to support information-sharing within their sectors, between suppliers and with the relevant security authorities. IT security teams can leverage this knowledge to develop more effective defence strategies for their own organizations ([59], p. 35), ([153], p. 62). Information-sharing among major IT companies has already shown how this can be especially helpful in detecting state-sponsored attacks at a much earlier stage ([207], p. 2). The benefits of greater collaboration include the integration of tools and processes for security and IT operations (42%), shortening the time needed to understand the risks involved in new business initiatives, the quantification and prioritization of measures (40%), closer cooperation in the procurement and operation of security technologies (37%), better monitoring of attack surfaces (33%), and reducing the time required to mitigate risks (31%) ([179], p. 22).

Currently, only 29% of the top-level decision-makers surveyed have studied the details and backgrounds of cyber incidents ([288], p. 25). One major challenge regarding cybersecurity is that decisions pertaining to cybersecurity and a cybersecurity culture are generally made at board level on the basis of key performance indicators (KPIs). However, the complex, multi-layered nature of cybersecurity makes it difficult to express in terms of KPIs: "But the problem with cyber is that it is super hard to come up with one figure that says how good or bad

we are." ([179], p. 11). The vision of a cyber-resilient organization is not a one-off, standalone initiative, but a "holistic organizational marathon" which entails constantly developing, adapting and implementing an appropriate defence strategy based on the current threat scenario in order to stay ahead of the cyberattack curve. The promising figures for revenue growth (+16%), lower costs for improvements (–21%) and a better balance sheet (+19%) among companies with a particularly high level of cybersecurity resilience should be powerful motivators for decision-makers to focus on the topic ([69], p. 21). SMEs should follow the example of cyber-resilient pioneers to significantly close the cybersecurity gap (90% of respondents) in the future ([288], p. 4).

1.13.2 Effective cyber regulation raises security across the board

Depending on their particular sector, future decision-makers will have a growing number of regulatory cybersecurity requirements to contend with around the globe. They will be required to constantly ensure and demonstrate compliance with cybersecurity and data protection regulations to minimize legal risks and avoid incurring significant penalties for their companies. Regulations currently differ from country to country, which has led some experts to speak of the "balkanization" of cybersecurity regulations.

When it comes to involving the law enforcement authorities (see section 1.13.6), decision-makers should be aware of the advantages of doing so and have sufficient knowledge of the relevant police procedures. Furthermore, internal company processes must stipulate the specific decision-making chains in the event of a successful cyberattack, so that no valuable time is lost while an attack is unfolding.

In cyberattacks, the personal data or personally identifiable information of decision-makers, employees and customers is a particular target for cybercriminals, due to its high potential for blackmail. The threat of penalties and claims for damages in the event of data breaches can result in considerable financial losses for companies. In addition to this financial impact, decision-makers should also remain aware of the very real psychological impact that a breach can have on individuals, and how this can significantly harm relationships of trust that employees and customers have built up over time with the company. Decision-makers should therefore prioritize the protection of private or personal data ([253], p. 18). The issue of trust in cybersecurity is already considered by 90% of the decision-makers surveyed to be a factor which differentiates their products or services, and helps them build and maintain the trust of their customers ([69], p. 12).

When estimating the losses which would be incurred in the event of an operational disruption, it is vital that decision-makers are cognizant of the relevant damage values per day for different degrees of impairment. Decision-makers should ensure that the company's digital assets (information, identities, databases, endpoints, cloud etc.) are listed and categorized, so that they always know the current value of these "crown jewels" ([59], p. 34). In the case of public companies, the loss in value can be measured directly on the basis of the share price. In the event of a successful cyberattack, an average fall in share price of 2.3% to 4.6% can be expected [297]. In the aftermath of the cyberattack on the German company Varta in the period under review, the share price fell by as much as 5.6% [190].

In companies with high cyber resilience, 60% of decision-makers manage cyberattack risks in the same way as financial risks. This means that cybersecurity is an integral part of their decision-making processes, from strategic planning to budgeting, thereby facilitating the implementation of effective risk management and mitigation strategies. Protecting sensitive data, maintaining operations and ensuring customer trust – and consequently fortifying resilience against cyberthreats – are of particular importance here ([69], p. 25).

When developing and implementing a new cybersecurity strategy, particularly cyber-resilient companies focus on the following actions ([69], p. 6):

- Embedding cyber resilience into the business strategy from the outset
- Establishing shared responsibility and consistent accountability for cybersecurity across the organization
- Securing the digital core
- Extending cyber resilience and cybersecurity culture beyond organizational boundaries and silos
- Establishing and maintaining continuous cyber resilience to stay ahead of the attack curve

The implementation of continuous, sector-specific cybersecurity measures should always take into account the changing risk landscape and be aligned with the relevant business priorities ([69], p. 38).

In particular, decision-makers should be incentivized to share responsibility, in order to eliminate exposures faster or accelerate the roll-out of new technologies aimed at enhancing cybersecurity ([69], p. 28). In the event of a successful cyberattack, every minute counts, and everyone involved finds themselves facing exceptional circumstances. In this case, companies should follow the "1-10-60 rule", which stands for: "Detect threats within the first minute, understand the threats within 10 minutes and respond within 60 minutes" ([59], p. 9). To "survive" under such exceptional circumstances, every company should have a "cyber crisis response playbook" in digital and, indispensably, in physical form. The company's decision-makers should be fully integrated in the process of creating this playbook.

The playbook must encompass key aspects such as executive decision-making, an overview of the digital core, internal and external communication processes, collaboration with external legal advisors and law enforcement authorities as well as the contact details of third-party cybersecurity response teams. It should always consider the worst case, or various different crisis scenarios ([69], p. 38). All decision-makers should have a plan in place to support and manage employees during prolonged emergency situations, which already takes into account the realities of human performance in high stress situations. 58% of the large companies surveyed and 26% of SMEs have already established training courses for decision-makers, including the management of employees ([112], p. 80). All stakeholders, decision-makers included, should regularly practice using these playbooks and test their effectiveness under realistic conditions (practice makes perfect) in order to identify any weaknesses in the defence strategy and familiarize everyone involved with the exceptional circumstances ([59], p. 35).

1.13.3 Sustained growth in spending on information security

An overwhelming 93% of organizations expect IT security expenditure to increase either significantly or slightly in the coming year. This growth is largely attributable to the worsening threat landscape and potential economic damage ([179], p. 20). 51% of companies confirmed they had increased their investment in security as the direct result of a successful cyberattack ([153], p. 5). In view of the continuing cyberthreat situation, global spending on information security reached €174 billion in 2023. Spending on information security has increased by 13.7% in comparison with 2022 ([112], p. 5). In Germany, spending has risen by 10.5% since 2022, with expenditure in 2023 amounting to €7.8 billion ([28], p. 55). Therefore, Germany's growth in spending was significantly higher than the average economic growth in Europe [115] or the average inflation rate in Europe [116]. In 2022, the cybersecurity economy grew twice as fast as the world economy ([288], p. 9).

Above-average annual growth of 11% is forecast for the eurozone over the next few years. Annual expenditure on security infrastructure is anticipated

to rise to €267 billion by 2027. For the cloud segment, annual growth rates of 25% and a market size of €5 billion are forecast by 2027 ([112], p. 5). With an average spend of €2 billion, the banking sector recorded the highest level of expenditure on information security per company, followed by the energy sector (€1.9 billion) and the healthcare sector (€1.3 billion) ([112], p. 22).

1.13.3.1 Benchmark for security investments: IS spending as a percentage of IT spending

The metric "IS (information security) spending as a percentage of IT (information technology) spending" has become a key indicator for recording and assessing investment levels and comparing different companies or organizations ([112], p. 10). The survey findings from the period under review indicate that budgets for information security continue to vary greatly from company to company.

Overall, the findings for the period covered by the report show that on average, 7.6% of the total IT budget is spent on information security in Europe, for instance on NIS-compliant service providers. In a global comparison, expenditure on IT security in Europe is considerably lower than in North America (–1.3%) and the Asia-Pacific region (–1.2%) ([112], p. 10). In Germany, expenditure on information security was found to be significantly below the European average, at 5.9% of the total IT budget ([112], p. 23). In contrast, a survey of 1,000 German companies conducted by Bitkom shows a budget share for information security of 14% to 20% in the report period ([21], p. 15). IS expenditure varies significantly from sector to sector. The highest average IS expenditure in relation to overall IT budget is recorded for online search engines (11%), digital infrastructures (10.5%), financial market infrastructures (10%) and the cloud (10%). In the banking sector, average IS expenditure is significantly lower, at 8% of IT expenditure. In the healthcare sector, IS expenditure stands at 6.8%, and in the energy sector, 5.3% of total IT expenditure ([112], p. 24).

Expenditure on IT security in Germany is expected to rise to €10.5 billion (+13%) in 2024, breaking the €10 billion barrier for the very first time [252]. The IT security market in Germany is therefore forecast to grow faster than the EU average.

A further rise in total expenditure to €12 billion (+13.6%) is forecast for Germany in 2025. The biggest increase in spending in Germany is anticipated to be on security software which will reach €5.2 billion (+16.9%), followed by IT security services at €4.4 billion (+12.0%). Investment in IT security hardware is expected to remain virtually unchanged at €939 million (+0.4%). To determine or estimate a balanced level of IS expenditure, it is recommended to base the calculation on the cost per day of a potential operational disruption (annual revenue divided by 365). It is essential that every decision-maker is aware of this figure when making investment decisions [145].

1.13.3.2 No cyber resilience without budgets for education and training

Educating and training employees is essential for the successful implementation of a cybersecurity strategy, and the necessary expenditure for this must be taken into account when planning IT budgets ([153], p. 5). However, 47% of the companies surveyed stated that they had not allocated a specific budget for information security training ([112], p. 28). At NIS companies, the median training budget for IT security was roughly €100,000, with an average training budget of €333,000 ([112], p. 48). The highest median expenditure on information security training was in the energy sector, at €200,000. Expenditure in the banking sector was slightly lower, at €190,000. In less security-critical areas such as cloud computing, and also in the healthcare and transport sectors, median expenditure stood at between €80,000 and €100,000. The findings highlight major differences in average training budgets, with smaller companies reporting average budgets of €27,000, compared with €341,000 for large corporations ([112], p. 50 ff.).

1.13.3.3 Information security expenditure proven to be a sensible investment

In SCSR23, the profitability calculation for IT security expenditure based on the "return on security investment" (ROSI) was introduced to support CEOs and IT managers in selecting appropriate investment measures. 20% of the companies surveyed are currently already using this indicator ([179], p. 11). Studies show that significant cost savings can be achieved through the introduction of security measures such as AI for cyber defence, encryption methods, Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), Security Orchestration, Automation and Response (SOAR) or Identity and Access Management (IAM) ([153], p. 28).

1.13.4 Cyber insurance as part of the cyber resilience strategy

Cyber insurance is another risk management option that companies can leverage. When it comes to covering financial losses, a cyber insurance policy can prove a valuable tool as part of a cyber resilience strategy. Larger companies were found to be significantly more likely to carry cyber insurance (75-85%) than smaller companies (21-25%). Overall, it was established that the number of companies holding a cyber insurance policy had fallen in 2023 (–24%) ([288], p. 32). In Germany, 70% of the companies surveyed confirmed that they had taken out cyber insurance – a significantly higher figure than the European average (58%). The financial, energy, healthcare, and transport sectors recorded the highest cyber insurance adoption rates, with more than 50% of companies holding policies. Only 18% of the companies surveyed stated that they had invested in additional insurance cover following a security breach ([153], p. 50).

When it comes to the settlement of claims for cyberattacks, the largest losses covered by insurance were, on average, for ransomware attacks (US $334,000). The average costs covered for BEC (US $91,000) and other attacks (US $76,000) were significantly lower [206].

Insurance companies are increasingly asking customers to provide more information about their cybersecurity status before concluding a policy with them. It is no longer possible to secure insurance cover without first investing in IT security. In certain cases, attackers have specifically targeted insured companies, as the willingness to pay the ransom is higher where cover is in place ([253], p. 13).

Insurance should not be seen as the sole means of achieving cyber resilience, but rather as a complementary tool. For small and medium-sized companies in particular, cyber insurance can be a very good means of covering major damages.

1.13.5 Boosting cyber resilience with skilled cybersecurity professionals

Enhancing cybersecurity is increasingly important at companies. The main objective is to continuously adapt the organization's cyber resilience according to the current threat situation. It is vital that organizations strengthen their overall cyber defence capabilities, both through implementing appropriate measures to prevent cyberattacks and creating the right conditions to recover quickly from serious attacks.

The growing importance of cybersecurity is currently reflected in the fact that 47% of Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) are reporting directly to the executive board more regularly. A total of 88% of the CISOs surveyed confirmed that their tasks are becoming increasingly complex and the strategic component ever more prominent ([179], p. 4). The challenge here is to successfully implement effective organizational measures and continuously adapt them to combat ever more complex threats, thereby achieving the desired or required cyber resilience. To this end, it will be increasingly important in the future for all organizational units to prioritize working together to develop a security culture, and

for companies to have the most effective technology and security tools at their disposal, for deployment by highly skilled staff ([288], p. 34).

1.13.5.1 Cybersecurity talent gap: A challenge facing every company

Resilience to cyberattacks can only be achieved as long as cybersecurity staff act professionally ([259], p. 1). The ongoing, continually increasing threat situation has resulted in a rapidly growing demand for skilled cybersecurity specialists. The findings from 2023 show that there is currently a global shortfall of 4 million skilled workers (cybersecurity talent gap) [165]. Demand (+12%) is growing twice as fast as supply year on year [165]. In Europe, the gap currently stands at around 400,000 skilled workers. Forecasts are already predicting that this lack of skilled workers will play a crucial role in 50% of all major cyber incidents in 2025. For this reason, the Allianz Risk Barometer 2024 ranks the shortage of skilled workforce as one of the top 10 cybersecurity risks ([7], p. 18). The shortage of skilled staff has an impact on both the company itself and a company's cybersecurity workforce. It is therefore vital that decision-makers focus their attention on the ways in which staff shortages impede the performance of their employees. This report takes a closer look at the talent gap in Chapter 4.

1.13.5.2 Employee training: Key to achieving cyber resilience

In an organization's efforts to achieve and improve cyber resilience, the focus should be on people rather than technology. As already highlighted in this report, people and their capabilities represent a major attack surface (e.g., social engineering), but skilled staff combined with technology can prove a highly effective instrument in defence. Educating and training employees across all company departments therefore constitutes a key pillar in the development of an effective strategy.

To close the qualification gap in the future, companies are increasingly focusing on retraining employees (45%) and providing internal training for IT staff (45%) ([112], p. 47). In addition, 91% of companies confirmed their willingness to invest in cybersecurity training and certification for their employees ([288], p. 18). Companies can rely on their employees' motivation to participate in such training, too, with surveys showing that 70% of employees are willing to go back to college or university to obtain a university degree or certificate if they receive funding to do so ([288], p. 19). Organizations can also opt to close skills gaps with short courses or special certifications ([288], p. 19). Creating programmes and training courses to raise security awareness is one way in which companies can increase the resilience of each and every employee to potential attacks, thereby significantly improving the security of the company ([277], p. 66). As social engineering and email phishing continue to pose a significant threat, a combination of customized video training programmes and phishing simulations is recommended for all companies. According to studies, exclusively conducting video-based training reduces phishing click behaviour by just three percent. When this training is provided in conjunction with phishing simulations, however, it opens up the opportunity to offer users a personalized training programme, which consequently improves click behaviour ([199], p. 32).

Another option for tackling the resource and skills gap is to outsource tasks and services to external organizations (IT security outsourcing). This solution is particularly popular among the majority (73%) of small and medium-sized companies ([112], p. 78). However, a large number of incidents occurred at various financial institutions during the reporting period, prompting the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) to take action to ensure organizations in the financial sector are more aware of the risks involved in outsourcing IT services ([34], p. 35).

1.13.6 Criminal prosecution

1.13.6.1 Reporting cyberattacks plays a vital role in successfully combating them

As already noted in SCSR23, the criminal prosecution of cyberattacks has continued to gain in significance, although only a fraction of DDoS attacks ([109], p. 32) and just 18% of attacks on private individuals are reported to the authorities ([35], p. 31). Failing to report attacks, however, denies criminal investigation authorities access to vital information that could be used to solve crimes or prevent future offences. The reporting of ransomware attacks is significantly higher, as there is evidently greater awareness that a criminal offence has been committed (pursuant to §§ 202a-d, 203, 206, 303a-b of the German Criminal Code StGB). In addition, certain companies are subject to a duty to report ransomware attacks. The competent police authorities not only provide support in dealing with the consequences of such an attack, but also scour the darknet for data which has been stolen during the course of the attack and may be offered for sale there. Companies can report attacks to the central points of contact for cybercrime (Zentrale Ansprechstellen Cybercrime – ZAC) belonging to the police in the federal states, while private individuals can turn to the internet units (Online-Wachen) of the respective state's police force. When attacks are reported, information can be pooled across the globe and targeted countermeasures taken [141].

1.13.6.2 Ramping up the pressure on cybercriminals

Prosecuting individual offenders is made considerably more difficult by the fact that the perpetrators are usually located abroad ([35], p. 34) ([258], p. 1). Nevertheless, investigating the individuals in question remains an effective tool, especially when criminal prosecution is combined with other sanctions. In Australia, the perpetrators of the biggest cyberattack in 2022 were successfully identified and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in absentia. Their assets were also seized, and travel bans imposed ([168], p. 1). The operators of the "Genesis Market", which was well-known for the trade in stolen account details, were identified and a total of 119 people were arrested ([108], p. 69). The seven Russian citizens behind the "Trickbot" malware were sanctioned ([108], p. 68). The FBI currently has wanted person notices out for 151 cybercriminals [120]. Investigating offenders and imposing sanctions massively restricts cybercriminals' freedom to travel.

1.13.6.3 Dismantling cybercrime infrastructures

In isolation, investigating and prosecuting individuals is not enough to inflict lasting damage on the cybercrime scene. Law enforcement authorities across the world are therefore focusing their efforts on the targeted dismantling of cybercriminals' IT infrastructures, as this has proven the most effective means of combating cybercrime. This is something that can only be achieved through international cooperation.

During the reporting period, the authorities successfully shut down illegal online marketplaces such as "Hydra Market", "Genesis Market" and money laundering service "ChipMixer" ([108], p. 69), ([258], p. 2). In addition, around 50 servers used for DDoS-as-a-Service attacks were shut down as a result of an ongoing operation since 2018 involving Europol ([35], p. 22). In another multinational operation, virtual network service "VPNLab", which was popular with cybercriminals, was successfully shut down and additional insights into ransomware attacks were gained ([113], p. 7). During the period covered by the report, the FBI developed a tool called "Perseus", which was used to overwrite the commands of the Russian malware "Snake". This intervention helped prevent Russia from spying successfully on NATO member states ([108], p. 69).

In February 2024, a Russian espionage network, operated by hacker group "APT28" on behalf of the Russian military intelligence service (GRU), was successfully dismantled in a joint strike by the FBI

and German authorities. The network had infiltrated hundreds of small routers in offices and private homes, on which malware was installed and the devices exploited. According to the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV), the network in question had been used to attack German targets over a period of two years [126].

On 19 February 2024, "LockBit", the oldest, most active ransomware network, was successfully shut down as the result of an international cooperation involving a number of law enforcement organizations. The joint operation, known as "Cronos", led to the arrest of two individuals, while three international arrest warrants were also issued. Over 200 crypto accounts linked to "LockBit" were also frozen. The entire technical infrastructure (34 servers in the Netherlands, Finland, France, Switzerland, the UK, the USA, Australia, and Germany) was seized during the operation, and the 14,000 user accounts found are now being checked and analysed by law enforcement authorities [134], [196]. A tool to decrypt and restore the data was developed by Japanese authorities [264].

1.13.6.4 Stopping the flow of funds to cybercriminals

Disrupting, siphoning off or seizing financial gains is currently deemed another highly effective means of law enforcement, with the authorities especially focusing on financial flows from ransomware. Authorities have successfully disrupted or reversed cryptocurrency transactions in both Europe and the USA. All ransom payments were later returned to the victims ([199], p. 25). In addition, a money laundering network (money laundering as a service) was successfully uncovered in Europe and shut down ([113], p. 13). The small collection of criminal investigation successes outlined in this report is intended to once again emphasize the importance of law enforcement in cybersecurity, especially regarding the long-term pursuit of criminals. IT decision-makers also have a particularly crucial role to play, as they are instrumental in the decision to report a criminal offence.

1.14 The threats of tomorrow: A glimpse into the crystal ball

The threat situation outlined in this report is characterized by notable incidents including a host of new trends, but also many established ones. In particular, it is worth highlighting the professionalism with which cybercriminals plan and carry out attacks these days. This is anything but unexpected, as the meticulousness of the threat actors is fuelled by increasing competition in the cybercrime ecosystem. The pressure on the criminals to succeed is simply passed on unfiltered to their victims. From these and other developments outlined above, we can derive points of reference that enable us to look into the crystal ball and make predictions for the ongoing year 2024 and beyond.

Ransomware continues to set the benchmark for cybercrime. According to expert assessments, this is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future. The combination of Ransomware-as-a-Service in partnership with affiliates has proven a very lucrative business model for all parties involved. Even though law enforcement agencies have been able to claim significant successes against cybercrime, threat actors constantly come up with new approaches in the form of novel tactics and techniques, while quickly learning from the mistakes of others ([160], p. 7). The use of tools developed for offensive security also adds considerable convenience for assailants. Although they offer essential functionalities that cybercriminals need, these tools are actually developed free of charge by those involved in security research and the security industry. At the same time, the tools are difficult for technical systems to detect due to their frequent use in legitimate security analysis. The use of unknown programming languages in the development of malware also plays into the hands of attackers, as security experts do not have sufficient proficiency in analysing such languages. Due to these advantages, legitimate security applications

and non-traditional programming languages are expected to increasingly find their way into the cybercrime toolbox ([108], p. 29 ff.).

1.14.1 Artificial intelligence: Increased efficiency for criminals and a target for exploitation

While artificial intelligence (AI) is currently on everyone's lips as a key technology, relatively few incidents involving AI occurred during the period covered by this report. However, one thing is clear – attacks either using AI or targeting AI systems are certain to increase sharply in the near future. Cybercriminals are sure to be interested in the technology. The high number of malicious packages based on the large language model "ChatGPT" found in open-source platforms for software package management provides a clear indication of criminal interest in the technology. It is only a matter of time before AI finds its way into Crime-as-a-Service offerings on a large scale, as it is now already technically connected via well-documented interfaces.

The authorities are working on the assumption that "deep fakes" and AI technology will find their way into the cybercrime ecosystem across the board by 2030 ([111], p. 14). Europol has also identified the automated generation of malicious code as another future field of activity. Models such as ChatGPT not only allow cybercriminals to express themselves eloquently but can also generate source code in various programming languages [114]. It is thus fair to assume that development cycles in the creation of malware programs will become more efficient and that the corresponding stages in the attack process will become appreciably shorter.

1.14.2 Increased risk of autocratic influence on the 2024 US presidential election

Due to the network of hacktivists, which has been growing since the beginning of the Ukraine war and continued expanding throughout this report period, state actors will increasingly operate covertly under false flags in order to use captured sensitive information for disinformation campaigns ([28], p. 25). This trend is also likely to have an impact on the US presidential election this year. However, it remains to be seen what will actually happen in the run-up to the election on 5 November 2024.

1.14.3 Increase in targeted attacks via Internet-of-Things and edge devices

In the future, the digital landscape will be flooded with networked, smart Internet of Things and edge devices, from mobile phones to wearables and smart home sensors. This trend has resulted in a huge attack surface for cybercriminals, as robust security mechanisms can only partly be implemented for such devices ([111], p. 16 ff.). However, it can also be expected that due to the sheer mass of devices, it will even be challenging to manage consistent update and patch management for those devices equipped with security functionality.

Another problem will be posed by legacy systems for which manufacturers no longer offer active updates, even though they are still in operation ([111], p. 16). The current report period provided a taste of what to expect, as threat actors have already started exploiting Internet of Things devices to carry out their illegal operations [15], ([186], p. 14).

Once attackers have gained access to an IoT device, it is easily conceivable that the network behind it will be compromised, allowing the intruders to take stock of sensitive information and seek to monetize it. However, exploiting information and resources

via such devices in the future will not be the sole focus of attackers. Threat actors will also increasingly take an interest in the data produced. Should they succeed in siphoning it off, they can use it to create behavioural profiles of potential victims, which in turn can be used to target victims using social engineering techniques ([111], p. 16 ff.).

2 Prevention – Continuous Threat Exposure Management

PREVENTION
CONTINUOUS THREAT EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT

THE TOP 10 MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES



Determining which attack techniques are most critical is highly dependent on the types of technology or service used to gather these observations. Several attack vectors appear in multiple sources (e.g., T1087, T1057), while many are only present in a single source (e.g., 9/10 only in OSINT).

Diagram: The most important attack techniques in a multi-source ranking

THE TOP TECHNIQUES ACCORDING TO THE XM CYBER ATTACK PATH ANALYSIS

WHO AND WHAT IS AT RISK?

	Organizations	Exposures	Critical Assets
Valid Accounts	**99.4%**	**15.5%**	**1.0%**
Use Alternate Authentication Material	**95.7%**	**10.3%**	**12.0%**
Account Manipulation	**95.1%**	**36.4%**	**7.9%**
Permission Groups Discovery	**94.4%**	**9.3%**	**10.5%**
Remote Services	**93.8%**	**3.6%**	**9.8%**
OS Credential Dumping	**93.2%**	**0.9%**	**10.4%**
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	**92.0%**	**9.0%**	**7.5%**
Scheduled Task/Job	**90.1%**	**2.9%**	**22.4%**
Windows Management Instrumentation	**90.1%**	**2.9%**	**22.4%**
Taint Shared Content	**89.5%**	**5.2%**	**4.0%**

The most significant ATT&CK Techniques identified by XM Cyber in 2023. "Top" status is determined using three metrics – the percentage of vulnerable organizations, the percentage of vulnerabilities that can be exploited, and the percentage of critical assets jeopardized through each technique.

Diagram: The outcomes of the 2023 XM Cyber Attack Path Analysis

SECURITY BY SECTOR

OVERALL SECURITY POSTURE SCORE

Diagram: Comparison of all security posture scores across the sectors examined. A score of 80 is considered a good result.

THE SIZE OF THE COMPANY MAKES NO DIFFERENCE

Diagram: Comparison of all security posture scores in relation to company size

Source: Own diagram; [202, 292]

2 Prevention – Continuous Threat Exposure Management

2.1 Prevention plays a crucial role in the security strategy

In addition to regulatory requirements, as already outlined in Chapter 1, the issue of work overload in IT security teams detailed in Chapter 4 also raises fundamental questions about efficiency and resilience in traditional approaches to cybersecurity.

While system landscapes are becoming ever more complex in this age of hybrid requirements (on-premises and cloud), so are cyberattacks and the severity of their impact. Despite joint efforts to boost and mobilize resources, attackers always succeed in finding new ways to evade security mechanisms.

The large number of exposures, combined with an ever-increasing array of attack vectors, has pushed even the best cybersecurity teams to their limits. They are no longer able to see the wood for the trees and resolving all the issues is no longer a realistic proposition. The customary approach of dealing with exposures based on their severity has met with limited success, as not every vulnerability is automatically exploited, and some turn out to be "digital dead-ends". The primary focus should be on exposures which grant attackers access to a company's critical assets – assuming the company even knows which of their systems and data have the most value. Exposures posing less risk can be deferred and dealt with subsequently.

In SCSR23, it already became clear that irrespective of the amount of assets a company holds within the enterprise environment, a consistent two percent of their systems contain security exposures which put their organizations' most critical assets at risk. This trend applies to both cloud and on-premises environments. Continuous risk-based exposure management, as opposed to a more conventional approach, thus helps to reduce staff efforts and misallocation of resources by up to 98%. As a result, the widespread prioritization of detection and response solutions is now being called into question.

Investment in prevention has consequently increased substantially at many organizations. Gartner, a market research and consulting company focusing on technologies, considers this approach one of the ten most significant topics for 2024 and has labelled it "Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM)" [131]. Gartner moreover hypothesizes that by 2026, companies planning their security investments based on CTEM will fall victim to cyberattacks three times less often than companies taking a more conventional approach.

2.2 Risk-based management of exposures with CTEM

CTEM assists in the identification, management and continuous assessment of risks. Rather than relying on reactive measures such as firewalls, SIEM or EDR exclusively, CTEM is a preventive, sustained approach, which considers the relations and correlations between the severity of exposure, potential threat actor activities and the criticality of assets.

Traditional exposure management maps out the theoretical risk a company faces. It reveals dangers which may arise due to a vulnerability in the system environment, without elucidating which of these hazards actually pose a meaningful risk.

Due to the ever-increasing complexity of system landscapes and an attack surface which is constantly growing as a consequence, traditional approaches to exposure management leave blind spots as they have not been designed to cope with the multitude of different assets and infrastructures (cloud, mobile devices, IoT devices, OT systems, etc.) which are now connected and communicating with each other. Even the penetration testing employed by cybersecurity experts excludes many business-critical systems and always only provides a snapshot of an organization's exposure situation.

Employing frameworks such as MITRE ATT&CK, presented in chapter one, and mechanisms for assessing exposures and threats such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is helpful. Yet, if only viewed in isolation, these approaches lose sight of the relevance of the potential impact of a particular detected exposure.

Integrated CTEM facilitates holistic insights by way of advanced analytics supported by machine learning and artificial intelligence. Therefore, it constitutes a more efficient approach to identifying and prioritizing threats in real time before they are exploited. The organization constantly receives information regarding its security status, enabling it to make informed decisions or allocate resources accordingly.

The key features of an integrated CTEM approach

1. **Real-time monitoring**
2. **Proactive identification & detection**
3. **Simulation of breaches & attacks**

The stages of CTEM

1) Firstly, the **scope of the programme** is defined, also known as **scoping**. This includes identifying and taking stock of the most **critical data and systems (assets)**. As a second step, a **risk assessment** is conducted for these assets based on damage and loss scenarios, resulting in the identification of the business-critical assets worthy of protection.

2) This is followed by the **discovery stage**, in which companies use numerous detection methods and solutions **to check all their IT resources** and identify potential choke points. Penetration testing and other security audits are often carried out at this stage.

3) During the **prioritization stage**, the **risk** (impact and probability) of **the choke point** in question is assessed with regard to its impact on business operations. As this risk assessment lays the foundations for all further steps, it is crucial for the overall success of the approach.

Source: Own diagram; [131]

Figure 1: The five stages of CTEM

4) Stage four focuses on **validation** – this involves the prioritized implementation of measures to minimize risk. As a rule, these measures are initially tested by the IT and security teams. These tests may lead to **changes** in the organization, for instance setting up additional safeguards, updating software or other adjustments in security settings.

5) **Mobilization**, the final stage of the CTEM strategy, plays a crucial role in the preparation and **implementation of an effective security strategy**. This stage comprises the **setting of objectives** along with **identifying the key stakeholders** and resources needed to support the implementation. A readiness review is then carried out to determine the current maturity level of the organization with regard to cybersecurity and exposure management. This review makes it possible to identify exposures before CTEM has been fully implemented, setting a solid foundation for the future security strategy.

Security assessments are by no means static, meaning they may shift in either direction due to changes in the environment or evolving attack scenarios which alter the risk to critical assets.

Managing cyber risks is not a project which requires attention only once or on an annual basis. Rather, it is a dynamic process that needs to be reviewed and adapted continually.

2.3 Corporate exposure management

In the second half of 2023, more than 300 IT security decision makers (e.g., CISOs) from companies in the USA (210) and the UK (90), each with over 2,500 employees, participated in a survey on the topic of vulnerability and exposure management [292].

Of the organizations surveyed, 87% are aiming to scale up their cybersecurity activities over the next 12 months, despite existing teams already being overburdened and a severe shortage of skilled workers on the job market. This objective is primarily driven by the high priority the topic is given at board level (27%). Regulatory requirements are another compelling factor (15%). Only five percent of the companies surveyed are planning to reduce their expenditure on eliminating and remedying security risks.

Dealing with security risks ties up 62% of security and IT team members, meaning that it has a considerable impact on operations. The gap between newly arising exposures and those that have been eliminated is ever more pronounced. Roughly 90% of the companies surveyed consider themselves not to be in a position to eliminate the risks posed by their exposure. The average security team manages to address and eliminate 12 vulnerabilities per week. At the same time, between 10,000 and 250,000 new exposures are added each year on average – not to mention other security challenges.

The detection and elimination of threats usually takes place within organizational silos. This prevents an organization from developing a comprehensive overview of the risk situation it is facing and counteracts efforts to reduce the workload by consolidating the measures it implements. The artificial boundaries created when dividing up networks, tasks or departments, increasingly act to constrain an organization's ability to mitigate the right risk at the right time.

Half of the surveyed companies (51%) have a centralized exposure management system. The other organizations (49%) manage these processes ad hoc or in silos.

Communicating the security situation to the company management poses another challenge. The budget, the cybersecurity culture and even the recognition of the work performed by IT security teams, are all largely dependent on effective communication between the parties involved.

2.4 From the hacker's perspective: Exposures in company systems

Anonymized data from millions of systems (PCs, servers, cloud instances) run by XM Cyber's customers around the globe was used to analyse over 40 million exposures and hundreds of thousands of attack paths at companies.

The average number of exposures rose substantially from 11,000 to around 15,000 per organization. Figure 2 displays the number of all assets potentially at risk (x-axis) and the actual choke points (y-axis) identified during the assessment of each organization. On-prem environments are shown on the left and cloud environments on the right. The overall trend remains constant at two per cent, regardless of the size of the IT environment.

In practice, this means that for some organizations it is much more difficult (or easier) to safeguard themselves against attacks efficiently than for others. However, it also underlines how crucial it is to know your own organization's IT footprint and understand its strengths and weaknesses, when seeking to limit the opportunities adversaries may have.



Source: Own diagram

Figure 2: Illustration of the relationship between choke points and exposed assets at companies



Source: Own diagram

Figure 3: Distribution of daily security posture scores in 2023

XM Cyber also generates a core value for the cyber-security posture of an organization. This risk score is derived from the average value (0-100) of all attack scenarios for the most critical data and systems. The lower the score, the shorter and easier the path from point of entry to the most critical systems is for an attacker. The higher the score, the better the organization is set up to protect itself from cyber-criminals.

All security posture scores measured daily by XM Cyber in 2023 are represented by grey dots in Figure 3. While the values vary greatly, they tend to accumulate at the right end of the range. The blue box plot field shows that the median value is 77, with half of all companies located between 60 and 92.



Source: Own diagram

Figure 4: Distribution of daily security posture scores in 2023

Security scores are far from static, however, shifting up and down as changes in the environment and evolving attack scenarios alter the risk to critical data and systems. While the overall daily average remains relatively constant, the scores for individual organizations can fluctuate considerably. To illustrate this, Figure 4 shows the varying trends in the overall cybersecurity scores of three organizations. This confirms that cyber risk management should not be treated as a one-off or annual project, as currently required by most regulations. It needs to be a dynamic, ongoing process.

A comparative analysis of the overall security scores in various sectors (Figure 5) reveals certain differences. The financial services sector, often considered particularly secure, appears in the middle of the table. Attacks on Frankfurt University Hospital in October 2023 and Change Healthcare in the USA on 21 February 2024, are well-known examples of how healthcare facilities frequently fall victim to cybercrime. The relatively low security scores for this sector reveal why so many cyberattacks are successful, often leading to severe repercussions for those impacted.



Source: Own diagram

Figure 5: Comparison of security posture scores according to sector in 2023

It is also important to mention service providers and external consultants. Such third-party companies are often responsible for managing critical systems for their customers or may be given temporary access to them. Assessing the risk posed by external service providers is often conducted by way of questionnaires. It remains to be seen whether this is the correct approach going forward. Service providers are ranked in the lower third of security posture scores across all sectors.

The security posture scores of organizations across all sectors can also be compared in terms of the size of the organization. One theory posits that because larger organizations have additional IT security resources and more mature processes, they should be better protected against cyberattacks. Another equally plausible theory is that large organizations have such complex environments that they are more difficult to manage, meaning that they in fact face a similar level of risk to smaller organizations despite having more resources at their disposal.

Figure 6 substantiates the latter theory. The group of large organizations with more than 100,000 employees achieves practically the same score as the smallest organizations with fewer than 100 employees.

Hence, it can be concluded that cybersecurity measures cannot be implemented more or less easily due to the size of the organization. It is of crucial importance to regularly reassess the organization's critical systems and data, as well as its security requirements and current risks. In this way, an organization can derive measures which are efficient, purposeful and goal oriented.



Source: Own diagram

Figure 6: Comparison of overall security posture scores in relation to company size

3 Gaining a perspective – Cybersecurity in the age of artificial intelligence and quantum computing

GAINING A PERSPECTIVE
CYBERSECURITY IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND QUANTUM COMPUTING

THE AI MARKET IN FIGURES

+37.3%
ANNUAL GROWTH
UNTIL 2030 (CAGR)

197 Billion US$
GLOBAL MARKET VOLUME (2023)

1,812 Bn
US$ TURNOVER FORECAST
BY 2030

AI AS A CYBER WEAPON

The FBI has issued warnings about physical cyberattacks – KRITIS facilities are under threat of attack.

Cyberattackers can cause huge damage with the help of AI.



Explosions

Shutting down power grids

Crippling KRITIS infrastructures

Systems using outdated programmable logic controllers (PLC) constitute a huge exposure

BEWARE

AI CAN CAUSE HALLUCINATIONS

OpenAI	3%
Meta	5%
ANTHROP\C	8%
Google	27%

Rate of AI hallucinations by providers of generative artificial intelligence, study 11/2023



Diagram: Pyramid defining risk categories for AI systems (EU AI Act)

OUTLOOK FOR QUANTUM COMPUTING

106 billion US$

ESTIMATED MARKET VOLUME BY 2040

QC MARKET VALUED AT

9–93 billion

ACCORDING TO ESTIMATES

		USA	CANADA	GERMANY
248	8 STARTUPS AROUND THE WORLD IN 2022	**72**	**28**	**11**
57	PUBLIC-SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS DEDICATED TO QC	**18**	**2**	**1**
180	ACADEMIC WORKING GROUPS	**67**	**9**	**7**

AI SYSTEMS CONFORMITY WITH THE EU AI ACT



Study by Stanford University on the conformity of various AI systems with the draft EU AI Act



Unacceptable risk

High risk

Limited risk
AI with specific transparency obligations

Minimal risk

Sources: Own diagram; Grand View Research: "Artificial Intelligence Market Size & Trends" 2024; Metz, C.: "Chatbots May 'Hallucinate' More Often Than Many Realize", The New York Times, 2023, Williams, K.: Cyber-physical attacks fueled by AI are a growing threat, experts say", CNBC, 2024; McKinsey and Company, "Quantum Technology Monitor", 2023; [1, 2, 23]

3 Gaining a perspective – Cybersecurity in the age of artificial intelligence and quantum computing

3.1 AI: What is the status quo?

Since November 2022, and the phenomenal success of OpenAI's ChatGPT, the topic of artificial intelligence (AI) has been on everyone's lips. Its easy accessibility via a web interface and the possibility to communicate with the system using natural language – by way of a large language model (LLM) – brought ChatGPT resounding success within a matter of a days. OpenAI achieved more than one million user registrations in just five days, and the openai.com website is now visited 1.5 billion times a month [84]. The ability of the system to output answers in complete sentences represented a quantum leap for AI-based systems, as did its ability to output complete programming code or even directly executable programs.

The use of AI-based methods has been on the rise for years, for instance in interactions with voice assistants like Google Assistant or Siri, or when calling a hotline. Nowadays, you need a great deal of patience if you want to talk to an actual human rather than a computer. However, ChatGPT has reduced the access barriers for the public to consciously use AI, resulting in an unprecedented number of potential new use cases at a level which is both tangible and easily understandable.

Since the launch of ChatGPT, development in this field has been relentless, with newer and better generative AI (GenAI) systems being rolled out. Text-to-image generators such as DALL-E or Stable Diffusion are delivering increasingly impressive results with every new version, while OpenAI's latest project, Sora, is able to produce realistic video scenes from text prompts.

However, its success has been accompanied by critical voices and concerns. One particular challenge posed by large language models is that although not all of its output is always correct, it can still appear entirely accurate due to the model's ability to generate fluent, grammatically correct and coherent texts. This effect is also known as AI hallucination [298].

Furthermore, the results generated by LLMs can also be biased – a phenomenon that has been well known in the field of machine learning for a long time. For example, in order to detect intrusion, data sets were measured to compare the performance of systems over a period of years (98/99) by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). However, their results were distorted, as packets representing malicious or benign traffic had properties that did not occur in real life [189]. While the tested systems were able to generate very good results in the lab, they did not produce any usable findings for actual system environments.

When it comes to bias distortions in search algorithms, conducting an image search on the internet is a well-known and often discussed example. For instance, a search query for wedding pictures still often yields images of couples with a bride in a magnificent white dress, while wedding gowns traditionally used in other parts of the world are displayed much less often in the results. Attempts are being made to counteract this through appropriate training and the use of more diverse, representative data sets. In this regard, Google launched

a competition for inclusive images in 2018 [82] to promote research into language models which better reflect geodiversity. Despite these efforts, biases within datasets remain a major challenge for training new language models, particularly with regard to languages less often used. Exacerbated by the automated translation of web content into other languages and the common occurrence of translations being retranslated, the quality of content can suffer greatly and represents a real challenge, particularly for less frequently spoken languages [266]. If new language models are trained using such low-quality data sets, this is reflected in their performance levels and the output of the final models – which can, in turn, be used as the basis for generating new low-quality data, creating a downward spiral.

Despite the huge volume of data used to train large language models today, these kinds of biases are still hidden in the data. Results often reflect Western stereotypes, which can easily be explained by considering the data used for training the models. Due to the origins of the Internet, its evolution in terms of spreading across the globe and the development of its usage, a large proportion of the available content is Western-influenced – and likewise the training data [19].

Source: [20]

Figure 1: Examples of biased results in text-to-image generation



Source: [282]

Figure 2: Examples of prompts specifically intended to provoke an LLM to provide a response which should be filtered out (also known as jailbreaking)

In addition to challenges regarding the quality of the output, critical voices have also been quick to draw attention to data protection issues. Large language models such as ChatGPT also draw on user input to train themselves. Features such as uploading documents so that the language model can summarize or answer questions about their content offer a useful way of coping with the ever-increasing flood of information in daily life and work.

However, this is not without its own hazards. Particularly in the initial period following the launch of ChatGPT, which was characterized by many unknowns, including a lack of experience in using AI and a lack of company policies governing its use, these features repeatedly led to leaks of internal company information and personal data.

Once these challenges became known, safeguards were introduced and improved to ensure that large language models would no longer provide results when, for instance, personal data was requested. Nevertheless, cybersecurity is always a game of cat and mouse, and methods were quickly discovered that use specially structured text inputs to circumvent protective measures and ultimately access the desired information. This is also known as LLM hacking and it enjoys widespread popularity [282].



Source: Own diagram; [1]

Figure 3: The EU AI Act defines four risk levels

Based on these experiences and the associated data protection concerns, the Italian data protection authority GPDP banned the use of ChatGPT in Italy in March 2023 and reiterated at the beginning of this year that ChatGPT violates European data protection law [137]. In Germany, the conference of independent data protection supervisory authorities of the federal and state governments is tasked with addressing the corresponding legal issues. While uncertainty still abounds with regard to data protection, the widespread use of ChatGPT and other LLMs continues unabated in schools, universities and business. This is where the Artificial Intelligence Act of the European Union [56] comes in, as it is designed to promote trustworthy AI and minimize risks.

The AI Act distinguishes between four risk levels. Applications with unacceptable risk are considered incompatible with the values of the European Union and are therefore prohibited. Examples of this are systems which aim to manipulate users (e.g., using subliminal techniques) or keep them under surveillance.

High-risk applications particularly relate to the use of AI in critical infrastructures (KRITIS) as well as areas in which the fundamental rights or future opportunities of individuals could be impacted. Strict requirements are imposed on applications in this category.

Limited-risk systems must comply with specific transparency obligations. A prime example of this are chatbots such as ChatGPT. When using such systems, it must be made clearly recognizable to users that the interaction taking place is with a machine and not a human being. In this way, the user is given the opportunity to make an informed decision about their continued use of the system.

However, the majority of AI systems currently in use fall into the final category, minimal risk, which includes systems that are considered safe and have low potential for causing harm.

Regardless of regulations, however, the potential for abuse of large language models has already become apparent and increased significantly in the short term, resulting in a corresponding impact on cybersecurity. For example, cybercriminals can leverage LLMs to generate high-quality, closely personalized phishing emails – free of spelling and grammar errors. When correctly prompted, the large language model also provides programming code to create a crawler that searches the web for profiles and information about a specific target person. Moreover, the ability of the models to change the appearance of program code while maintaining its functionality, for instance, can lead to the high-frequency generation of novel malware variants which are increasingly difficult to detect, known as polymorphic code [240]. While large

language models can be used to create an entire website in the blink of an eye without prior programming knowledge, for example, they can also be used to generate functioning malicious code purely on the basis of a text description or, as recently demonstrated, to autonomously hack websites [119].

The sense that these AI capabilities – whether positive or negative – appeared overnight along with the tremendous success of ChatGPT and other new GenAI systems (such as DALL-E for generating photorealistic images solely on the basis of descriptive text input) is misleading. The field of AI research has had a long history of development with its origins dating as far back as the 1950s [270]. The road to today's successes was rocky at times and by no means without setbacks. Based on enthusiastic proclamations about the future capabilities of systems based on machine learning (ML), funding and investment in this fledgling research area grew. However, research results initially fell far short of expectations, disappointing investors. As a result, funding was cut or cancelled altogether, and interest from the scientific and investment communities waned. This phenomenon has occurred in the field of AI not just once but twice. These periods, firstly in the mid-1970s and then again from the late 1980s to early 1990s, have been referred to as "AI winters" [210].

Following these setbacks, however, a huge leap forward was made in 2012, when systems for speech or image recognition based on deep neural networks (DNN) achieved unprecedented results, making them suitable for everyday use. Development continued at pace and resulted, among other things, in the victory of the AlphaGo program over eighteen-time Go world champion Lee Se-dol, who felt compelled to retire in the face of AI's dominance [17]. Even in multi-person poker games, where the concealment of information and bluffing have long posed a challenge, AI can now prevail against professional players [27].

However, the more impressive capabilities of AI systems today are not only due to the underlying, advanced algorithms, which are now much better understood. Early algorithms were also extremely promising, but two key elements were lacking. Computing power and data.

The processing of algorithms was made difficult by the extremely limited capabilities of past computers, which filled entire halls to provide ridiculously low computing power seen from today's perspective (an iPad 2 already provided performance equal to a Cray 2 supercomputer from 1985 at a fraction of the energy consumption and size in 2011), limiting them to simple use cases.

In addition, there was the challenge posed by very limited storage capacity as well as the insufficient availability of data. Even though not all algorithms or AI procedures necessarily require large amounts of data for training, a large portion of them – especially those used with a great degree of success today – are highly dependent on large volumes of data. The large amounts of data, for instance the 570 GB of text extracted from the Internet for training ChatGPT-4, combined with the use of powerful hardware and special accelerators in its processing, have made the decisive difference between past failures and today's success. Using cloud services, companies are now able to train their own models, which can be adapted to and optimized for their specific needs, and apply them in a way which is scaled to their requirements without having to invest in their own data centres. In view of the strict requirements set by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), top-grade cloud services are particularly important in this regard, as they guarantee the storage of data within Germany or the European Union as well as compliance with all data protection requirements. This in turn has a positive effect on performance and quality of use, as latencies that arise between data centres and end applications due to signal propagation times and Internet processing are minimized. Ideally, these data

centres should also be located in close proximity to key Internet nodes with high data rates, such as the DE-CIX in Frankfurt where peak data transfer rates exceed 16 terabits per second at the present time.

3.2 Quantum Computing: What is the status quo?

There are parallels between the present development of quantum computers (QC) and AI in the past. While the theoretical possibilities of QC became the focus of academic interest following the development of a groundbreaking algorithm by Peter Shor in 1994 [241], it took several years before the topic sparked the interest of the general public. The attainment of fully functional QC was simply still too far in the future. However, impressive progress in this field triggered a veritable quantum computing hype, particularly after Google announced in 2019 that it had achieved "quantum supremacy" with its QC named Sycamore [13], executing a calculation in a few minutes that would previously have taken ten thousand years on the world's best supercomputer. This hype was once again accompanied by exaggerated expectations of its (soon to be available) capabilities.

Here, too, despite substantial investment, it was not yet possible to deliver on expectations – leading to disillusionment and the decline of projects in 2022, a year sometimes referred to as the "quantum winter". This decline was, however, much less substantial than was the case with the funding of AI. Given the continued massive investment in QC technology, the expected profit is by no means undisputed. However, figures like these always need to be viewed in relative terms. For instance, while US $1.8 billion was invested in quantum technologies by the US public sector in 2022 [23], about nine percent of the total investment in quantum, it is dwarfed by the US $136.8 billion spent by private households on US pets in the same year [194].



Source: Own diagram; [2]

Figure 4: Quantum computing hardware companies and technological approaches



Source: [117]

Figure 5: Development in the number of qubits by various platforms/companies

Analogous to the early days of AI, QC is currently still experiencing a shortfall in the availability of suitable, high-performance machines to comprehensively test and develop the possibilities offered by the algorithms and, above all, to demonstrate the value it actually adds. However, driven by multi-billion-dollar research programs and the prospect of high profits, numerous systems based on different technologies are currently under development – all competing to achieve the goal of developing efficient QC. With solid roadmaps, these systems have been able to demonstrate that the milestones set for the ongoing development of the systems have not only been met but are also being reached much faster than anticipated in some cases.

The systems use various methods to produce qubits, the basic unit of information in QC. In contrast to conventional digital bits, which can have either the state 0 or 1, qubits use the quantum mechanical phenomena of superposition to achieve a linear combination of two states. As a result, QC can achieve a speed advantage when using suitable algorithms and tackling certain problems. While digital bits are silicon-based, qubits can be based on ions, photons, silicon or other methods – each with their own advantages and disadvantages in terms of stability and scalability.

That begs the question: Given the planned, regular advancements in this technology, is the breakthrough of achieving quantum computing only a few years away? And is there a "quantum apocalypse" on the horizon due to the prospect of QC achieving incalculable computing power, as IBM – otherwise generally restrained in their statements – dramatically warned last January at the World Economic Forum in Davos [280]?

To answer this complex question, particularly regarding the computing power QC is anticipated to achieve in the future, the issue needs to be examined more closely. This is essential as certain misconceptions have already become entrenched. At the same time, the importance of certain academic publications must also be placed within the context of a bigger picture.

It is generally important to note that QC cannot fundamentally deliver a specific acceleration compared to conventional systems, meaning it cannot be considered to be faster by a factor of X – a misconception repeatedly claimed in various articles, especially in the wake of Google's quantum supremacy announcement. For instance, there were reports highlighting that QC is 158 million times faster than the world's most powerful supercomputers. By the same token, QC cannot present all possible solutions to a problem in parallel (another common myth), and there is no fixed value for the speed benefit it offers. This always depends on the specific problem being tackled.

On the contrary, the anticipated speed advantage is much less pronounced in the case of many of the problems known today or algorithms published in academic journals than an optimal exponential case, such as the one presented by researcher Peter Shor, seemed to promise. In practice, quantum computers may even be slower than their conventional digital counterparts when tackling certain problems. Beyond this, it still appears that the gain in speed often demonstrated in theory by quantum algorithms needs to be critically re-examined with regard to the actual advantage generated in practice with real hardware. Many recent academic publications describing new quantum algorithms for various problems "only" offer a quadratic gain in speed. The "only" is worth highlighting here, because quadratic appears better at first glance than it is in practice For instance, a calculation using QC requires only two minutes when it conventionally requires four, but it requires only 60 minutes when conventionally it requires 60 hours. In other words, when it comes to more complex calculations, QC-based execution is increasingly superior. However, it is necessary to carefully consider at which point this actually makes sense in practice, because for smaller problems factors such as the physical computer implementation and controlling come into play.

The smallest components in today's digital computers are extremely fast and take less than a nanosecond to switch. By comparison, the components belonging to a quantum computer are relatively slow and require times in the range of microseconds.

This has a decisive influence on whether a quantum computer with a quadratic or similar speedup actually solves a problem faster than a conventional system. The slower processes for loading the data into the quantum computer and the slower switching times of the components must also be taken into account. Other limitations are the data rate and volume of data that can be processed by a quantum computer. Although QC can process large volumes of data using qubits, this data must first find its way into the system and the result of the calculation must then be exported again. At present, this is still a rather slow process, significantly limiting the possibilities. Employing QC only makes sense when it overtakes the speed of a conventional system after including the slower transmission and switching processes with regard to the required data in the calculation [146]. Depending on the specific problem and the speedup, QC can therefore actually be slower than conventional systems for some problems. Expectations are obviously high that QC components will also continue to evolve and switching times will become shorter and better – as has been the case with digital systems over the years. However, it is not only the hardware which is still facing open questions, but also the algorith.

The power and genius of Shor's algorithm is so significant – and rare – that it is sometimes referred to as "Shor's Moment." The algorithm is capable of more efficiently solving or tackling the mathematical problems of prime factorization and discrete logarithms, which work behind the scenes in the digital context to guarantee the security of part of our modern encryption systems, and hence our everyday Internet communications. In this regard, it addresses very specific mathematical characteristics of the problem, which cannot be found in the same form in many problems or have at least not been found yet. This is also the reason why QC does not pose a threat to all encryption processes – another inaccuracy frequently claimed –, but only the proportion using the asymmetric algorithms which base their security on the previously described mathematical problems of prime factors or discrete logarithms.

These algorithms are extremely important because they establish a secure, encrypted connection between two devices via an insecure channel such as the Internet. However, for reasons of efficiency and speed, the actual data exchange is then encrypted using other encryption processes which are sym-

metric. These encryption processes cannot yet be efficiently attacked, even by way of QC, because the best currently known quantum algorithm from Grover only offers a quadratic speed advantage, not an exponential one. Sufficient protection against QC attacks is therefore achieved by simply doubling the key lengths. This increased key size effectively counteracts the quadratic speed advantage gained via using QC to search for the key.

As a consequence, not all encryption is at risk, but only the proportion using asymmetric algorithms. At the same time, this does not mean that Armageddon is necessarily imminent for asymmetric processes. As far back as 2016, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated a campaign to solicit, evaluate, and standardize one or more post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms, i.e. processes that can withstand attacks made possible by future high-performance quantum computers by employing new mathematical approaches. After several rounds and selection procedures, the standards are now being finalized – and not only have some of these already been implemented, but in some cases they are already in use. Google's Chrome browser, for instance, has enabled the use of a conventional encryption algorithm in combination with a new PQC method (TLS 1.3 hybridized Kyber support) since 2023, while the first testing of PQC algorithms in Chrome took place as early as 2016. Open Secure Shell (OpenSSH), a widely used program for secure communications with other computers via insecure networks, already introduced the use of a combination of a conventional and PQC algorithms in 2022 (NTRU Prime for PQC and the widely used X25519 for key exchange).

However, it is important to remain aware that when it comes to PQC, the knowledge and state of research are still in their infancy, meaning that some surprises and new insights regarding the (in)security of algorithms can still be expected to emerge in the years ahead, as work on this topic intensifies and new opportunities arise through the availability of more efficient QC. A perfect example of this is the SIKE (Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation) algorithm, which was a promising candidate in NIST's standardization campaign and reached the fourth round of the multi-stage competition [211]. However, researchers then managed to demonstrate how an attack on the algorithm, which was supposed to be able to withstand QC, was able to succeed using a simple laptop with only one processor core in less than an hour [47], later achieving this even faster



Source: [147]

Figure 6: Problem size in relation to quantum computing time

with optimizations. This was by no means the first such case. The PQC candidate Rainbow, which is based on another mathematical principle, had also previously been cracked.

Consequently, the use of hybrid systems such as TLS 1.3 hybridized Kyber will be essential in the coming years, because they achieve maximum protection by combining conventional cryptographic algorithms, which have been studied more thoroughly and are better understood, with new PQC algorithms. Needless to say, this results in additional computing time. Although this is generally not a problem for today's IT, it can lead to problems in proprietary systems with limited hardware such as Internet of Things (IoT) applications, controlling systems and integrated systems, and in some cases may not be possible to implement at all.

3.3 What does tomorrow hold for AI and QC?

The evolution of fields of research into quantum computing remains dynamic and exciting, as many questions are still open and unresolved. It is already known and mathematically proven that QC is superior to conventional systems for certain tasks. Mathematics applies complexity classes which, put simply, describe which problems can be solved on a computer in terms of computing time and memory requirements or where an existing solution can at least be checked for correctness. One of these complexity classes, the so-called Bounded Error Quantum Polynomial Time (BQP), is relevant for QC because it contains problems that cannot be calculated practically on a conventional system, but can be solved using powerful QC. Shor's algorithm for solving prime factors of an integer is one example here, but the exact scope and limits of this class of research are still undefined [4].

New developments are not only anticipated in the field of quantum algorithms, but also in traditional algorithms, which will make this race all the more exciting. Spurred on by the repeated announcements that quantum supremacy had been achieved by a system, researchers have managed to skilfully transfer the demonstrated algorithms and problems to conventional systems and make up for the speed advantage of QC using optimized solutions. Take Google's above-mentioned announcement of quantum supremacy, for instance. This was quickly disproven by IBM after they demonstrated a way to simulate the problem within 2.5 days (in the worst case) on a conventional system. Given that John Preskill's original definition of quantum supremacy from 2012 states that quantum supremacy will only be achieved when QC can solve problems that a conventional system cannot, it is clear that this requirement has not yet been met [218].



Source: Own diagram; [3]

Figure 7: Complexity classes

Innovations in algorithms are making it possible to extend the performance limits of conventional systems again and again. Just a few years ago, it was still assumed that quantum computers with 50 to 100 logical qubits and a low error rate would be able to surpass the capabilities of conventional supercomputers. In the years since, new algorithms have already succeeded in raising the bar to 127 qubits [268]. This increase is much more remarkable than it may first appear – because with each additional qubit, the number of possible states doubles. As a result, the jump from 50 to 127 qubits is enormous.

These developments and examples highlight the current challenges of demonstrating quantum supremacy, particularly on the currently available, error-prone, medium-sized QCs – often referred to as Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) systems. At the same time, it is important to remember that the superiority of QC in tackling specific problems has already been mathematically proven. The question now occupying centre stage is regarding the technical feasibility of error-tolerant quantum computers with a sufficiently high number of qubits, which is known as fault-tolerant quantum computing (FTQC).

Regular new discoveries and milestones in building powerful QCs are offset by the complex challenges of scaling the systems and achieving stability, with further technical breakthroughs required in this regard. In addition to achieving a sufficient number of error-tolerant qubits, the coherence times of sensitive quantum states also need to be extended significantly. The latter denotes the length of time in which qubits can maintain their state and therefore be used for calculations. Since coherence times can differ vastly due to the wide range of ways qubits are implemented, it makes little sense to compare systems solely based on the number of qubits. For instance, when it comes to the practical execution of algorithms, a QC built using superconductors with a higher number of qubits may in fact lag behind a system that deploys ion traps with significantly fewer qubits. This is because the latter is currently more stable and generally has

longer coherence times. The quantum volume (QV) measurement was introduced to facilitate the comparison of a QC's practical performance with other QCs with both similar and different technological designs. This metric not only encompasses the number of qubits, but also other properties such as measurement errors. However, studies have shown that quantum volume information should also be taken with a pinch of salt, as the measured values provided by manufacturers are not always achievable in practice and often require comprehensive optimization of the target architecture [219]. This underlines both the complexity of QC technologies and the challenge of finding a suitable means of comparison between available systems and their performance parameters.

Estimates suggest that 4000 error-tolerant qubits would be required to execute an algorithm like the one developed by Peter Shor and successfully break a 2048-bit key. Since most qubits today are very error-prone, the current approach is generally to generate logical qubits from multiple physical qubits. If the state of one or several physical qubits collapses, the information of the logical qubit can still be maintained by the other stable physical qubits. It is estimated that millions of physical qubits would be needed to achieve 4,000 logical qubits.



Source: Own diagram; [227]

Figure 8: Development of Quantum Volumes



Source: Own diagram; [118]

Figure 9: Requirements for useful Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) and Fault-Tolerant Quantum Computing (FTQC)

The feasibility of such complex systems remains an open question, but various breakthroughs suggest that this extremely challenging goal is not unattainable. A new qubit design based on superconductors was demonstrated in January 2024. Thanks to the chemical structure used, this design is able to inherently protect a qubit from external influences and thus significantly extend the coherence time. This may represent a significant milestone on the road to powerful QC [26].

"Materials and Structures" play a key role with respect to what it will be possible to achieve with QC going forward. As outlined above, applications in which QC will be able to make its superior speed count in future are much more limited than often assumed. Apart from taking into account the actual achievable speed advantages of a quantum algorithm on a physical machine and the limitations in data transfer speeds – though these can likely be improved significantly in the course of the continued development of these systems, in a similar way to the evolution of digital computers –completely new questions which have barely been touched upon are still emerging. For instance, research in 2023 showed that the limited accuracy of high-resolution clocks could represent a constraining factor in the performance achievable by QC [195].

In order to maximize the possibilities of QC and bring them to fruition as soon as possible, it is important to optimize quantum algorithms and their adaptations for the respective QC hardware, so that fewer qubits are required for their execution. Just as algorithmic optimizations disproved suggestions of quantum supremacy, a great deal could likely be achieved with regard to quantum algorithms and their optimized adaptation to the complex architectures of QC. This would help to reduce hardware requirements in the future.

Novel architectures leveraging qudits potentially represent another path to reducing the complexity of the required circuitry and paving the way to executing algorithms using smaller number of elements [279]. Compared with a two-dimensional qubit, a qudit uses a higher-dimensional state space for storing and processing information.



Source: Own diagram; [148]

Figure 10: Development of quantum coherence time

However, a qudit is also more complex to implement and more susceptible to decoherence, i.e. the loss of information due to external influences. In addition, requiring more complex physical implementations of physical components, which have slower execution times, can also negate the advantages gained, as described above, when comparing the speed of conventional bits with qubits. In general, it is therefore important to focus primarily on problems that are viewed as promising when it comes to the ongoing development of QC and its algorithms.

Such areas include machine learning using QC – quantum machine learning (QML) – or solving big data problems. While an increasing number of algorithms are becoming available for these use cases, and QC is in principle able to perform complex searches in large data sets much faster than conventional computing, the challenge posed by exchanging data between QC and conventional systems is often overlooked. Due to the bottleneck generated by the intermediate input/output interfaces, lengthy data transfer processes can render the speed advantages promised by QC irrelevant. Without significant improvements to these interface technologies, the future practical application of QC will remain limited to problems with small data sets but high computing requirements [146], which could especially limit the range of use cases in the field of AI. This also applies to the proposed applications for cybersecurity. It is rather unrealistic to expect QC to be able to offer improved real-time results for detecting anomalies in data traffic.

When it comes to the more promising and desirable use cases for QC, it is also important to take some additional factors into account. For instance, calculations using QC can also be useful if they can be implemented in a more energy-efficient way in terms of their physical implementation and execution. However, there are no fixed values for this either, and any potential advantages and disadvantages are always dependent on the architecture used as well as the specific implementation of the algorithm. In many cases, conventional execution will be more efficient.

Where QC can definitely show its power is in tackling problems in the fields of materials science, chemistry and pharmacy, quantum simulation or logistics. Analog QC (quantum annealer) is focused on optimization problems and simulation, but it is

important to note that these are not universal computers and are limited in terms of the problems which can be calculated on them. However, these are precisely the areas in which QC is already able to calculate individual tasks more efficiently than using conventional algorithms. For instance, the modelling and simulation of quantum properties for tiny particles is of great importance for developing new materials as well as novel and more effective medicines.

Although the range of fields where the practical use of QC makes business sense remains extremely limited, especially in comparison to the unrealistic notion of universally applicable, on-demand "superfast" QC, the efforts to build powerful QC with an eye on these use cases may still be justified given the potential benefits.

The Copper, Bronze and Iron Ages did not draw their names from these metals without good reason. Materials have had a lasting impact on human development. As the Information Age paves the way for the construction of viable QC, these systems can help us find materials for the next age, and there are already some indicators signposting the road ahead. For instance, although some erroneous discoveries in this regard have been published, regular progress is still being made in the search for a material that can superconduct under normal conditions [178]. Powerful QC can significantly aid in the search for materials like these but can also enhance research into more advanced and effective medicines, thus helping us gain a better understanding of their potential interactions.

In the wake of the resounding successes of recent years, the field of AI is once again facing excessive expectations. The ability of the technology to live up to these inflated prospects remains very uncertain, particularly with regard to the actualization of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI).

	GPU	ASIC	Future Quantum
I/O Bandwidth	10,000 Gbit/s	10,000 G/s	1 Gbit/s
Operation throughput			
16-bit floating point	195 Top/s	550 Top/s	10.5 kop/s
32-bit integer	9.75 Top/s	215 Top/s	0.83 kop/s
binary (Boolean logical)	4,992 Top/s	77,000 Top/s	235 kop/s

Table 1: Comparing the computing power of today's conventional processors (e.g., NVIDIA A100 GPU) or an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) with a future QC equipped with 10,000 error-tolerant qubits and 10 µs switching time for logical operations and corresponding speeds for data transport (I/O). Presented in tera operations per second (factor 10^{12}) or kilo operations per second (factor 10^{3})

Source: [147]

For example, in its August 2023 release, Gartner's Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies put AGI top of the expectations chart – projecting more productive levels of AI within two to five years. While AI has surpassed human capabilities in many areas over the last decade, this has been achieved through specialized models and procedures. It seems rather unlikely that a system with the ability to solve problems more generally can be created based on large language models, as the recent heated discussion about the performance and importance of OpenAI's text-to-video project Sora shows. It has raised the question of whether a large language model can generate an actual understanding of physical relationships. Despite their powerful performance, large language models are still limited in their capabilities. But many interesting advances are also being made in this field that may ultimately provide the building blocks for AGI.

Apart from AGI, the AI-based technologies already available still hold the potential to fundamentally change entire areas of our everyday lives. In addition to the world of work, where the actual productive use of AI is still in its infancy, it can also make a significant impact in the fields of materials science, chemistry and healthcare, as already shown in practice. In particular, combined with QC, it can open up a whole new dimension of possibilities. For instance, in February 2024 researchers rolled out a new generative model for QC to search for cancer drug candidates, which surpassed the performance of current conventional models in generating viable candidates [275].

AI is also set to bring about sweeping changes in business and industrial processes over the coming years. Following the first wave of AI applications for processing consumer data, resulting in the product recommendations and personalized advertising we experience every day, applications for handling company data are now also on the rise. Take predictive AI, for example, and its focus on optimizing the maintenance times of machines and systems.

Based on the analysis of wide-ranging sensor data and increasingly sophisticated IoT applications, new opportunities are emerging for analysing data and creating useful applications. Combined with new algorithmic approaches, these developments could drastically reduce the previously formidable requirements for training data [220]. In turn, this may not only revolutionize existing areas of application, but also open up entirely new use cases for AI. The greatest impact, however, is expected to come from the introduction of autonomous machines and systems [184].

3.4 The impact of AI and QC in the context of cyber-security

The effects of AI and QC have been felt across many fields for some time now, and this is set to intensify significantly in the near future. Given the expected future capabilities and their importance, both from the point of view of attackers and defenders, there is clearly an acute need for action. When it comes to cybersecurity, in particular, there are numerous challenges that businesses and the public sector must address in a timely manner, as well as opportunities that must be grasped.

Even though QC is technologically and mathematically complex, and the availability and ultimate performance of future systems can currently only be predicted to a certain extent, clear recommendations for action can still be concluded. With regard to the potential threat posed to the security of a portion of the cryptographic methods used today, it is important to undertake the appropriate preparations now in order to guarantee the security of communication and data in the future. In this respect, it is also crucial to minimize the potential damage caused by data stolen in encrypted form in today's cybersecurity incidents, as this could be decrypted at a later date should the appropriate QC technologies become available (capture/harvest now, decrypt later).

The timely introduction of quantum-resistant encryption methods is essential in this regard, but due to the relative novelty of the math employed in the new algorithms, hybrid methods applying proven conventional components in conjunction with new PQC options should be preferred. Given that new findings could render encryption methods ineffective overnight in the worst-case scenario, crypto-agility is of particular importance here. A concept which is often misunderstood, crypto-agility does not mean that those responsible for the configuration and operation of networks and systems should select or even regularly exchange cryptographic algorithms. Rather, crypto-agility means that when the security of an algorithm is compromised by new mathematical insights or attack methods, a rapid change in algorithm is ensured. This is often not the case, especially when it comes to legacy systems.

Examples such as the integration of PQC into Google Chrome (which is transparent to the user) or successful projects by larger companies to secure their wide area networks with appropriate technologies show that the timely introduction of PQC is not overly complex in many areas.

In particular, as long as systems for quantum key distribution (QKD) are not yet suitable for large-scale use or technically mature, PQC offers the best possible opportunity to rapidly increase the protection of data. Unlike QKD, which requires hardware changes to the IT infrastructure, PQC has the advantage that in many areas no change or introduction of additional hardware is required. The performance of today's standard IT systems is sufficient to integrate these methods. However, a closer look must be taken at data centres and other areas where the introduction and use of new and additional algorithms would result in a significant increase in required computing power, including the legacy systems referred to above.

3.4.1 Offence & defence

The omnipresent cyber threat to business and industry, government institutions, academia and private individuals from cybercrime and professional attacker groups (via Advanced Persistent Threats, APT) is not expected to abate any time soon. On the contrary, particularly due to the high profits available from ransomware attacks, organized cybercrime has become thoroughly professionalized

in recent years and has demonstrated an ability to adapt extremely rapidly to new technological opportunities – often much faster than large companies and especially the public sector. Attackers are extremely inventive and able to quickly apply new technologies and exploit them for their own purposes.

The use of large language models for generating perfect-looking phishing emails (which we are already seeing) is just the beginning. The ever-improving results and new capabilities of GenAI, coupled with increasing challenges in detecting relevant content, will only serve to provide more interest in this area. In particular, new possibilities such as the automatic generation of malicious code or the automated attacking of websites have lowered the entry barriers into the world of cybercrime for new actors. Scanning for systems affected by vulnerabilities that have just come to light, which starts after just a few minutes, is not a new phenomenon and has been observed for several years. If this is combined with the capabilities of specialized LLMs for the generation of code, malware can be created even faster and more specifically to target newly identified vulnerabilities with virtually no delay. As a consequence, defending against cyber-attacks could become even more challenging than it already is.

In the longer term, however, the new possibilities offered by AI-based technologies can have a positive effect on cybersecurity. Key to a significant improvement in the cybersecurity situation is the continued research and development into systems giving rise to skills such as self-healing and self-patching (Self-X).

The most frequently exploited attack vectors continue to be based on vulnerabilities that are already known, where patches to close gaps are either not yet available, no longer created due to the obsolescence of the product, or existing patches have not yet been applied or do not work correctly. Furthermore, a major challenge is also posed by the exploitation of vulnerabilities still unknown to the manufacturer and the public, known as zero-day exploits, by professional adversaries. While suitable development and testing methods can detect and reduce weaknesses in the code, the increasing size and complexity of networks and systems coupled with the increasing possibilities to automate the exploitation of vulnerabilities mean that the exposure can only be permanently resolved by introducing self-protection methods for the systems.

DARPA, an agency responsible for research projects involving the US Department of Defense, impressively demonstrated the potential of automated security systems for defending against cyber-attacks in real time in 2016, as part of their Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) [71]. In the final round, seven teams competed against each other, or rather seven computers – as human intervention was not allowed. The challenge was for the systems to detect vulnerabilities in software products, automatically develop patches to close the exposures and attack vulnerabilities in the opposing system while protecting their own.

This demonstrated capabilities for automated cyber defence, significantly reducing response time to near real-time. While the development and deployment of patches usually takes weeks in practice, these systems were able to provide patches in minutes. However, the system used for the competition was not a well-known operating system such as Windows, MacOS or Linux. Instead, it was a system specially generated for the competition called the DARPA Experimental Cyber Research Evaluation Environment (DECREE), which was extremely simplified compared to systems used in

real environments, in order to facilitate the implementation and evaluation of the tasks during the competition. The fact that even eight years later no defensive capabilities comparable with those demonstrated at the CGC have found their way into widely used operating systems (even automated patching still works sub-optimally), underlines the difficulty in creating these solutions for complex operating systems and environments. The increasing performance of AI-based systems could be the decisive factor in achieving such functionalities.

When it comes to defending one's own networks and systems, it will be crucial to consider and exploit the capabilities and opportunities offered by AI in all areas of cybersecurity. The starting point for this could be the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF), for instance, a holistic approach that supports organizations in building and improving risk management for information security and cybersecurity. This framework includes five core security functions – identify, protect, detect, respond and recover – and its requirements can also be mapped to BSI KRITIS, ISO 27001 and other regulations and standards.

3.4.2 Identify

One significant challenge is the visibility and knowledge of existing systems, and this does not only apply to large and complex networks and environments. It is not uncommon for a forgotten legacy system from a previous project or an irregularly maintained server to provide an inviting entry point into a network. AI-based procedures not only support the identification and classification of all elements in a company's own system environment as well as an assessment of the risk they may pose but can also provide a real-time overview which is up to date at all times, highlighting components identified as critical and providing notification of any changes.

3.4.3 Protect

The proliferation of data is a key challenge posed by the information age. Protecting the internal information comprising a company's intellectual property and ensuring proper handling of data in line with the GDPR are time-consuming, error-prone tasks. AI-based systems can simplify and ensure the correct handling of data in this respect.

AI can also play an important role in terms of raising cybersecurity awareness among staff. The most effective cybersecurity campaigns are achieved with modules adapted to the needs and characteristics of the environment as well as leveraging gamification. Identifying the most critical aspects of a respective target environment and putting this knowledge into practice in training content and other forms can be optimized and simplified using AI.

3.4.4 Detect

Behaviour-based intrusion and anomaly detection as well as malware detection are concepts that have been well-known for many decades but have always been limited in terms of their practical applications. False alert rates and the generation of huge amounts of logging information in real time remain a major challenge, even when using security information and event management (SIEM) systems. Incorporating new AI-based methods can play a crucial role in ensuring better real-time detection, both for intrusion detection and data leakage prevention (DLP), and provide the basis for implementing self-X (self-fix) methods, which also include automated responses.

3.4.5 Respond

In the field of automated response, AI-based methods can also enable massive, crucially important progress and improvements in security. Although systems for the automated handling of detected security incidents (Intrusion Prevention Systems, IPS) have been available for many years, their performance has so far proven too limited and error-prone in practice. New AI-based methods which are capable of transferring the cyber defence capabilities demonstrated on trivial demonstration systems during the CGC onto real system environments in active use, will hold the key to shifting the (im)balance of power in favour of defenders. Robust, automated protection procedures with the ability to respond in real time are essential for countering the asymmetric advantage attackers enjoy in cyberspace, and can also generate further analyses about the attacker and help to define recommended actions.

3.4.6 Recover

When it comes to recovering after a cyber incident, AI-based procedures can also provide significant support in identifying optimized sequences, proposing measures to improve cybersecurity and prevent similar incidents, and enabling continuous and rapid adaptation to the evolving threats.

3.5 Seven areas requiring urgent action

In light of the opportunities and risks associated with AI, QC and their development, which is proceeding rapidly and in increasingly unpredictable ways, decision makers need to ask themselves some urgent questions regarding their system landscapes, dependencies and the state of their preparedness for the challenges ahead.

3.5.1 Security and data protection

Which measures have been implemented thus far to protect data and systems from cyberattacks, and to enable the organization to respond as quickly as possible in the event of an incident to keep business processes running or restore them? Have appropriate backup plans been implemented, which are also regularly tested in practice? Are these backup and contingency plans able to keep pace with faster, automated attacks? An honest answer is rather unlikely to be positive in most cases these days! Is business-critical data and intellectual property backed up regularly and redundantly in an offline environment? Are all reporting obligations and contact points known in the event of an incident occurring and is there a plan available for strategic communication?

3.5.2 Quantum resilience

Which encryption methods used in the IT systems are already secured with a hybrid PQC approach, and what is the migration plan for systems that are still exposed? Which legacy systems can no longer be updated, and how can the dangers posed by powerful QC and faster AI-based attacks be addressed in a timely manner? Are all components in the infrastructure known in full, and where is the weakest link? Also, where are the "crown jewels", i.e. the most critical data?

3.5.3 Awareness and enhancing competency

Which cybersecurity training and awareness-raising measures are already being offered or carried out for staff – up to board level – and to what extent do they address the challenges which lie ahead? What kind of training is being provided? An annual instruction lecture cannot effectively instil these issues in the minds of staff and is quickly forgotten. Continuous training measures – and especially the gamification of cybersecurity within the company – are more sustainable.

3.5.4 Use of AI within the company

In which ways and areas is AI already being used within the company, and what are the plans and timelines for the future? Are all existing and planned projects compliant with data protection regulations? Soon the use of AI will be unavoidable, not only to cope with the growing flood of information, but also to withstand the speed of attackers and ensure one's own capacity to act and ability to survive.

3.5.5 Readiness to innovate

To ensure that an organization is able to remain competitive in the future, a high willingness to innovate is of crucial importance. This is increasingly true when it comes to the exploration and role of new technologies such as QC and AI. Is the corporate culture geared towards identifying and assessing potentially relevant ideas at an early stage, for example through cooperation, networking with universities and research institutions, suitable training of staff and investment in research and development?

3.5.6 Agility

Having the necessary agility – particularly in IT systems, but also in corporate culture and working methods – will be more crucial than ever moving forward, to ensure sufficient protection against the rising flood of rapidly developing threats and cope with the possible disruptive impacts of new technologies. How and according to which timelines is the organization able to respond to new threats or implement improvements based on new insights – from processes and technical systems to education and training?

3.5.7 IT strategy

Finally, there is the question of how up to date and appropriate your company's IT strategy is, assuming one even exists. Is it fit for the purpose of addressing the wide-ranging, growing challenges ahead? Given the ever-accelerating (exponential) pace of technological development and the resulting impact on organizations, it is important to regularly review the way in which data protection and compliance issues, risk management, the technology roadmap, education and training, and cooperation scenarios are handled with regard to their future viability.

4 Under fire – The psychological impact of cyberattacks on management, IT departments and IT security teams

UNDER FIRE
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF CYBERATTACKS ON MANAGEMENT, IT DEPARTMENTS AND IT SECURITY TEAMS



Proofpoint report: CISOs who have suffered from burnout. Data gathered in 2023.

OVERLOAD IN SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTERS (SOC)

45% 0 – 9,999

13% 10,000 – 49,999

7% 50,000 – 99,999

8% 100,000 – 999,999

27% More than 1 million

Survey: How many security alerts does your SOC receive every day?

As a consequence, **54%** of all SOC staff report high degrees of frustration and stress in coping with the flood of alerts.

90% of all cybersecurity professionals continue to read their emails on holiday.

74% of all board members are aware that their cybersecurity employees are either **stressed or extremely stressed**.

STRESS/PERFORMANCE CURVE ▶



Source: Own diagram; [5, 22, 24, 42, 48, 64, 79, 124, 132, 157, 224, 265]

HOW DO I RECOGNIZE BURNOUT?

EXHAUSTION

LOSS OF APPETITE

DEPRESSION

ISOLATION

FORGETFULNESS

TIPS FOR BETTER MENTAL HEALTH

RESTFUL SLEEP

HEALTHY NUTRITION

WORK-LIFE BALANCE

PHYSICAL ACTIVITY

ASKING FOR HELP

Gartner forecast by 2025

50% of all cybersecurity officers will change their jobs.

25% will take on an entirely different job.



4 Under fire – The psychological impact of cyberattacks on management, IT departments and IT security teams

In recent years, concerns over falling victim to a cyberattack have topped international surveys on the most significant global risks for organizations across all sectors [7], [289]. The latest statistics confirm that targeted attacks on companies are indeed on the rise [62], [63].

While the financial damage cybercrime causes to the German economy can be thoroughly analysed and quantified [21], the psychological impact of cybercrime on those responsible for cybersecurity at companies has been the subject of relatively little research and is seldom part of public discourse. This situation crucially needs to be addressed, as the mental state of those responsible for cybersecurity and the consequences both for these individuals and their work constitute a growing problem. Surveys and studies indicate that the general mental health of cybersecurity managers (e.g., CISOs, ISBs, IT security managers) is in poor shape due to the enormous pressure and high levels of stress experienced in their day-to-day work. The prevalence of burnout is high [224]. When an extremely stressful incident is added to this already fraught situation, as commonly occurs in the case of a cyberattack, this can have long-lasting negative impacts on mental health and work performance. These consequences can be seen, for instance, in an increased number of days absent from work or even long-term absence due to mental illness, [42] as well as employees "mentally" resigning or actually quitting their jobs [88]. This further exacerbates the shortage of skilled labour in the IT (security) sector, which in turn is partly responsible for the difficult situation.

To break this vicious circle, the psychological states of those responsible for cybersecurity before and after cyberattacks urgently needs to become the focus of scientific and public discussion, as does the search for appropriate solution strategies. This would make a valuable contribution to raising awareness in companies and improving the situation in the long term.

Against this background, this chapter aims to provide insight into the psychological inner life of cybersecurity managers before, during and after they have been impacted by a cyberattack. It explores the underlying reasons for the general illusion of security at companies with regard to falling victim to cyberattacks. In addition, it examines the psychological consequences for key stakeholders who are fulfilling their duties in the face of a disparity between the need for adequate preparation and a scarcity of resources. In conclusion, the report provides stakeholders with recommendations for practical preventive and reactive measures to counteract the immense psychological strain on the affected individuals before or during a cyberattack.

4.1 Emergency situation: The three phases of a ransomware attack

Drawing on studies and crucial insights into disruptive incidents can help illuminate the psychological consequences of a cyberattack [60], [169], [182], [229], [271], [281]. Based on the MIRA phase model

(Mental Impact of Ransomware Attacks) [213], companies go through three distinct phases when recovering from a cyberattack – the first week following an attack, the first month and several months to a year after the attack (see Fig. 1).

To illustrate the emotional and psychological impact on key stakeholders during and after a cyberattack, we have correlated them with the phases of a ransomware attack in the fictional case study below.

The core business of our fictitious, medium-sized, internationally active production company known as GableGo GmbH is manufacturing forklift trucks. While production is based in Germany, the products are also distributed and sold in other European countries. The company achieves annual turnover in the double-digit billion range. It works with several suppliers and external service providers. The owner-led company essentially consists of the production unit and typical internal departments such as HR, R&D, Sales and Marketing. IT is managed internally, headed by a Chief Information Officer (CIO) with conventional IT education and training. While the CIO is responsible for IT operations across the company, one of his employees is in charge of IT security. This IT security manager acts as an interface between the IT department and the CISO, who is responsible for maintaining information security at management level. The CISO reports directly to the executive board.

4.1.1 Phase 1

One Tuesday afternoon, GableGo GmbH falls victim to a ransomware attack:

Through the company's IT ticket system, an employee working in administration reports significant delays in their company systems. The responsible IT employee initially puts processing the ticket on hold, ascribing the problem to a user error on the part of the employee. A short while later, two similar reports are received from other employees. A sales colleague complains at the coffee machine that he is suddenly unable to open the files containing his tender documentation. Not long afterwards, when the production manager reports sudden, inexplicable reboots of the central computer, the IT employee gets nervous and contacts his CIO. He initiates a network diagnosis, but 45 minutes have now passed since the first ticket was received. The first ransom demands appear on the employees' computers. The CIO and IT security manager isolate the internal network from the outside world, but the malware has already spread so widely that production grinds to a standstill.

The tell-tale indications of a cyberattack were not recognized by the responsible employees. This grants the attackers valuable time to spread throughout the network. As all operations have come to a standstill, enormous pressure mounts on those involved – usually centred on the IT department, the CISO and executive board. In the first week following an attack, the focus is on damage limitation, removing the remaining threats from the systems and becoming operational as quickly as possible. The first week is consequently characterized by immense stress and powerful emotions such as anger, despair, inability to act and helplessness. In this first phase after a cyberattack, 12-16 hour working days are the norm. Sleep and good nutrition are often neglected. The employees' fear of losing their livelihood combined with high stress may lead to irrational decisions [213], [229]. In addition to the pressure that has already built up internally, enquiries are stacking up from customers, partners and investors eager to get a picture of the situation that often does not exist yet at this point. In certain cases, the company might opt for a deliberate lack of transparency in their communication. While this could arise from the company's own lack of knowledge regarding the extent of the damage, obfuscation may also be employed purposefully, for instance ostensibly to protect the reputation of the company or the people responsible. Not much



Source: Own diagram

Figure 1: The three phases of a cyberattack and key emotional aspects

research has focused on deliberate misinformation. However, the phenomenon of deliberately withholding information or disclosing false information in order to protect oneself and one's colleagues is referred to as "defensive lying" or "principled lying" [172]. This behaviour may also continue into phase 2. Key stakeholders often report feelings of guilt during this phase, with IT security managers and CISOs suffering particularly badly from the effects of stress [213].

4.1.2 Phase 2

Three weeks have passed since the attack and the basic systems are up and running again. However, the IT department is still working hard to remove the ransomware from the company's systems. The management, in cooperation with the LKA (State Criminal Police Office), has decided against paying the ransom and is now mainly concerned with limiting the extent of the financial damage. With every passing day, GableGo is losing several hundred thousand euros in revenue due to the production outage which has lasted several weeks.

Once the first five to seven days have passed following a cyberattack, the adrenaline level which had remained constantly high so far, starts to drop slowly, exhaustion sets in, and the first psychological and physical symptoms often begin to appear. During this second post-attack phase, the IT department is no longer only responsible for analysing and restoring the company's systems, but also for supporting those that are already up and running again. Key stakeholders are still under extremely high pressure, which is now compounded by the additional burden caused by a lack of understanding for the consistently high workload among family and friends [213]. In fact, it can take several months for operations to return to normal in the wake of a ransomware attack [213].

4.1.3 Phase 3

GableGo resumes its operations after four months of production outage and downtime. While the employees are able to resume their daily work, the IT department is only partially back to regular operations. The CIO, CISO and IT security officer begin the lessons learned process and establish a cybersecurity and awareness plan with the full backing of the management.

It takes 23 days, on average, for a company's basic systems to become available again following a cyberattack [213]. However, it often takes months before normal operations can be resumed. This is the third phase after an attack. While a growing

number of employees put the crisis behind them as time passes, the incident is still very much ongoing for the IT department and management. The recovery of all systems is still in progress, and the implementation of security standards to prevent another attack is also an ongoing project. The high levels of stress and consequent exhaustion of the key stakeholders often do not abate after the first two phases, so the long-term consequences of months of excessive workload can mean psychological support becomes necessary [87], [213].

4.2 Human resilience – the mental state of cybersecurity mangers before and after a cyberattack

While improving technological resilience to cyberattacks has been the subject of extensive research, the human side of resilience has been comparatively neglected, even though humans have been shown to currently pose the greatest risk to cybersecurity [83]. In recent years, however, efforts to raise awareness about the mental health of IT and security managers have increased [22], [64], [85], [212], [224]. In recent times, the impact of cyberattacks on its human victims has also been a growing focus for researchers [9], [24], [60], [171], [192], [214]. To gain a deeper understanding of the emotional and psychological dimensions affecting employees and managers in the field of cybersecurity, it is first important to be aware of their everyday stresses (see section 4.2.1). Taking this background into account plays an important role in appropriately assessing the psychological impact of cyberattacks on those affected by them (see section 4.2.2).

4.2.1 The basic mental state of those responsible for cybersecurity

On a daily basis, IT and security professionals face immense workloads which often go hand in hand with psychological and emotional challenges. In addition to providing functioning IT and security plans and approaches, they are often also charged with implementing or at least supporting IT security tasks. On the one hand, they are thus always required to anticipate various exposures which could result in cyberattacks, such as technical failure, organizational deficiencies and, in particular, human error [140], [159]. On the other hand, they constantly have to identify potential threats and attacks themselves. In this regard, IT and security staff find themselves tasked with monitoring a flood of anomalies. At 55% of security operations centres, between 10,000 and one million potential threats are reported per day (SOCs) [157]. As a result, cybersecurity managers find themselves constantly needing to differentiate between irrelevant false alarms and critical incidents. Due to this stressful day-to-day situation, 54% of SOC team members surveyed in a study reported high levels of frustration and stress [157]. The shortage of staff in IT and security departments exacerbates the problem [164]. The resulting workload often leads to staff feeling they are permanently on call and need to do the work of several people at once [124]. This “always on” culture and the resulting lack of equilibrium in their work-life balance mean that the accompanying stress is not compensated for consistently in many cases [64]. In one survey, 90% of the participating cybersecurity managers stated that they read emails while on holiday [48]. It is correspondingly difficult for employees to balance their work and home lives adequately. The compulsion to always be available often stems from the fear of not being reachable at the critical moment of an attack. However, the fear of making mistakes and being held responsible for a security incident can also be very burdensome for IT and security staff [64]. This perceived

pressure can have a negative impact on creativity and willingness to take risks. Employee morale and job satisfaction decline [64], which in turn harbours an increased risk that detecting future attacks may become problematic.

The pressure on those responsible for cybersecurity has not gone unnoticed at the executive level. Responding to a survey, 74% of board members described their security teams as stressed or extremely stressed [212]. Yet board members often overlook the personal impact of workplace stress on their security teams [212].

At top management level, CISOs and CIOs are required to meet the high demands of a profession where talent and skills play a crucial part in their efforts to maintain organizational security and defend their infrastructures against cyber threats [124]. Meanwhile, they are faced with the challenge of constantly keeping up with new security frameworks, tools and models. In addition, they have to maintain the qualification levels within their teams, despite the current staff shortfall and skills deficit. There is also a disparity between the strategic positioning of CISOs and cuts in security budgets, particularly in times of economic downturn [224]. Reduced budgets are in stark contrast to the perceived threat situation. In 2023, 83% of the German CISOs surveyed for a study were concerned about falling victim to a cyberattack. At the same time, almost half of those surveyed believed that their organization was not adequately prepared for a targeted attack [224]. According to a global study by Splunk, 96% of the approximately 350 CISOs surveyed had already experienced a ransomware attack, with 52% reporting attacks that had a significant impact on business processes.

The discrepancy between the need to be adequately prepared for cyber incidents and the shortage of financial, technical and human resources can lead to frustration and a feeling of helplessness. This is borne out by studies, which show that only 10% of CISOs experience no stress at work, while around 90% of the CISOs surveyed experience moderate to severe stress [22], [212]. Difficulties in the working relationship between CISOs and the executive board exacerbates the stress experienced in many cases – only 39% of German CISOs (62% internationally) believe that their board-level executives have an understanding of cybersecurity challenges which is similar to their own, i.e. that C-level managers are sufficiently sensitized. Around the globe, 29% of the CISOs surveyed feared being dismissed from their jobs in the event of a security incident, with 20% expecting to be dismissed regardless of culpability [85]. Consistent with this high level of pressure and stress, the average tenure of a CISO with their employer is only two years and two months, according to data from the UK and the USA [212]. While no statistics on this are available for Germany, Gartner predicts that around half of those responsible for cybersecurity will have changed jobs by 2025, while 25% of them will be looking for a completely different position [133]. In 2023, more than a third of CISOs in two large Western countries responded in a survey that they are considering leaving their current employer [22].

In general, cybersecurity managers are confronted with a toxic combination of factors, experiencing high levels of stress and exacting demands regarding their performance along with scant recognition of their importance within the organization. The pressure to constantly maintain secrecy exacerbates stress levels in the security sector, as successes often go unnoticed while failures immediately attract attention.

While almost everyone experiences stress from time to time, chronic stress can have severe consequences. In daily work, it can diminish cognitive abilities such as problem-solving skills, judgement competency and reaction times, resulting in security threats being overlooked rather than identified. Attempts to combat fatigue with caffeine often prove ineffective and may lead to accidents

or errors [79], [265]. In the security sector, where the smallest details and speed are of crucial importance (for example, setting configurations correctly or tracing a symptom back to the cause), this can have significant consequences for an organization.

Depending on the case, chronic stress can also have a lasting impact on mental health and lead to burnout in the medium term. In 2023, according to an international survey, an average of 60% (54% in Germany, 74% in the UK and 39% in Saudi Arabia) of all CISOs surveyed stated that they had experienced burnout within the past year [224]. Recognized by the World Health Organization, burnout is a phenomenon that is characterized by exhaustion, cynicism towards work and weaker performance [291]. Roughly half of the cybersecurity managers surveyed in 2023 reported experiencing anxiety, depression and sleep disorders [79]. In addition to affecting mental health, chronic stress and burnout can also have a significant impact on physical health. They can give rise to heart disease, diabetes and high blood pressure [265]. Particularly severe cases of burnout can lead to a prolonged absence from work for security personnel, resulting in a vicious circle of increasingly drastic shortages of specialized staff.

4.2.2 The psychological impact of cyberattacks on cybersecurity officers

The mental state of many cybersecurity officers, as outlined above, is generally not in the best shape. In the event of a successful cyberattack, an extremely challenging work and mental situation may therefore be met with a distinct lack of resilience and coping strategies.

In the past, cybercrime was generally perceived to be financially motivated or non-violent [243]. The fact that the attacks are not physical but carried out in the virtual world [212], gave rise to the misconception that cybercrime does not cause direct harm to individuals [215]. However, recent research has shown that a cyberattack, as described in our case study in section 4.1, can be experienced as a traumatic event by cybersecurity officers, resulting in them showing severe stress reactions and physical symptoms [87], [213].

According to the Shattered Assumptions Theory [169], our psychological self-concept is characterized by assumptions and expectations about the world and ourselves. In this way, the world is perceived as fundamentally meaningful and comprehensible, while the self is seen in a fundamentally positive light. When a person falls victim to a crime, such as theft or robbery, these basic assumptions can be shaken to such an extent that it causes severe suffering and impairment of the victim's life [170]. This same effect can be seen with cybercrime. The shattering of fundamental positive assumptions about the security of the organization and oneself can trigger emotional and psychological impacts comparable with the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) [60]. All employees can be affected in this way, no matter whether they are working in IT teams, as supervisors or at executive level. The psychological symptoms develop and change over time, as already outlined in the description of the phases following a cyberattack [213].

During the first phase described above, immediately following a security incident, a state of shock combined with not knowing which persons, data and systems have been affected can initially trigger strong negative emotions such as despair and panic [87], [213], (see section 4.1). Since rational judgement is impaired under these circumstances, victims often describe having taken decisions too hastily when working to minimize the damage caused by the cyberattack, which may lead to mistakes being made. Studies show that levels of exhaustion and frustration experienced by cybersecurity officers increase significantly over the course of dealing with a cybersecurity emergency [85].

Once the extent of the data theft, sabotage and potentially also blackmail attempts are known, the impacted managers and employees at a company are often confronted with fears about losing their livelihoods, which tend to persist over a lengthy period of time. They often experience psychosomatic reactions. For instance, it is not uncommon for direct victims of a cyberattack and those involved in mitigating the damage (such as CERT members) to describe loss of appetite, headaches or back pain during the first few weeks after an attack (phase 2) [213]. Around 20% of those directly involved report these somatic symptoms [213]. Feelings of guilt, shame and reduced self-confidence are also very common [24], [171], [213], [214]. Unhealthy coping strategies and a self-focused negative-thought spiral further exacerbate the situation [182], [213]. The psychological impact can also lead to long-term consequences (described in phase 3 above). Even months after the incident, one in seven employees shows such severe stress symptoms that psychological help must be sought to cope with the trauma [213]. Following a cyberattack, the profound impact on an employee's self-image and perception of their company results in more than half of them questioning their current position and considering changing jobs [88]. Cyberattacks thus not only have an impact on individual well-being but can also undermine employee morale and trust in the company.

Factors that amplify the negative psychological effects of a cyberattack include a generally poor psychological state of those involved [48], [224] (see section 4.2.1) and the traumatizing potential of identifying oneself as the victim of a crime [170]. Research is currently being conducted into whether there is a connection between an individual's perception of security prior to an attack and the psychological impact after it has occurred. The hypothesis is that the more convinced victims are of the security of their organization, the more pronounced the stress responses and long-term consequences may be (cf. a discussion in [24]). In addition, managers exacerbate the feeling of stress if they exert pressure on those responsible for cybersecurity rather than providing constructive support [123]. This is especially related to internal or external communication characterized by the apportioning of blame.

In addition, the risk of having to take personal responsibility for a damaging attack is also not conducive to a positive mental state in those responsible for cybersecurity. It has recently been observed, for example, that C-level managers are prominently associated with the company's name following cybersecurity incidents. Depending on legal provisions in the respective country, executives may be held personally liable and even subject to prosecution under certain circumstances. The failure of Uber's former CISO to report a data breach in 2022, for instance, resulted in a fine and three years' probation. In 2023, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) indicted the company SolarWinds and its CISO in connection with the investigation of a cyberattack [239], causing an uproar among cybersecurity managers worldwide. These developments, which even threaten legal consequences for board-level executives, at least of publicly listed companies, is sure to ramp up the psychological pressure on cybersecurity managers and their fear of falling foul of the law following cyberattacks. This is already reflected in the fact that, according to surveys, almost two-thirds of CISOs surveyed would not like to work for a company that does not provide them with protection – for example through insurance – from financial liability in the event of a successful cyberattack [224].

4.3 The resource dilemma and the cyber illusion

Three quarters of CEOs have concerns about their organization's ability to cope with a cyberattack, while over 95% of them believe that cybersecurity is critical to the growth and stability of the business [5]. At the same time, the majority of CEOs surveyed assume that the costs involved in implementing cybersecurity solutions are higher than the consequential costs of a cyberattack – despite many case studies showing the contrary [5], [52]. Numerous guidebooks and other sources provide IT security managers with recommendations on how they can convince their top management to prioritize security. For example, they suggest starting with lower budget requests to increase their chances of success [247]. This already shows a clear discrepancy between the security expectations, the actual set-up and the budgeting of cybersecurity at companies. Where does this dilemma come from? And how does it relate to the general overburdening of IT security staff?

When it comes to presenting arguments in favour of investing in cybersecurity measures, worst-case scenarios are often cited. However, this approach tends to fail because decision makers may feel overwhelmed and adopt a defeatist attitude [89]. Cybersecurity managers are also concerned that presenting the same risks again and again may make them look like "pessimists", "naysayers" or "obstructionists", further exacerbating this dilemma [61].

Already long before an attack occurs, the discrepancy between the knowledge that a cyberattack could have drastic repercussions and the unwillingness to invest in resources to safeguard the infrastructure leads to frustration, especially among those bearing responsibility. In one survey, 98% of security experts stated that there is a shortfall in financial resources to implement security requirements, while 23% believed that only an attack would spur the management on to make resources available [123], [224].

This could be explained by the tendency for the IT operations, IT security and executive level to be separated from each other in the company organization, in the same way as our fictitious company GableGo GmbH is set up. Among other reasons, this could partly be due to the vast majority of CEOs viewing cybersecurity as a purely technical issue, meaning it falls under the responsibility of the IT department. Their own responsibility at management level is not sufficiently taken into consideration if considered at all [5]. For reasons of self-preservation, people moreover tend to take an overly optimistic view of something that seems complex and technical, believing it to be controllable [152]. This discrepancy between responsibility and fields of competence can lead to unclear communication channels and inconsistent processes, resulting in a lack of transparency and causing uncertainty. The consequences could include errors in judgement or the inability to assess the true security level of the company. This can either be accompanied by a great sense of insecurity or, inversely, even a false sense of security [152].

Errors in judgement are also often influenced by the fact that a few security measures have the potential to affect every employee in their daily work, meaning that they attract widespread attention. Security measures, such as internal rules demanding complex passwords or the regular resetting of passwords, the application process for access rights or whitelisting, are often perceived as overly obtrusive and inconvenient [152], [193]. On the one hand, this prominence creates a potentially deceptive sense of security, while on the other hand, it also harbours the potential for another dilemma that security experts regularly face – the constant need to find a balance between quality, security and usability [86]. The more security is built into a

system, the more complex it becomes to manage, for instance through multi-level authentication, complex password policies or the need for regular patch cycles. This makes it more difficult for users to navigate the systems, which can lead to frustration and unwillingness. Unless a company has a sound security culture, this may result in low acceptance of the measures and the concomitant use of unauthorized workarounds, which in turn undermines security [149], [193], [233].

According to various studies, IT security managers and/or CIOs find it difficult to admit mistakes or weaknesses, often due to fear of negative professional consequences or concerns about their competence being called into question [53], [129]. In addition, experienced IT security experts develop strong preconceptions about the level of security within the organization, which may influence their decisions and statements. This can also be described as "tunnel vision" [129].]. IT security managers, CIOs or even CISOs may truly be convinced of the high level of security their company's IT infrastructure possesses and communicate this to management accordingly. It can be assumed that this illusion of security could be one factor leading to the above-mentioned resource dilemma, as there may appear to be little urgency to invest, combined with a lack of arguments in favour of further spending. Seen against the backdrop of the generally heightened stress levels experienced by CIOs and CISOs [224], [265], the emotional dismay in the face of one's own erroneous judgement is particularly severe in the event of a successful attack. This also often forms the basis for any feelings of guilt that may arise in the wake of an attack [171], [213].

4.4 Best practices – recommended actions

Experiencing something as highly stressful and strenuous as a cyberattack can have a negative, long-term impact on the mental health of those involved. Even taking cyberattacks out of the equation, mental illness is increasingly to blame for employee absence (around 15% of all days absent) [42]. Following a ransomware attack, 21% of the employees directly involved leave the company or consider leaving [213]. In view of these figures, it is vital that employee mental health is addressed without delay.

There is a growing awareness in the security industry of the need for well-organized incident management. Contingency plans and hands-on cyber incident response training are already common practice in many companies. However, support for the mental health of employees rarely forms part of the plan. Yet there are a number of measures that companies can take to improve the mental resilience of their employees, both preventively and reactively.

4.4.1 Preventive measures to promote mental health in the workplace

Companies often lack the necessary expertise to deal with the mental strain experienced by their employees. A first step in this regard can be to appoint a mental health officer, who can acquire the relevant knowhow by participating in training courses. Whenever the need arises, this specially trained colleague is then able to react quickly and appropriately, providing emotional support and ensuring stabilization of the employee's mental state. Receiving early support from such mental health first-aiders can reduce the emotional impact of a

ransomware attack [11], [43]. For a number of years now, moreover, the promotion of mental health in the workplace has also been supported by the statutory health insurance companie [41], [42].

The case study described above illustrates how the sharing of responsibilities between the CIO and IT security manager, on the one hand, and the CISO and executive board, on the other, can lead to unclear responsibilities and general uncertainty. While the need to create a clear separation of responsibilities is a common organizational scenario at companies [276], it is accompanied by the challenges resulting from nebulous channels of communication and an unclear allocation of duties. This is one area organizations can tackle well in advance, to ensure an all-encompassing, harmonized process. It starts with working together to determine requirements and shared objectives. Regular alignment meetings help to achieve the defined goals. Good, open communication is particularly advisable in this regard [135].

A culture of appreciation lays the foundation for job satisfaction. This includes engendering a positive error culture, in which employees do not have to fear being disciplined for making mistakes. Especially in IT security, where the human factor is one of the biggest exposures [31], [72], [83], admitting having made a mistake should not incite fear. It is crucial that concerns about losing their standing or being punished must not stand in the way of an employee reporting a security incident [193].

Within the scope of workplace health management, general measures can be taken to counteract the negative mental state of employees as described above. Granting workers more room for initiative and decision-making raises their self-esteem, thereby increasing their motivation [231]. A reasonable workload, flexible working hours, opportunities for further education and fair pay also ensure significantly higher employee satisfaction while boosting their mental stability [43].

Good emergency and crisis management can be established in the context of a business continuity management system (BCMS). A BCMS is effective in both preventive and reactive scenarios, especially in the first phase of the attack as described above. If any exposures are identified in the risk analysis, they can ideally be remedied in advance to prevent the crisis occurring in the first place. To be prepared in the event of an incident, action plans are drawn up and processes established. These should be practised regularly in order to minimize panic during an actual crisis. In addition to company-specific technical and organizational measures, businesses should likewise make provisions for mental health measures. These measures could specifically include:

- Ensuring sufficient rest periods
- Organizing regular, healthy meals
- Defining clear duties and contact persons for mental health support during the crisis



Source: Own diagram

Figure 2: Reactive measures to promote emotional stability following a cyberattack

4.4.2 Reactive measures in the event of a cyberattack

The reactive measures to stabilize the emotional and mental states of those involved can be correlated with the phases specified above (see Figure 2).

4.2.2.1 Phase 1

In the first phase after an attack, stress levels are rocketing and adrenaline is running high. Clear guidelines help staff cope with the crisis. One measure could be to appoint one of the employees as a health manager, specifically tasked with looking after the organization of the crisis response team. This can ensure that everyone involved gets enough sleep and eats healthy meals on a regular basis. Regular check-ins with key stakeholders can help to monitor and support mental (and physical) health in a structured way [213].

4.2.2.2 Phase 2

Phase two is characterized by exhaustion, nonstop pressure on the IT department and executive management team, coupled with a growing lack of understanding both within the company and the employee's private life. Internal and external communication is especially important during this phase. Employees not directly involved in resolving the attack should be made aware of the extent of the recovery work that still needs to be done. In this phase, feelings of guilt are very common among those responsible for IT security. It is essential for top management to openly show appreciation and support. Looking for someone to blame is counterproductive. The focus should rather be on working together to resolve the crisis. Honest communication within the company is of vital importance at this stage to avoid insecurity and uncertainty (see also [53], [213], [281]). Larger companies, in particular, may also find themselves in the public spotlight. Here, too, it is essential to manage communication in such a way that all parties are protected from possible recriminations. It is advisable to prepare appropriate crisis communication for external audiences in advance and integrate this into the response plan.

4.2.2.3 Phase 3

In the months following the attack, normality gradually returns to the company and employees can get back to their usual tasks. However, it remains important in this phase to continue monitoring the mental health of key stakeholders in particular and, where necessary, offer them appropriate support options to help them cope. They should be offered an evaluation session as soon as possible to discuss the attack and how the company handled it [213]. Finally, care should be taken that everyone involved, including supervisors and management, are given adequate time off. Employees involved in cybersecurity incidents emphasize that following an attack, a few weeks of leave is more valuable to them than financial compensation [213].

4.4.3 Positive consequences of a cyberattack?

As paradoxical as it may sound, overcoming a cyberattack can also have positive consequences for those involved over the medium and long term. If excellent preparation, transparent communication and support from key stakeholders make it possible to overcome the crisis working together, an attack can also have positive psychological consequences. After successfully coping with and overcoming an incident, 66.7% of those directly involved and 62% of those indirectly involved reported that they felt they had the ability to master difficulties. Of those directly involved, 46.7% reported realizing they were stronger than they had thought, and that the crisis confirmed they are good at their jobs [213]. In addition, security incidents and the process of handling them appear to strengthen bonds between colleagues, especially among those directly involved [213]. These figures suggest that appropriate coping strategies can boost the resilience of the entire company to future cyberattacks.

Recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of those responsible for cybersecurity and supporting them in their roles is indispensable if we are to secure our companies against the rising tide of cyberattacks over the long term.

5 The Future – Training and skills shortage

THE FUTURE
TRAINING AND SKILLS SHORTAGE



181
MASTER'S DEGREE COURSES

367
DEGREE COURSES AT 285 UNIVERSITIES

186
BACHELOR'S DEGREE COURSES

Sources: Own diagram; ISC 2; "Cybersecurity Workforce Study: How the Economy, Skills Gap and Artificial Intelligence are Challenging the Global Cybersecurity Workforce 2023"; WeAreTechWomen: "#IWD Women in cybersecurity: still a work in progress", 2023; Lindner, J.: "Cybersecurity Diversity Statistics", Gitnux, 2023, 2024; [6, 77, 164, 165]

PROMOTING DIVERSITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES



The proportion of women is only 24%.

Only 17% of CISOs are female.

30% of women earn less than men in the cybersecurity sector.



CyberEducation

8M

BY 2030, 8 MILLION CYBERSECURITY POSITIONS MAY BE UNFILLED.

THE ANNUAL DEMAND (+12%) IS GROWING TWICE AS FAST AS THE SUPPLY.

GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY WORKFORCE IN 2023 (ESTIMATE)

5,452,732

5 The Future – Training and skills shortage

In their digitalization efforts, organizations rely on a complex blend of legacy and state-of-the-art technologies, which they not only need to leverage optimally for their own purposes but also protect from highly creative adversaries around the globe.

This requires specialists who have developed their skills throughout their careers. Demand for these experts clearly exceeds the global supply, with very limited numbers of young professionals available, and opportunities for training and further education hard to come by. This chapter examines the skills shortage and summarizes the findings of an internal study on universities offering opportunities for cybersecurity education and training in 33 countries.

5.1 The cyber skills gap

By 2030, 8 million jobs in cybersecurity could be unfilled. This cyber skills gap weakens organizations, allowing attackers to gain access to their targets even without the use of sophisticated methods. As many as 92% of IT security experts stated that there are skills gaps within their organizations in one or more areas [164]. These skills gaps range from technical skills such as penetration testing and Zero Trust implementation to non-technical skills such as communication.

In 2023, there were an estimated 5.5 million people working in the cybersecurity sector worldwide ([164], p. 4), representing an increase of around 8.7% compared to the previous year. The difference between the number of cybersecurity experts needed and the number available grew by 12.6% to around 4 million jobs ([164], p. 11). In 2022, there was a shortfall of between 260,000 and 500,000 cybersecurity experts in Europe alone [91]. This was confirmed by another study from the same year, in which 47% of the companies surveyed stated that they had struggled to find qualified cybersecurity experts [142].

Organizations are therefore competing for suitable talent and driving up salaries. By 2025, it is anticipated that almost half of all cybersecurity managers will change jobs, with 25% expected to take on a completely different role outside of cybersecurity due to multiple work-related stress factors [132].

A further reason for the lack of qualified young talent is that cybersecurity is a multidisciplinary field. Experts not only need specialized knowledge in the obvious areas of IT, law and compliance but also in ethics, psychology and social issues. Many companies also underestimate the effort needed to train their employees or fail to recognize that their current approaches to cybersecurity training are ineffective [163].

5.1.1 Education and training

More and more educational institutions are offering courses in cybersecurity, but these studies often lack specialized curricula that meet the requirements of the job market. The content of these courses can also hardly keep up with the latest methods used by attackers. Furthermore, the search for suitable lecturers is proving just as challenging as the search for cybersecurity specialists for organizations.

One solution for closing this gap between education and training on the one hand, and the job market on the other, is to establish training programmes and partnerships between companies and educational institutions.

However, many young people are not aware of the opportunities and career paths available in cybersecurity. Some think that cybersecurity falls exclusively under the umbrella of “Computer Science”. This may lead to a lack of interest and low numbers of students.

5.1.2 Tips for organizations

Organizations have various options at their disposal to counter the cyber skills shortage.

Partnerships with colleges and universities are one option for ensuring positive visibility among students. Organizations can, for instance, offer internships, give guest lectures or provide financial support (e.g., via a scholarship) for specialized education and training programmes. Additional investment in internal training programmes and certifications ensures more attractive working conditions, enabling companies to retain specialists over the long term. In one study, 80% of the cybersecurity experts surveyed stated that there are now more pathways into cybersecurity than ever before ([164], p. 44). For example, existing employees can earn additional certifications to become cybersecurity experts in various areas.

Currently, 52% of cybersecurity professionals start their careers with an IT job with no cybersecurity component, and 51% start out in cybersecurity by earning a certification ([164], p. 45). A total of 48% of new entrants into the cybersecurity field are aged 39 years or older ([164], p. 49). These figures show that it is never too late to invest in employees and provide them with further training. Many new entrants are motivated to work in a field that is constantly evolving. This is confirmed by the figures from the companies surveyed, with 51% stating that they are hiring more people from non-cybersecurity backgrounds and 56% revealing that they fill these positions internally ([164], p. 44).

Cybersecurity Learning Hub

The Cybersecurity Learning Hub [7] is an initiative designed to tackle the global cyber skills shortage, led by Salesforce with support from Fortinet, the Global Cyber Alliance and the World Economic Forum.

The Cybersecurity Career Path was created as part of this initiative. The website offers a growing library of career-oriented information, expert interviews and training modules. Interested individuals can use it to map their own career path through a variety of cybersecurity roles. The Cybersecurity Career Path allows anyone, regardless of previous training and background, to retrain for the future and learn skills that are in demand with employers. There are also cybersecurity resources for managers and organizations, such as Cyber Resilience for Organizations, a curated learning path of explanatory and technical courses.

5.2 Cyber Education Analysis[1]

Another reason for the severe shortage of cybersecurity professionals is perhaps the lack of focus on cybersecurity in the national curriculum and insufficient awareness of the whole discipline among pupils and students. Therefore, young people do not get intrigued by the topic or become interested in a career in cybersecurity. But does the shortage of experts start with education and training? And just how many degree programmes are on offer that specialize in cybersecurity? This chapter aims to shed some light on these and other issues.

The findings are based on internal research into existing bachelor's and master's degree programmes in a total of 33 countries. The focus was on degree programmes specializing in cybersecurity. Degree programmes in which cybersecurity is only one of many courses or forms only a small part of a computer science degree, for instance, were not taken into consideration. For the purpose of the study, both colleges and universities have been aggregated under the keyword universities.

The figures provided are estimates, as not all degree programmes offered at the universities in the 33 countries surveyed are available in German or English on their websites. Only programmes leading to degrees with the following terms in their titles were taken into consideration: Cyber, Cybersecurity, IT Security, Cyber Defense and Information Security.

In the 33 countries analysed, there are 367 different degrees in cybersecurity on offer at 285 universities. These are broken down into 186 bachelor's degree programmes at 149 universities and 181 master's degree programmes at 136 universities. These are spread across the various countries as follows:

- **USA:** 94 bachelor's degree programmes and 73 master's degree programmes
- **Israel:** 1 bachelor's degree programme and 2 master's degree programmes
- **Southern Europe (Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain):** 3 bachelor's degree programmes and 22 master's degree programmes
- **Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia):** 6 bachelor's degree programmes and 7 master's degree programmes
- **Northern Europe (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Northern Ireland, Sweden, United Kingdom):** 45 bachelor's degree programmes and 51 master's degree programmes
- **Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland):** 37 bachelor's degree programmes and 26 master's degree programmes

In addition to the various degree programmes on offer, there are also a variety of further training and qualification opportunities available in cybersecurity in all countries.

[1] See infographic at the beginning of the chapter.

5.2.1 German speaking countries

Germany boasts an especially large number of computer science degree programmes including individual courses in cybersecurity. Despite Germany having approximately 211 universities [77], there are very few degree programmes exclusively focusing on cybersecurity. Only a total of 27 universities in Germany offer degree programmes in cybersecurity, divided into 21 bachelor's degrees at 20 universities, and 7 master's degrees at 7 universities. The lack of degree programmes on offer is further diluted by the universities themselves, as some degree programmes are not available starting every year. When queried, the educational institutions surveyed did not give any clear reason for this approach, but student interest in the related degree programmes also appears to be rather low. In addition to a traditional degree, there are a wealth of other training options in the field of computer science, as well as various opportunities for further training through pursuing certifications.

In Austria, a total of 62 [14] universities offer a bachelor's degree programme focusing on cybersecurity. A total of 10 master's degree programmes at 7 universities in Austria suggest that students take a classic computer science degree programme at bachelor's level and then build on this with a cyber-specific master's degree.

In Switzerland, 3 universities offer a bachelor's degree in cybersecurity, and 2 universities a master's degree in the field.



Source: Own diagram

Figure 1: Cyber degree programmes – German speaking countries



Source: Own diagram

Figure 2: Cyber degree programmes – UK, USA and Israel

5.2.2 UK, USA and Israel

In direct comparison to the German speaking region, the United Kingdom offers more study opportunities in the field of cybersecurity at over 160 [254] universities, with a total of 62 degree programmes. These can be broken down into 29 bachelor's degrees at 26 universities and 33 master's degrees at 29 universities.

In the USA, there are a plethora of degree programmes with "cyber" in their title, but with a focus on management and policy (e.g., in the context of international relations, political sciences, public management). Just a few universities actually offer degree programmes in cybersecurity, although there are over 4,000 [272] universities across the country. Instead, many universities offer individual certifications and further education opportunities in cybersecurity.

In Israel, cybersecurity is one of the most successful industries. Despite a high level of awareness through research and studies, as well as various summer camps and programmes for pupils and students, there are very few specific degree programmes in cybersecurity in the country.

5.2.3 What content does a degree programme in cybersecurity comprise?

In general, many cybersecurity degree programmes are structured in a similar way and comprise identical courses:

- Programming
- Mathematics
- Security
  - Systems, Networks, Hardware, Internet, Cloud
- Applied Cryptography
- Machine & Deep Learning
- Digital Forensics
- Ethical Hacking

Strikingly, many topics are only dealt with very superficially, and only a few degree programmes focus on the actual skills which are currently required or cover a specific field in detail. This is also reflected in the career opportunities listed for graduates:

- Manager
  - Information security, risk or incident response
- Specialist or analyst
  - Database, security or application
- Cybersecurity consultant
- Ethical hacker
- Administrator, tester or developer
- Positions in research

5.2.4 EU Cybersecurity Skills Academy

Various EU initiatives, such as the EU Cybersecurity Work Programme and the Cybersecurity Skills Academy, aim to take a holistic approach towards raising awareness about cybersecurity to ensure that the topic receives greater attention at colleges and universities, as well as in society.

The European Commission decided to establish a "Cybersecurity Skills Academy" [100] to boost the number of qualified cybersecurity professionals in the EU. The Academy aims to bring together existing initiatives to promote cybersecurity skills and make them accessible via a platform focusing on digital competency and jobs. The Academy's objectives include increasing the number of cybersecurity professionals and the proportion of women in the field, while also reducing the gap between supply and demand in the labour market. It will also teach the competences needed to fulfil legal and policy requirements at EU and national level as well as introducing measures to improve the comparability, quality assurance and certification of cybersecurity skills [100].

In addition, the Academy aims to improve visibility and synergies between public and private cybersecurity skills initiatives and to offer needs-oriented training for citizens. For students and professionals, it offers an overview of existing educational options, as well as opportunities to acquire new cyber skills [100].

For universities, training organizations and industry, the Academy provides information on the development of the labour market, funding opportunities and suggestions for the design of curricula or course plans. It also advertises training and certification opportunities which support the development of cybersecurity skills [100].

To attract future generations to a career in cybersecurity, three goals need to be achieved:

1) **Create awareness:** Organizations have a responsibility to raise cybersecurity awareness among their employees and management team. It is important to ensure that staff are conscious of the key role that cybersecurity plays in everyday life.

2) **Make investments:** There are a host of initiatives on offer to ensure that the next generation is well trained and prepared. Organizations need to work together to achieve this goal. It is worth investing in programmes such as scholarships, summer schools, hacking camps, further training and certifications.

3) **Inspire young people:** Getting young people interested in, excited about and inspired by cybersecurity is a top priority, so they have the opportunity to engage with the topic and may consider pursuing a career in the field.

6 Regulations at a glance

REGULATIONS AT A GLANCE


IENCE ACT // CYBERSECU
IDARITY ACT // RADIO EQ
IENCE DIRECTIVE (CER) A
TIS ORDINANCE // IT SECU

6 Regulations at a glance

EU Solidarity Act

BACKGROUND

With cyberattacks becoming ever more complex, effective and affordable (Cybercrime-as-a-Service), the cyber threats facing the European Union continue to grow. The European Union agency for cybersecurity (ENISA, European Network and Information Security Agency) was able to reaffirm this state of affairs in its report covering the 2023 period. All sectors are impacted by cybersecurity risks, with government administration and medical facilities especially coming under attack in recent times. The readiness of the EU to prepare for cybersecurity incidents and respond appropriately when they occur is still insufficient, as is the solidarity between states at EU level. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has once again underlined the EU's reliance on digital technologies. The conflict has brought about an increase in cyberattacks on organizations forming part of supply chains and critical infrastructure (KRITIS) as well as an increased frequency of social engineering attempts targeting their employees. This has, in turn, dramatically increased the need to establish measures to recognize and mitigate risks even further [92], [102], [108].

IMPETUS

The Cyber Solidarity Act promotes measures to strengthen solidarity at EU level with regard to cybersecurity. It establishes the following three-pillar approach for Europe [92], [94], [98], [102]:

1. The EU aims to set up a European Cyber Shield. Its objective is to enhance the block's ability to detect, analyse and respond to cybersecurity risks, and to establish a cybersecurity community by collecting and sharing information on cyber threats. The Shield is intended to be a networked pan-European platform, consisting of national and cross-border Security Operations Centres (SOCs). These SOCs will be tasked with registering, analysing and monitoring reported cybersecurity events and resolving incidents. Each EU Member State will set up a national SOC, which will serve as a point of contact for public and private organizations at national level when it comes to collecting and analysing information relating to cybersecurity incidents. A cross-border SOC should consist of a consortium of at least three national SOCs. The members of a cross-border SOC are obliged to share information about the cybersecurity situation with each other. Should a cross-border SOC obtain information or receive reports relating to an ongoing, large-scale cybersecurity incident, it is required to provide relevant data to the European Cyber Crises Liaison Organisation Network (EU CyCLONe) [110], the EU Computer Security Incident Response Team Network (CSIRT Network) [107] and the EU Commission. EU CyCLONe has already been established as a network for collaboration between national authorities dedicated to cyber incident management and is supported by ENISA. Its aim is to develop a structure for the timely sharing of information and promotion of cyber awareness. The EU CSIRT Network was established by the Network and Information Systems (NIS) security directive and, just like EU CyCLONe, serves as a platform for Member States to cooperate and exchange information on cybersecurity issues. ENISA assumes the role of secretariat (general administration). The European Cybersecurity Competence Centre (ECCC) will implement Cyber Shield's projects and activities. The ECCC can also call on individual national SOCs to jointly procure/implement tools and infrastructures. The EU undertakes to provide funding of up to 50% for national SOCs and up to 75% for cross-border SOCs.

2. The EU will establish a Cyber Emergency Mechanism to support Member States to improve their readiness and ability to respond to (major) cybersecurity incidents, including the testing of organizations operating in highly critical sectors (KRITIS) regarding their response to potential exposures. ENISA is to compile the list of KRITIS operators to be tested and assessed, in accordance with the recently revised Network and Information Systems Directive (NIS2) [94]. The Cyber Emergency Mechanism is intended to establish an EU-wide Cybersecurity Reserve which can be activated in the event of significant cyber incidents and provide (financial) support for the mutual assistance between countries. The reserve is to consist of trusted incident response providers which have been certified according to EU standards. The EU Commission, in collaboration with ENISA, will be responsible for implementing the project. Non-EU countries would also be able to request support from the EU Cybersecurity Reserve, provided they have already concluded an association agreement with the EU regarding their participation in the DEP (Digital Europe Programme).

3. A review mechanism is to be established for cybersecurity incidents. This involves reviewing and assessing significant or large-scale cybersecurity incidents. ENISA is responsible for implementing this Cybersecurity Incident Review Mechanism and is required to deliver an incident report review to the EU Commission, the EU CyCLONe and the CSIRT network, communicating any relevant findings and recommendations.

In addition to these three pillars, the Cyber Solidarity Act proposes amendments to the respective provisions in the DEP to pave the way for the establishment of the Cyber Shield and Cyber Emergency Mechanism [92], [102].

On 20 December 2023, the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States (COREPER, Comité des représentants permanents) submitted a proposed amendment to the Cyber Solidarity Act to the EU Council, which was adopted. The proposal was based on amendments requested by the Member States and certain definitions in the original version not yet being in line with NIS2. The proposed amendment retains the general position of the EU Commission, but the following points, among others, have been adapted in the draft regulation [90], [92], [228]:

- The terminology was adapted at the request of the Member States. In particular, “Security Operations Centre” has been renamed “Cyber Hub” and “Cyber Shield” has been renamed “Cybersecurity Alert System”.

- The definitions of terminology have been amended and harmonized with other legislation, in particular NIS2.

- Improvements were introduced in the areas of procurement, funding, the sharing of information and the incident review mechanism.

- The role of ENISA has been reinforced and clarified.

OBJECTIVES

The ultimate aim of the Cyber Solidarity Act is to establish measures which strengthen solidarity and capacity within the EU when it comes to identifying, responding to and preparing for cybersecurity risks. To this end, it is essential to boost EU-wide cyber resilience by raising situational awareness of both internal and external cyber threats and incidents in critical and highly critical sectors. The law aims to promote cooperation between Member States and the sharing of information, while ensuring sufficient funding is available to combat cyberattacks [92], [102].

TIME FRAME

- Publication of first draft proposal: 18 April 2023 3
- Last proposed amendment: 20 December 2023 [228]
- Trilogue: In progress

PARTIES ADDRESSED

The Cyber Solidarity Regulation is aimed primarily at the Member States of the EU, and more specifically the designated national SOCs. The establishment of the Cyber Emergency Mechanism and Cybersecurity Incident Review Mechanism once again underlines the crucial importance of ENISA for cybersecurity in Europe [102].

REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTIES ADDRESSED

The act requires EU Member States to appoint a national institution as a SOC within the framework of the EU-wide Cyber Shield. These national SOCs are tasked with cooperating with each other as well as collecting and sharing information on the cybersecurity situation in the EU. ENISA is responsible for the successful implementation of mechanisms to strengthen the EU's cyber resilience in the event of security incidents [102].

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REQUIREMENTS

Due to the urgent need to implement the Cyber Solidarity Act, the EU Commission did not carry out an assessment of the new law's potential impact. Although the European Court of Auditors has welcomed the basic idea of bolstering cyber solidarity, especially the prospect of closer cooperation and proactive exchange of information between Member States, it also considers the act to be complicating the EU cybersecurity landscape, which already comprises numerous private and public sector actors at regional, national and EU level. The Cyber Solidarity Act would add new levels of complexity [105]. Another problem which has been raised is that existing CSIRT networks and SOCs may overlap, resulting in an increased potential for confusion between the various communication channels. As each country requires its own institution to appoint and set up its SOC, or may even have to establish new authorities for this purpose, this in turn means organizational efforts and financial expenditure [92].

SANCTIONS

The cyber solidarity law explicitly does not contain any information on sanctions or penalties to be imposed in the event of non-compliance with the regulations. Although the Cyber Solidarity Act is currently still in trilogue, it will be binding for all EU Member States from the day it comes into force. In the event of non-compliance by a Member State, the infringement procedure can be initiated in the worst case [96]. The European Court of Justice can then impose financial sanctions at the request of the EU Commission. These fines imposed may consist of a lump sum and/or a daily penalty payment [104].

EU Cybersecurity Act

BACKGROUND

Driven by a growing range of products and services, access to information and communication technologies (ICT) is becoming increasingly popular, especially in this era of the Internet of Things (IoT). The trend towards digital transformation and networking has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in cybersecurity risks to which governments, companies and private individuals – including vulnerable members of society such as children – are exposed within the European Union (EU). Low levels of cybersecurity and an inadequate amount of certification for ICT products, services and processes brought about a situation where organizations and consumers hardly knew anything about their security features. At the same time, there have been too many different approaches to cybersecurity and competing standards within the individual EU Member States. The result was a fragmented cybersecurity landscape in which it was difficult to ensure standardized levels of protection. Confidence in digital solutions was undermined, moreover, by the ambiguity this lack of alignment gave rise to. Increased coordination and cooperation at EU level was essential in order to respond to cyber threats appropriately. The EU Parliament recognized the need to extend and strengthen the mandate for the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), which was originally due to expire in 2020. In the new EU Cybersecurity Act, ENISA is tasked with supporting the EU Member States in the development and implementation of cybersecurity measures [93].

IMPETUS

While the EU Cybersecurity Act gives ENISA more duties, it also provides the agency with increased resources to support EU Member States more comprehensively in their efforts to combat cyber threats. The regulation describes the structure and organization of ENISA in greater detail. Within the next four years, ENISA is to be given more staff (growing from 84 to 125 employees) and its budget is set to increase by more than double (from €11 million to €23 million). Beyond this, ENISA's mandate will be made permanent, and it will be assigned more powers. The agency's primary duties are to coordinate and promote increased co-operation between EU Member States and itself. These tasks are broken down as follows [93], [216]:

- Policy development and implementation: ENISA is to provide increased support to the EU Commission and the EU Member States in the development, implementation and review of general cybersecurity policy in the European Union. The key strategic sectors mentioned in the NIS Directive (Network and Information Security), such as energy, finance, transport and other areas belonging to critical infrastructure, also fall within the scope of the review.

- Operational cooperation: In line with its role to promote cooperation within the Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) and acting as a permanent administrative office (secretariat), ENISA should be able to support EU Member States upon request. For example, ENISA advises Member States on how they can improve their capabilities to prevent, detect and manage security incidents. It facilitates the technical management of security incidents with considerable or substantial impact as well as ensuring that cyber

threats and security incidents are analysed. ENISA is also tasked with organizing practical cybersecurity exercises across Europe via the CSIRTs network to increase the EU's ability to respond to cyber threats.

- Building up knowledge, information and capacities: Another task of ENISA is to act as a central point of contact for cybersecurity issues on behalf of the EU institutions and bodies. It is tasked with providing analyses and advice to raise awareness and sensitize users regarding cybersecurity issues. This will enhance the skills and expertise of the Member States to enable them, for example, to prevent cyber incidents or respond appropriately to them.

- Support for NIS: The regulation is also intended to help ENISA support EU Member States in their efforts to implement the NIS Directive, which clarifies the reporting obligations of national authorities in case of serious incidents.

The Cybersecurity Act also covers the establishment of an EU framework for the definition of cybersecurity certification schemes. This is aimed at facilitating the development of tailored EU-wide certification systems within a comprehensive set of rules, technical requirements, standards and procedures for certain categories of ICT products, processes and services. Each scheme will be based on an agreement at the EU level for the evaluation of the security properties of a specific ICT-based product or service. These certificates will attest that the ICT products, services or processes which achieve certification under such a scheme comply with the specified security requirements. After certifying their products, processes and services only once, companies will be entitled to obtain certificates that are valid throughout the EU. The intention behind this certification process is to increase the security of networked products, IoT and ICT devices, and critical infrastructures. The framework also aims to provide users with an opportunity to assure themselves of the security level of the certified devices, as security aspects are already taken into account in the early stages of their technical design and development [101]. Assurance levels are employed to inform users of the cybersecurity risk of a product. The levels are basic, substantial or high. They reflect the level of risk associated with the intended use of the product, service or process in terms of the probability and impact of an incident. For example, a high assurance level would mean that the certified product has passed the most stringent security tests. A European Cybersecurity Certification Group (ECCG) is to be established to develop certification schemes. This group will serve the EU Commission and ENISA in an advisory capacity on a wide range of cybersecurity certification issues [99].

The EU Member States are also required to implement a number of other measures to ensure a higher level of cybersecurity [93]:

- National cyber strategies are to be developed for securing networks and information systems in co-operation with ENISA.

- Member States must designate at least one national authority to implement, monitor and enforce cybersecurity measures and appoint certification bodies responsible for issuing cybersecurity certificates in accordance with the EU-wide certification framework.

- Operators of essential services and providers of digital services must be supervised.

- Participation in EU-wide groups for coordination and cooperation on cybersecurity issues as well as national promotion of cybersecurity awareness, including support for education and training programmes.

OBJECTIVES

The aim of this legislation is to strengthen ENISA in its role as the leading point of contact for cybersecurity issues within the EU in order to improve the EU's ability to respond to cybersecurity threats, ensure more resilient protection against cyberattacks and strengthen trust in the digital single market. As the spearhead, ENISA should ensure the promotion of the digital single market and provide support for innovation in cybersecurity. At the same time, the creation of a standardized, EU-wide framework for defining cybersecurity certification schemes is also envisaged [93].

TIME FRAME

- Publication: 17 April 2019
- Entry into force: 27 June 2019
  - Articles 58, 60, 61, 63, 64 and 65, applied from 28 June 2021

PARTIES ADDRESSED

One of the parties addressed by this regulation is ENISA. Its mandate was reaffirmed and reinforced by the EU Cybersecurity Act, empowering it to better support EU Member States in the development and implementation of cybersecurity measures. In this regard, the Member States are themselves addressed. Implementation is overseen by the European Commission. At the "bottom level", this law addresses participants in trade and industry as well as companies in the cybersecurity sector. The certification conditions are dedicated to these providers of security products and services [93].

REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTIES ADDRESSED

ENISA is required to support EU Member States in fulfilling their obligation to transform and implement these cybersecurity measures from European law into national law. It is also tasked with developing schemes for the certification of ICT products. Another duty for ENISA is the technical and strategic coordination of certain cybersecurity aspects at EU level. Member States must ensure that the rules laid down in the regulation are effectively implemented within their national territories. Manufacturers and providers of ICT products, services or processes which voluntarily submit to a certification assessment then have to comply with the requirements it imposes. A self-assessment procedure is only possible if there is a low risk, which corresponds with the assurance level "low" [93].

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REQUIREMENTS

The stronger mandate granted to ENISA also means more tasks, duties and responsibilities for the agency. In collaboration with the EU Member States, a standardized level of cybersecurity and a qualified certification framework must be established. This will require substantial organizational efforts and financial investment. Some countries may have difficulties implementing the measures within the planned schedule. For providers of ICT products, services or processes, the certification framework gives them the opportunity to declare that their products, services or processes are secure across Europe without having to navigate through the fragmented certification landscape. Users can be confident that certain providers will provide better protection.

SANCTIONS

While the Cybersecurity Act does not explicitly designate sanctions, it does specify that Member States should adopt their own regulations in response to violations of the act or the European cybersecurity certification schemes [93]. However, all EU projects to increase the general level of cybersecurity (including the Cybersecurity Act) fall under the NIS2 Directive. Consequently, the provisions for sanctions outlined in NIS2 have to be implemented in the form of national measures by the Member States [94]. In Germany, for example, the Federal Ministry of the Interior's draft bill "NIS2 implementation and Cyber Security Strengthening Act" categorizes a violation of this cybersecurity legislation as a regulatory, or administrative, offence. According to the Act on Regulatory Offences, the following fines can be imposed [39], [45]:

- A regulatory offence may be punished with a fine of up to €2 million.
- For institutions deemed "important", the potential penalty increases to a maximum of €7 million or at least 1.4% of the total global turnover achieved by the respective company in the previous financial year.
- If the offender is an operator of critical facilities (KRITIS) or a particularly important institution (a regulated institution belonging to the defined "NIS2 sector", based on the number of employees or turnover/balance sheet values exceeding the threshold level [94]), the offence may be punished with a fine of up to €10 million or a maximum amount of at least two percent of the total worldwide turnover achieved by the company in the previous financial year.

BSI-KritisV: Ordinance for the identification of critical infrastructures in accordance with the BSI Act

BACKGROUND

Critical infrastructures (KRITIS) include organizations and facilities which are essential for state and society. Their failure or impairment would result in sustained supply shortages, significant disruptions to public order and safety or other dramatic consequences. Since 2015, regulation of critical infrastructure organizations in Germany has been based on the Information Technology Security Act (IT-SiG) and the Kritis Ordinance (KritisV), which provide the general framework for KRITIS. As an omnibus law, the IT-SiG amends several existing laws simultaneously. The most significant of these is the Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI Act), which defines duties and tasks for the BSI and KRITIS operators [44]. Until 2016, it was left up to each operator to independently assess whether their infrastructures were to be considered crucial for the provision of critical services to the general public. Notwithstanding a public-private partnership between operators and the federal government (known as UP KRITIS), in which schemes and recommendations for action were developed to improve the security of information technology in critical infrastructure operators, it could not be sufficiently ensured that each of the sectors had an equivalent and adequate level of protection in practice. The IT-SiG and the BSI-KritisV, which is pursuant to the BSIG, were introduced with the intention of achieving the required level of protection by identifying KRITIS organizations and holding the respective operators responsible for the implementation of specific security standards and reporting obligations [37].

IMPETUS

The scope of the BSI-KritisV (issued by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community (BMI) [37] and BSI [36]) defines KRITIS sectors in the economy, allowing operators providing services to the general public (also known as KRITIS organizations, facilities or installations) to determine whether they are subject to KRITIS regulations based on whether the calculation for their facilities meets the KRITIS threshold values. The relevant sectors are listed below:

- Basic supplies
  - Energy sector
    - Power (generation, trading, transmission, distribution)
    - Gas (extraction, trading, transport, distribution)
    - Fuel and heating oil (extraction, production, trade, transport, storage, distribution)
    - District heating (generation, control, monitoring, distribution)
  - Water sector
    - Drinking water (extraction, treatment, distribution, control, monitoring)
    - Wastewater disposal (urban drainage, wastewater treatment, water discharge, control, monitoring)
  - Nutrition sector
    - Food products (production, treatment, trade)
  - Health sector
    - Inpatient medical care
    - Supply of directly life-sustaining medical devices which are consumer goods (manufacture, dispensing – e.g., of disposables, implants and transplants)
    - Supply of prescription medicines and blood/plasma concentrates for internal or external human use (manufacture, distribution, dispensing)
    - Laboratory diagnostics

- Services
  - Information Technology and Telecommunications sector
    - Voice and data transmission (access, transmission, switching, control)
    - Data storage and processing (housing, IT hosting, trust services)
  - Finance and Insurance sector
    - Cash supply (withdrawal authorization, clearing and settlement systems, debiting the customer's account, logistics)
    - Card-based payment transactions (authorization, clearing and settlement systems, debiting the customer's account, crediting the payee's account)
    - Conventional payment transactions (receiving bank transfers, direct debits, clearing and settlement systems, debiting and crediting customer accounts)
    - Trading in securities and derivatives, as well as clearing and settlement of securities and derivatives transactions (submission of orders for trading, trade execution, portfolio management for customers, clearing of transactions, booking of securities and cash)
    - Insurance services, social security benefits and basic benefits for jobseekers (drawing on insurance or social benefits)
- Transport
  - Transport and traffic sector
    - Passenger and freight transport (air, rail, sea and inland waterway, road, local public transport, logistics, covers all means of transport)

The BSI-KritisV specifies the criteria and periods of validity from which facilities, installations or parts thereof are considered critical infrastructures based on the outcome of a calculation using a formula provided in the regulation. The infrastructure is considered critical if the result of the calculation reaches or exceeds the threshold values listed in the BSI Criticality Ordinance. With the fourth ordinance, published on 6 December 2023, amending the KRITIS Regulation, the Transport category of the BSI-KritisV was extended to include the municipal waste disposal sector. This includes the activities of collection, transport, recovery and disposal [37].

The threshold values of the BSI-KritisV apply strictly to critical infrastructures. Groups, companies, operations or sites themselves are not KRITIS. In other words, if no individual facility ever exceeds the threshold value, it is not considered KRITIS. However, an exception is made if several facilities of the same type are located in a close spatial and operational context. If together, they reach or exceed the abovementioned thresholds, they then count as a joint installation and are considered critical infrastructure in the sense of KRITIS [29].

It is important to note that although the government, public administration, media and culture sectors also belong to KRITIS, they are not subject to the obligations of the BSI-KritisV.

OBJECTIVES

Against the backdrop of rapid digital transformation and increasing networking, it is essential to ramp up the cybersecurity requirements for individual KRITIS. The regulation aims to achieve a standardized, high level of protection to safeguard German KRITIS sectors, in particular their networks and information systems, from cyberattacks and other security incidents. In order to achieve this, it is first necessary to identify whether the individual systems serving the public interest in fact fall into the KRITIS category.

TIME FRAME

- Date of issue: 22 April 2016
- Entry into force: 3 May 2016
- Last amendment: 6 December 2023 [37]

PARTIES ADDRESSED

BSI-KritisV is aimed at companies in KRITIS sectors whose systems exceed predefined thresholds. Since 2021, companies in the special public interest (UBI) and providers of digital services have also been included [33]. This means that these organizations are considered KRITIS operators and fall under the BSI-KritisV.

REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTIES ADDRESSED

According to the BSIG and the BSI-KritisV, a KRITIS operator is obliged to fulfil the following requirements [32]:

- Assessment of its systems:
  - The KRITIS operator must compare all output produced by its (joint) systems with the corresponding threshold value, as stipulated in the BSI-KritisV under the assessment criteria. If the latter is reached or exceeded, the system is considered KRITIS. The operator must then fulfil the requirements below.
- Contact point:
  - The operator is required to designate a contact point through which it can be reached at all times. To define this more precisely, the BSI understands this obligation to mean that the operator is able to receive, immediately view and evaluate BSI communications (cybersecurity alerts, situation updates, etc.) warning and informing KRITIS operators around the clock (24/7) via the registered contact point.
- Mandatory reporting of incidents:
  - In the event of an IT security incident or IT disruption, there is an immediate duty to report these to the BSI via the contact point. This applies for (substantial) disruptions to the availability, integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of IT systems, components or processes that have led or could lead to a failure or significant impairment of the system's functionality.
- Improving IT security:
  - No later than two years after the BSI-KritisV comes into force, the KRITIS operator is obliged to take appropriate, state-of-the-art precautions to prevent disruptions to its information technology systems, components and processes (provided that its infrastructures have reached the threshold values). The technical measures required may differ depending on the specific case and regulation of the sector, therefore it is not possible to describe the "state of the art" conclusively. One way of determining the state of the art at a particular point in time could be to base it on existing national or international standards (e.g., DIN, ISO, DKE or ISO/IEC) or by leveraging tried and tested models for the respective sector.
- Obligation to provide evidence of compliance:
  - Every two years, the operator must provide evidence to the BSI to prove that its IT systems are state of the art.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REQUIREMENTS

Owing to the rapid, wide-spread growth of digital transformation, operators of KRITIS are facing major challenges with regard to securing their IT systems, processes and components. Every two years, operators are required to examine whether these still conform with the state of the art and close any gaps which may be discovered. Acquiring new IT components or restructuring existing systems to secure their infrastructure, coupled with the cycle-based provision of evidence to the BSI, not only require labour-intensive organizational efforts, but also place them under a significant financial burden.

SANCTIONS

Violations of the applicable KRITIS regulations are classified as a regulatory (administrative) offence under the BSIG [44] and are subject to sanctions as defined in the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG) [45]. The size of the fine depends on the respective offence and with the introduction of the IT Security Act 2.0, some penalties were increased. The potential fines comprise four levels between €100,000 and a maximum of €20 million (for legal persons/bodies). Some examples of offences and their penalties are [29]:

- if the operator's contact point cannot be reached: up to €100,000
- if not registered as a KRITIS despite exceeding the threshold: up to €500,000
- failure to report incidents: up to €500,000
- failure to implement precautions in accordance with BSIG: up to €10 million
- failure to provide evidence: up to €10 million
- a violation of the BSI's orders to restore functionality, avert danger or eliminate a security exposure: up to €20 million

23 NYCRR 500: Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Service Companies

BACKGROUND

The threat posed by cybercrime emanating from states, terrorist organizations and non-aligned criminals continues to grow. As these crimes have a strong focus on the financial sector, among others, it is continuously monitored by the New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS). The NYDFS has frequently noted attempts by attackers to exploit technical exposures and allow assailants to view or steal sensitive electronic data. With no uniform minimum standards for cybersecurity across New York's financial services sector, the overall situation posed a significant threat to financial services providers and consumers alike. Consequently, the NYDFS saw the need to establish a regulatory framework that, while not "overly prescriptive", required certain minimum cybersecurity standards from its regulated entities, so that cybersecurity programmes could be commensurate with the risks involved and keep pace with technological advances [209]. The resulting "23 NYCRR 500" regulation forms part of the overall package of New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (NYCRR) [267].

IMPETUS

In 23 NYCRR 500, the NYDFS sets out a list of requirements regulating the measures to be taken when implementing a cybersecurity scheme for organizations and companies. Organizations and companies (referred to in this chapter as entities) operating and therefore under supervision in New York are obliged to carry out their own risk assessment. Pursuant to this, requirements with regard to designing a cybersecurity programme and a cybersecurity policy must be complied with. In addition to these mandatory requirements, deadlines are also stipulated for when an organization has to implement these requirements.

OBJECTIVES

By way of this regulation, the NYDFS aims to promote the protection of customer data and the information technology systems of institutions falling under its supervision. Each entity is required to critically assess its own risk profile and develop measures to address risk factors. Decision makers at organizations and corporations will be required to establish adequate cybersecurity programmes and demonstrate these to the NYDSF. Each organization addressed by this regulation is required to take action without delay.

TIME FRAME

- Publication: 16 February 2017
- Entry into force: 1 March 2017
- Last amendment: 1 November 2023

PARTIES ADDRESSED

This regulation is aimed at all organizations and companies falling under the administration or supervision of the New York State Department of Financial Services. With a few exceptions, the regulation therefore... [232]

... applies to the following organizations:

- Trust companies
- State-chartered banks
- Mortgage companies
- Licensed lenders
- Private banks
- Service contract providers
- Insurance companies operating in New York
- Foreign banks holding a licence to do business in New York
- Third-party service providers

... does not apply to the following organizations:

- Organizations with fewer than 10 employees
- Organizations whose annual gross revenue from their New York operations did not exceed $5 million three years prior to the regulation coming into force
- Companies with a year-end balance sheet reflecting equity of less than US $10 million
- Charitable organizations operating in New York

In addition, it is important to highlight the fact that Class A companies have been subject to stricter requirements since the last amendment to 23 NYCRR 500. This class includes [287]:

- Companies with more than 2,000 employees, including subsidiaries
- Companies with gross annual turnover of more than US $1 billion, including subsidiaries

REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTIES ADDRESSED

The 23 NYCRR 500 regulation contains a list of requirements that must be fulfilled by the supervised entity [209], [232], [284]:

1. **Cybersecurity programme**
   An institution is required to establish and maintain a cybersecurity programme. It can either set up its own programme or adopt existing cybersecurity programmes from other institutions, provided that these programmes also meet the requirements. The cybersecurity programme must be based on regular risk assessments and risk monitoring to quickly identify and manage risks. Its purpose is to safeguard information systems and the non-public information stored in them. In this way, the programme aims to support the entity in responding appropriately to cybercrime incidents and recovering from them to the extent necessary. All documentation and information relevant to the programme must be made available upon request to the NYDFS superintendent. The cybersecurity programme must also include:

a. annual penetration tests based on the risk assessment to identify risks across the entire IT infrastructure and prevent them from developing into threats.

b. bi-annual vulnerability assessments to detect publicly known vulnerabilities which could pose a risk to the integrity of the entire IT architecture.

c. restriction of users' rights to access information systems and non-public information. These access privileges must be reviewed at regular intervals. Using the risk assessment as a basis, multifactor authentication shall be implemented for access control, unless an exception has expressly been granted by the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), especially when accessing the internal network from an external network.

d. measures designed to ensure the use of secure development practices for in-house developed applications. These measures must be reviewed periodically by the CISO.

e. a disposal scheme for the secure deletion on a periodic basis of any data that is no longer required.

f. risk-based policies, procedures and controls designed to monitor the activity of authorized users. In addition, periodic awareness training sessions are to be organized to promote risk prevention.

g. controlling measures, including data encryption, designed to protect non-public information located within or transmitted through third-party systems. Encryption controls must be reviewed and approved on a regular basis by the appointed CISO.

h. a written incident response plan designed to promptly respond to, and recover from, a cybersecurity event which materially affects the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the information systems or disrupts the ongoing operations.

2. **Cybersecurity policy**
The NYDFS requires each covered entity to establish and maintain a written security policy or policies. This policy must be approved by a senior manager or the covered entity's board of directors and detail all measures taken to safeguard its information systems and the non-public data they contain from security threats.

3. **CISO and security personnel**
The covered entity is obliged to appoint a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) to oversee and implement cybersecurity measures in accordance with its policies and programme. The CISO should be a qualified cybersecurity specialist who can also be outsourced from a partner company or a third party if certain conditions are complied with. The CISO must report to the executive board on the drafting and implementation of cybersecurity guidelines. In parallel, qualified cybersecurity personnel should be deployed to manage the cybersecurity risks of the covered organization and to initiate or oversee the performance of core cybersecurity functions. Training and awareness measures should be taken to ensure that staff remain up to date with regard to the current cybersecurity threats and countermeasures.

4. **Transaction audit trails**
   Each covered entity must securely maintain its systems for ensuring the traceability of financial transactions. These systems must:

   a. be able to reconstruct material financial transactions in such a way as to fulfil the business and operational obligations of the entity concerned. These records must be kept for at least five years.

   b. contain audit trails which can be used to detect security incidents reasonably likely to have a significant impact on operations. These records must be kept for at least three years.

5. **Risk assessment**
   The covered entity is required to carry out a periodic risk assessment to ensure that the overall security programme remains effective. When conducting this assessment, the organization must follow the provisions outlined in the cybersecurity guidelines and measures. Current threats and control mechanisms must be taken into account when determining the security risk. The risk assessment must be documented.

6. **Third party guidelines**
   Each organization covered by the regulation is required to implement written policies and measures to ensure the security of information systems and non-public information accessible to or in the possession of its third-party service providers. These policies and measures must be based on a previously conducted risk assessment of the specific third-party service provider.

7. **Duty to report**
   Security incidents deemed reasonably likely to cause significant damage must be reported to the NYDFS within 72 hours. A written report by the CISO for the previous calendar year must be submitted annually by 15 April. The purpose of the report is to certify that the organization concerned fulfils the requirements set out in 23 NYCRR 500.

Class A companies are subject to the following stricter requirements, including:

- an independent annual audit of the covered entity's cybersecurity programmes.
- the introduction of additional security controls, such as a privileged access management solution.
- implementation of endpoint detection tools and other solutions to monitor and log potentially unauthorized activities.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REQUIREMENTS

The development of new cyber threats makes it all the more essential for all financial service providers to secure their IT systems using a uniform standard. However, this goes hand in hand with substantial organizational efforts and high costs. This can be a challenge for SMEs, in particular, as they may otherwise be threatened with sanctions.

SANCTIONS

The NYDFS has not imposed any explicit sanctions against organizations failing to comply with the regulation. Nevertheless, NYDFS inspectors have the authority to issue consent orders and impose civil penalties, or revoke licenses of financial institutions in accordance with New York banking law [151]. New York banking law authorizes the imposition of fines up to [263]:

- US $2,500 per day that the violation continues.
- US $15,000 per day in the event of negligence, reckless behaviour or if a pattern of misconduct is established.
- US $75,000 per day if a wilful or intentional violation is detected.

One of the largest fines thus far incurred amounted to US $4.5 million and was imposed on EyeMed Vision Care, LLC on 18 October 2022 for its violation of the “23 NYCRR 500” [136].

Draft of the new EU directive on product liability

BACKGROUND

The Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC is a European directive passed in 1985 by the Council of the European Communities (now the European Union) which regulates a strict liability regime for defective products. It is applicable in all Member States of the European Union, the Member States of the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and the United Kingdom [95]. However, due to the increasing digitalization of products and provision of services in the digital realm, the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Member States saw the need for a directive that better reflects the digital age to strengthen the rights of consumers [128].

IMPETUS

In the draft of the revised EU Directive on Product Liability (also known as the New Product Liability Directive) the following points will be expanded or altered [106]:

- Extension of the definition of the term "product" from the current directive to include digital production files, software, digital services and products from the field of artificial intelligence (AI) [75], [106], [128], [286].

- Under the current provisions, in certain circumstances, defectiveness or deficiency could persist in a product after it has been placed on the market or in a service after it has been used. This could be due to a range of factors, such as the updating of software under the manufacturer's sphere of influence or failing to patch cybersecurity vulnerabilities, as well as AI and machine learning (ML). In addition, the new draft bill could hold developers liable for the foreseeable future once the service has been launched or put into operation [106], [128], [130], [286].

- Extension of the current definition of "damage" to include material losses such as death, bodily injury including mental harm, damage to property, as well as loss and corruption of private data which was not being used for professional purposes (for instance, improving the security or compatibility of software) [18], [106], [128], [130], [286]. In addition, the new legislation is set to abolish the current liability threshold of €500 and the possibility for Member States to impose a financial ceiling of €70 million [128].]. This means that in future, claims can be made for unlimited amounts of damage [155].

- One aim is to alleviate the burden of proof, due to the increasing complexity of products. According to the draft, plaintiffs are merely required to provide plausible evidence that a product has caused damage to occur, while manufacturers are obliged to disclose information about their products relevant to the case, which could constitute evidence [106], [128], [130], [155], [286].

- The new directive plans to make several defences or exemptions from liability available to manufacturers. These apply if the manufacturer did not bring the product to market, the defect did not exist at the time the product was placed on the market or the state of technical knowledge at the time of placing the product on the market made it impossible to discover the defect [18], [106], [128].

- The directive will not apply to freeware, free software and open-source software (OSS), unless it has been developed or made available for commercial use. With this exemption, the EU aims to avoid preventing continued innovation with the software in question [18], [128].

OBJECTIVES

Consumers and manufacturers alike stand to benefit from the revision to update the current Product Liability Directive, through a clearer definition of defects included in the new, expanded definition of the product – simultaneously improving consumer protection and competitiveness within the EU [106], [128], [130], [286].

TIME FRAME

- Evaluation of the directive: August 2017 [106]
- Adding an expert group focusing on liability and new technologies: September 2018 [106]
- Impact assessment study: 2020 [106]
- Public consultation: Q3 2021 [106]
- Workshops with stakeholders: Q4 2021 [106]
- Submission of the new directive proposal: 28/09/2022 [75], [286]
- Unanimous approval of the draft is expected in 2024/25 [128], [286].

PARTIES ADDRESSED

As previously, the draft of the New Product Liability Directive addresses the stakeholders defined under the term “manufacturer”, which includes importers of products into the EU as well as quasi-manufacturers – i.e. companies which affix their logo or brand to their product and those with stake in the product [75], [95], [128]. With this extension, stakeholders who make significant alterations to the product also become parties with primary liability. Importers and companies refining, enhancing or finishing products for the market are thus also made liable for product defects. This extension additionally strives to make manufacturers from the EU liable [75], [128].

REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTIES ADDRESSED

Companies selling or distributing products in the EU need to ensure they are prepared for the new legal requirements and that their products meet the standards outlined under the new directive. This may require adjustments to production processes, quality management and liability guidelines [106], [128], [130], [155], [286].

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REQUIREMENTS

The required revision of the existing Product Liability Directive will potentially lead to micro and small enterprises having to bear greater damages than more established or larger companies, perhaps even threatening their existence. For this reason, the requirements are being reviewed to determine whether micro and small enterprises could be excluded in the new draft or made subject to more limited liability [18], [106].

SANCTIONS

In the new directive, the threshold for damage to property and the limitation of liability have been removed, meaning that manufacturers may be sued for unlimited damages [128].

SEC issues new provisions regarding the disclosure of cyber incidents

BACKGROUND

The exponential proliferation of cyber threats prompted the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to expand the Security Exchange Act of 1934 in 2011 and 2018 [74], [273]. The SEC introduced a more restrictive cybersecurity disclosure regime, which emphasizes the need to constantly adapt to the threat landscape to increase transparency and safeguard investors in listed companies against cyber risks [74], [273].

IMPETUS

In an update to the SEC's final rule on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and the disclosure of incidents, issued on 26 July 2023, the following points have been expanded or altered [73]:

- The scope of the initial disclosure of incidents has been narrowed – material cybersecurity incidents must be disclosed within four business days of detection using the revised Form 8-K [73], [74].
- Provision for a limited delay was added for situations where disclosure may pose a significant risk to national security [73], [74].
- Item 106(b)(1) of the revised Form 10-K, requires a company to disclose its cyber risk management and strategy processes annually to the regulator, including the following information, so that investors can develop a general understanding of the measures taken [73], [74]:
  - whether and how the described cybersecurity processes have been integrated into the overall risk management system or processes of the company [73], [74];
  - whether the company engages assessors, consultants, auditors or other third parties in connection with such processes;
  - whether the company has processes in place to oversee and identify material cyber threats associated with third-party providers [73], [74], [226].
- Item 106(c)(1) of the revised Form 10-K requires a company to disclose to the regulator the cybersecurity risks the executive board is exposed to. These include:
  - an overview of the cybersecurity threats under the executive board's supervision;
  - an overview of all board-level committees, or sub-committees, responsible for overseeing cybersecurity threats;
  - a description of the processes and procedures by which the executive board and responsible committees are informed about cybersecurity threats [73], [74], [226].
- Item 106(c)(2) of the revised Form 10-K requires a company to disclose how management assesses and responds to material risks arising from cybersecurity threats, including:
  - whether and which management positions or committees are responsible for assessing and responding to these risks (and their relevant experience);
  - the processes by which these individuals or committees monitor cybersecurity incidents;
  - whether and how management reports cybersecurity information to the executive board, committee or sub-committee of the executive board [73], [74], [226].

OBJECTIVES

With these new disclosure requirements, which take factors such as cyber risk management, strategy, governance and incident management into account, the SEC makes it mandatory for companies to provide investors with up-to-date, consistent information about the company's cyber threat posture.

TIME FRAME

- Proposal of the SEC Cyber Security Rules: February 2022 [74]
- SEC Final Rule (Publication): 26 July 2023 [273]
- SEC Final Rule, effective date: 15 September 2023 [74]
- Form 10-K, Directive S-K, effective: Beginning with annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after 15 December 2023 [74]
- Form 8-K, mandatory disclosure: 18 December 2023 [74]
- Form 8-K, mandatory disclosure for smaller companies: 15 June 2024 [74]

PARTIES ADDRESSED

The SEC's updated disclosure rule applies to all domestic and foreign companies (participants or registrants, in SEC terminology) under the SEC's supervision [273].

REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTIES ADDRESSED

Companies under the supervision of the SEC are required to disclose cybersecurity incidents promptly once this rule comes into force [74], [226].

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REQUIREMENTS

The new requirements for the disclosure of cybersecurity incidents will presumably have a severe impact on companies in certain cases. Among other developments, the following impacts are projected:

- an increase in compliance costs to fulfil the additional requirements;
- a higher frequency of official SEC inspections;
- a higher risk of reputational damage, which in turn could severely harm listed companies – in particular financially;
- greater investor focus towards cybersecurity, which may also lead to shareholder activism and demands that companies should improve their cybersecurity practices [8].

SANCTIONS

It is generally assumed that the updated regulation will have a significant personal and legal impact on board members and executive management. In addition, untimely or incomplete disclosure may also provoke conflict between interest groups, potentially leading to a securities class action [278]. The SUNBURST incident at SolarWinds gives an indication of the SEC's stricter approach to cybersecurity incidents. In addition to the company itself, former CISO Timothy G. Brown was held personally liable, even though the incident had occurred three years before the current regulation came into force [274].

Appendix

Schwarz Group companies at a glance

Over	Over	Active in over	Around	
575	**13,900**	**30**	**7.2**	**€167.2**
thousand employees worldwide	stores	countries	billion regular store customers at Lidl and Kaufland	billion in sales in the fiscal year 2023

Schwarz Group companies in profile

With over 575,000 employees in 32 different countries, the Schwarz Group is one of the world's leading retail groups. Based in Neckarsulm, in the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, the Group's two retail divisions Lidl and Kaufland represent the pillars of the corporation's food retail business. Schwarz Produktion is the group's food production division, while PreZero provides environmental services. This makes the Schwarz Group one of only a few retail groups to cover the entire value cycle – from production and retail to waste disposal and recycling. The Group's IT and digital division, Schwarz Digits, offers compelling products and services which comply with Germany's strict data protection standards. All Schwarz Group companies receive support from various service providers both locally and abroad. Alongside the provision of administrative services, this also includes services such as the procurement of non-retail goods and vehicle fleet management.



Diversity is our strength

Retail

The country organizations belonging to the Lidl Group are food retailers in the discount sector. As a leading discounter, Lidl currently operates over 12,340 stores in 31 countries and more than 220 goods distribution and logistics centres. In total, Lidl has over 374,000 employees. Lidl also employs staff in Asia. The Lidl product assortment comprises an average of 4,300 items. In the financial year 2023, Lidl generated turnover of €125.5 billion.

Acting responsibly for a better future

Acting responsibly is how Lidl reaffirms its commitment to quality each and every day, thereby ensuring the best possible future for the company. Lidl has developed six strategic focus areas within which to put this insight into practice: "Protecting the climate", "Conserving resources", "Respecting biodiversity", "Acting fairly", "Promoting health" and "Engaging in dialogue".

The country organizations comprising the Kaufland Group are large-scale food retailers – with over 1,500 hypermarkets and around 155,000 employees in eight European countries. Offering, on average, 30,000 items in German and 17,000 in other countries, Kaufland stocks a wide assortment of food and everyday products. Kaufland also has five meat processing plants, which produce the meat and sausage products for its stores. In the financial year 2021, the range of available products was expanded with the launch of the Kaufland.de online marketplace. In the financial year 2023, Kaufland generated turnover of €34.2 billion.

Commitment to greater sustainability

Kaufland strives to promote sustainability within the product assortment and advocates responsible production conditions and ethical conditions for the keeping of animals. The company is also committed to comprehensive environmental, climate and biodiversity protection.



Schwarz Group company locations worldwide

Waste disposal and recycling

The PreZero Group is an international environmental services provider. With around 30,000 employees across approximately 460 locations in eleven countries, PreZero handles the disposal of waste and the sorting, processing and recycling of reusable materials. The closed-loop recycling concept plays a key role at PreZero. For example, in addition to its operational waste management and recycling activities, PreZero is also active in the field of packaging consulting and licensing (PreZero Dual). The portfolio is supplemented by the internal service provider GreenCycle, which is among other things responsible for the management of recyclable materials for the Schwarz Group companies. In addition, the portfolio includes OutNature's sustainable fibre and paper products, sustainable packaging and PreTurn's logistics solutions. In the financial year 2023, PreZero generated turnover of €3.7 billion.

New ways of thinking for a cleaner tomorrow

PreZero is committed to a clean future – in which an efficient, fully closed recycling loop protects our environment. Our company aspires to conserve resources and reduce the amount of waste that cannot be recycled.

Production

In the financial year 2023, companies belonging to Schwarz Produktion, with a total of around 5,500 employees at 23 facilities, produced high-quality food products as well as sustainable packaging and materials for Schwarz's retail divisions Lidl and Kaufland. Beverages, chocolate, ice cream, baked goods, nuts and dried fruit, coffee and pasta products were produced in 16 factories. A paper production facility has been in operation since March 2023. Schwarz Produktion also operates plastic and recycling plants. These plants are core parts of a unique and sustainable PET recycling loop.

Delivering today, thinking of tomorrow

The commitment of Schwarz Produktion's companies stems from our conviction that sustainable management and business success go hand in hand.

Corporate services

All companies in the Schwarz Group are supported by Schwarz Dienstleistungen. Corporate services include administrative functions (e.g., controlling, finance, HR) and operational services (e.g., procurement and real estate). This approach enables us to pool strengths, exploit synergies and act efficiently and sustainably.

Living out our global responsibility with diversity

As an international group of companies, the Schwarz Group has the ability to influence society and the environment in numerous areas. Hardly any other corporate group is as diverse as we are, because our companies cover the entire value cycle. We take the resulting responsibility very seriously and work to align all our actions with our vision of a sustainable future, which is based on the four focus areas of "People", "Product quality", "Circular systems" and "Ecosystems".

Digital transformation

Digital transformation is a crucial factor for the success of the companies in the Schwarz Group. Digitalization and IT topics have been bundled and driven forward at Schwarz Digits, an independent division of the Schwarz Group, since the financial year 2023. Schwarz Digits guarantees the highest degree of digital sovereignty, provides the IT infrastructure and solutions for the extensive ecosystem of companies in the Schwarz Group and develops this further to ensure that it remains future proof. Schwarz Digits creates optimal conditions for the development of trend-setting innovations for end customers, companies and public sector organizations. At Schwarz Digits, 7,500 employees comprise the workforces at the Schwarz IT, Schwarz Digital, STACKIT, XM Cyber, Kaufland e-commerce, Lidl e-commerce, Schwarz Media and mmmake brands.

An important aspect is our comprehensive omnichannel strategy. This enables the retail divisions Lidl and Kaufland to effectively link their in-store businesses to the online world. The Lidl online shop, Kaufland online marketplace and the Lidl Plus and K-Card loyalty programmes are key components in this strategy. On the online marketplace Kaufland.de, more than 10,000 sellers offer over 45 million products. In 2023, Kaufland opened additional online marketplaces in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Further online marketplaces are set to be launched in Austria and Poland in 2024. Lidl online stores are already available in eight countries – Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Spain. As a consequence, our retail divisions are already very well positioned in terms of their online business, thereby creating the basis for highly promising synergies between in-store and online retail. Schwarz Group companies generated total online turnover of €1.7 billion.

To position themselves for the future, the companies in the Schwarz Group are developing new trends and business areas in a digital world, with a particular focus on the cloud as the underlying technology. With STACKIT, we have also been offering our cloud and colocation services to customers from outside the Schwarz Group since March 2022.

The scope of services provided by the STACKIT Cloud is aligned with the specific needs of customers and can be tailored to meet their requirements. It can be implemented easily in any organization, from those without existing digital solutions to those with established IT landscapes which are isolated and segmented. In this way, the STACKIT Cloud services facilitate individualized, direct access to the cloud.

The portfolio is continually developed further, in part to align with the relevant market-specific requirements. This also makes STACKIT an attractive solution for new user groups. A great deal of importance is placed on data security and protection. The Schwarz Digits data centres in Germany and Austria are consequently fully compliant with European law and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

At the end of 2021, in a move to protect the entire IT landscape against attacks, including the cloud, Schwarz IT acquired XM Cyber, an innovative Israeli cybersecurity company. As this security solution is successfully protecting our systems, it is also offered externally. A leading provider of hybrid cloud security solutions, XM Cyber develops new approaches for minimizing cyber risks within companies. The XM Cyber solution reveals exposures, i.e. how attackers may be able to exploit misconfigurations, stolen login details, and other vulnerabilities which allow adversaries to gain access to critical resources and systems, in cloud, on-prem and hybrid environments. XM Cyber displays these attack vectors 24/7, by priority and in real-time, and shows how they can be blocked. A host of international organizations leverage this solution to optimize their risk management practices.

Values-based corporate management

Society, economy and the retail sector are facing far-reaching changes. The companies in the Schwarz Group have the opportunity and responsibility to shape the transformation that is currently taking place to ensure sustainability, while keeping the global challenges firmly in view. Our day-to-day work often brings us into contact with the most pressing issues of our time. When it comes to tackling climate change, resource scarcity and human rights violations, solidarity is key. Only by working together, across all companies and levels – from employees to top management – can we succeed in achieving long-term, effective change, and thereby contribute to sustainable development.

Trustful cooperation is based on listening to other opinions, sharing ideas and experiences, and striving to find the best solution. That is why maintaining a real dialogue with stakeholders is an essential part of the Schwarz Group's values-based corporate management strategy. Our sustainable conduct is shaped by shared principles and values. Only by doing the right thing out of real conviction will one be perceived as a fair partner. As a consequence, we sincerely believe that it is essential for the management to act in a transparent manner. Companies belonging to the Schwarz Group have a social responsibility to act with integrity and to actively combat corruption and unfair business practices. We involve our stakeholders in control and complaint mechanisms to ensure compliance with legal frameworks and internal policies. For the Schwarz Group, responsible business practices also encompass the digital transformation of business processes and compliance with data privacy and protection requirements. Fair, longstanding business relationships, collaborations in countries where production takes place, and the funding of infrastructure projects also form part of our social commitment.

Definitions & Abbreviations

Glossary of definitions

Access-as-a-Service	By way of Access-as-a-Service, cybercriminals offer paying customers access to compromised systems. This is done through selling stolen identity and login details as well as ready-to-use initial access to the target systems – for instance, controlled via C2. Buyers can thus gain access with hardly any technical effort or know-how.
Affiliates and affiliate programmes	Affiliates are cybercriminals who make use of CaaS, while paying CaaS providers a fee in return.
Backdoor	A backdoor provides secret, unauthorized access to a target environment or system.
Big game hunting	Big game hunting describes efforts specifically focused on blackmailing high-revenue companies.
Bot/Botnet	A bot is a remotely controllable malware installation on a host system. The term "botnet" refers to a network of bots that can be controlled remotely via C2 channels. The compromised systems can be instructed to download additional malicious payloads or send stolen data back to the attacker.
Brute force attack	A brute force attack is an approach in which an assailant uses automated software or scripts to systematically guess passwords.
Bug bounty programmes	A bug bounty is a monetary reward offered for the detection of vulnerabilities. Conventionally, software manufacturers establish bug bounty programmes to motivate security researchers to search for vulnerabilities in their software.
Business email compromise	Business email compromise is a scam in which companies and organizations are targeted through the use of social engineering techniques. Acting under false pretences, the attacker attempts to trick an employee or manager into carrying out an activity which causes harm to the company (e.g., transferring money or disclosing login details).
Command and control (C2)	Command and control (C2) describes a client/server infrastructure or any number of techniques an attacker can employ to communicate with and control compromised computer systems which have been integrated into a botnet, for example. C2 generally consists of surreptitious communication channels between target systems and platforms controlled by attackers.
Cybercrime-as-a-Service	Cybercrime-as-a-Service (CaaS) is a construct in which criminals commit crimes on a contract basis, usually in return for financial compensation, and are provided with the tools to carry out these offences.
Cyber resilience	Cyber resilience describes the ability to defend oneself against cyberattacks. Should an attack nevertheless succeed, cyber resilience characterizes the way in which a company is able to recover from it. Good cyber resilience comprises technical and organizational measures such as regular security updates, backups and user training.
(Distributed) Denial-of-Service attack (DDoS)	A Denial-of-Service attack (DoS attack) takes aim at the availability of services, systems or networks in order to disrupt or sabotage them. If such an attack is carried out by several systems in parallel, it is referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).
Double extortion/Triple extortion	Following a successful ransomware attack, a double extortion approach involves cybercriminals typically threatening to release stolen data to the public in addition to encrypting it. If an additional threat is brought into play, such as a DDoS attack, this is referred to as triple extortion.
Malware/ Malicious code	Malware or malicious code is software, or a snippet of it, which has specifically been developed to execute undesired, harmful functions on a system.

Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)/ Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM)	Man-in-the-middle (MitM), also known as adversary-in-the-middle (AitM), is a technique in which attackers manage to position themselves between a victim and a legitimate service. This mechanism can also be used to overcome authentication measures such as MFA.
Multi-factor authentication (MFA)	In multi-factor authentication (MFA), the identity of a user accessing a system is confirmed by way of multiple authentication factors from a variety of categories (verification of biometric features, knowledge query or proof of ownership).
Patch/Patch management	Software manufacturers issue patches to fix any security gaps or vulnerabilities in systems, and to integrate improvements. Patch management comprises the processes and procedures which ensure that patches can be managed, rolled out and integrated more efficiently.
Phishing	Phishing is derived from "password fishing". Using fake websites, emails or other messages, cybercriminals carry out phishing campaigns as a way of obtaining the personal data of their potential victims or to trick them into performing harmful actions.
Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS)	With Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS), tools or other offerings relating to phishing are made available as a service. PhaaS is a sub-category of CaaS.
Ransomware	Ransomware is a type of malware which encrypts files on systems. Attackers use it to extort ransom money. In return, they promise to hand over the decryption key.
Ransomware-as-a-Service	Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) involves making ransomware or other offers relating to ransomware attacks available as a service. RaaS is a sub-category of CaaS.
Sinkhole	A sinkhole is a computer system to which requests from botnets can be redirected. Sinkholes are commonly used in security research to detect botnet infections.
Social engineering	Social engineering is an approach used by cybercriminals to exploit perceived human weaknesses such as fear, curiosity or blind obedience to deceive their victims into disclosing sensitive information, bypassing protective measures or installing malware.
SQL injection	SQL injection is an attack in which malicious database queries are typically entered through a web application and executed in the underlying database. This allows attackers to tamper with the database or gain unauthorized access to data.
Supply chain attack	A supply chain attack occurs when a cybercriminal penetrates a software provider's network and compromises the software by introducing malicious code. This manipulated software is then able to further compromise the systems or data of customers or partners.
Token forgery	Token forgery is the fraudulent creation or manipulation of authentication tokens. Using this tactic, adversaries replicate the appearance, characteristics or authorizations of legitimate tokens to deceive authentication systems and gain access to protected areas.
Webshell	Webshells can be used as malware on web servers, where they can provide criminals with remote access, access to data and commands or the ability to execute scripts, among other things.

Wiper attack	A wiper is a type of malware which encrypts, damages or deletes data on a target system. In contrast to ransomware, a wiper is technically not equipped to decrypt the data again, for example to extort a ransom. The sole purpose of a wiper attack is sabotage.
Zero-day vulnerability / Zero-day exploit	Vulnerabilities in a system or software can be exploited by attackers. An exploit is the lever, for instance a code fragment, which enables adversaries to technically exploit the vulnerability. Zero-day exploits are a special class of vulnerability, because neither the manufacturer nor the operator of the system or software is aware of their existence.

List of abbreviations

AaaS	Access-as-a-Service
AGI	Artificial General Intelligence
AI	Artificial Intelligence
AI Act	Artificial Intelligence Act of the European Union
AitM	Adversary-in-the-Middle
API	Application Programming Interface
APT	Advanced Persistent Threat
ASIC	Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
BEC	Business Email Compromise
BGH	Big Game Hunting
BKA	German Federal Criminal Police Office
BMI	German Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community
bn	billion
BQP	Bounded-Error Quantum Polynomial Time
BSI	German Federal Office for Information Security
BSIG	Act on the (German) Federal Office for Information Security
C2	Command and Control
CaaS	Cybercrime-as-a-Service
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
ChatGPT	Chat Generative Pre-Trained Transformer
CGC	Cyber Grand Challenge
CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
CISO	Chief Information Security Officer
CIX	Commercial Internet eXchange
COREPER	Comité des représentants permanents
COVID	Coronavirus Disease
CRA	EU Cyber Resilience Act
CSF	Cybersecurity Framework of the NIST
CSIRT	Computer Security Incident Response Team
CTEM	Continuous Threat Exposure Management
CVE	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DECREE	DARPA Experimental Cyber Research Evaluation Environment
DEP	Digital Europe Programme
DevOps	Integrated software development and IT operations
DevSecOps	Integrated software development, security and IT operations
DLP	Data Leakage Prevention
DNN	Deep Neural Network
ECCC	European Cybersecurity Competence Centre
ECCG	European Cybersecurity Certification Group
ENISA	European Network and Information Security Agency
EU	European Union

EU CyCLONe	European Cyber Crises Liaison Organisation Network
EUR	Euro (currency)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FS-ISAC	Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Centre
FTE	Full Time Equivalent
FTQC	Fault-Tolerant Quantum Computing
GenAI	Generative AI
GB	Gigabyte
GPDP	Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, Italian Data Protection Authority
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
GPU	Graphics Processing Unit
GRU	Russian foreign military intelligence agency
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IAM	Identity and Access Management
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
INCD	Israel National Cyber Directorate
I/O	Input/Output
IoT	Internet of Things
IP	Internet Protocol
IPS	Intrusion Prevention System
IR	Incident Response
IS	Information Security
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IT	Information Technology
IT-SiG	German IT Security Act
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
KRITIS	Critical Infrastructure(s)
KritisV	Critical Infrastructure Ordinance
LLM	Large Language Model
m	Million
Malware	Malicious software and code
MFA	Multi-factor Authentication
MFT	Managed File Transfer
MitM	Man-in-the-Middle
ML	Machine Learning
MOAB	Mother-of-all-Breaches
MSP	Managed Service Provider
NAND	Not And, logic gate in circuits
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NFT	Non-Fungible Token
NIS	Network and Information Security Directive
NIS2UmSuCG	NIS2 Implementation and Cybersecurity Strengthening Act
NISQ	Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NRW	North Rhine-Westphalia
NSA	National Security Agency
NYCRR	New York Codes, Rules and Regulations
NYDFS	New York State Department of Financial Services
OpenSSH	Open Secure Shell
OT	Operational Technology
OWiG	Act on Regulatory Offences
PhaaS	Phishing-as-a-Service
Phishing	Password phishing
PQC	Post-Quantum Cryptography
QC	Quantum Computing
QKD	Quantum Key Distribution
QML	Quantum Machine Learning
Qubit	Quantum bit
QV	Quantum Volume
RaaS	Ransomware-as-a-Service
RDoS	Ransom Denial of Service
ROSI	Return on Security Investment
RTSP	Real-Time Streaming Protocol
SaaS	Software-as-a-Service
SCSR23	Schwarz Cybersecurity Report 2023
SecOps	Security Operations
SEO	Search Engine Optimization
SIEM	Security Information and Event Management
SIKE	Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation

SFTP	Secure File Transfer Protocol
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
Smishing	SMS phishing
SOAR	Security Orchestration, Automation and Response
SOC	Security Operations Centre
SQL	Structured Query Language
StGB	German Criminal Code
SW	Software
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UBI	Companies in the special public interest (BSI Act)
US$	US dollar
Vishing	Voice phishing
VoIP	Voice over IP
VPN	Virtual Private Network
WinSCP	Windows Secure Copy

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CYBER THREATS TIMELINE

2010 2013

State-sponsored hacker group

Criminal hacker group

Hacktivists

Global damage caused by cyberattacks (estimated) [1]

The cases presented here are only a selection and by no means complete.

Former NSA employee Edward Snowden leaks documents to journalists. They expose the global surveillance programmes run by the secret services of the USA and UK, leading to a public **debate about the limits of state surveillance.**

Edward Snowden leaks

Yahoo! Data theft

Stuxnet worm

FIN7

DOUBLE DRAGON

LAZARUS GROUP SINCE 2009

Target data theft

COZY BEAR SINCE 2008

ANONYMOUS SINCE 2003

Operation Payback

EQUATION GROUP SINCE 2001

CULT OF THE DEAD COW SINCE 1984

2010 2013



1) Source: Statista; "Estimated cost of cybercrime worldwide" from 2016-2028; Accessed on 09/2023

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